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Abstract
Title of Dissertation : Contemporary issues on the domestic Ro-ro passenger
ferry operation in developing country: Identification of
safety issues in domestic ferry operation based on the ferry
involved accident investigation report in Indonesian water
year 2003 - 2013
Degree

: MSc

The dissertation is a study to present recent overview to the safety issues in the
domestic ferry operation in developing country. This was done by taking example
Indonesian domestic ferry operation.
The ferry operation considered as the most successful maritime operation in sense of
its transporting people, vehicle and goods. In developing countries, ferry is not just a
transportation tools but it also use to maintain national integrity by providing access
to remote islands or isolated by water location. However, accident to ferry in typical
developing country more likely resulted in a catastrophic consequence of losing life
and damaged to the property. Investigation into the accident had been done to reveal
the causal root and present the outcome to the related stakeholders. The main idea of
the dissertation is to review 16 ferry involved investigation report issued in 20032013 with appropriate accident causation model and determine which factors were
missing and contribute to the development of accident from cultivation of risk to the
greater consequences. The review mainly focused on the three different type of
accident namely fire, collision and capsize.
The utilisation of state of the art, SEMOMAP model to the selected cases has
presented detail outcome and useful information on the issues in the domestic ferry
operation. Each of type of accident has shown various and interdependent factor that
describe how the accident developed from contributory factor to the evacuation
process. The model also made possible to review how human and equipment interact
during the critical stage and later the model also identify the miss, lack and gaps
within the process of accident.
Further analysis and extensive discussion to the outcome of the model conducted to
properly presents the outcome of the models. Relatively not surprisingly that the
outcome of the SEMOMAP model showing the human failure contribution to the
overall mishaps and significantly contribute to the overall accident process. Certainly
that the accident causation models utilised and developed under the dissertation are
immature system, some areas also requires further development in order to achieve
better utilisation and handier outcome.
Within the concluding chapter, the trend of safety issues in domestic ferry operation
revealed and relevant recommendation are developed so it could be a reference for
safety improvement in Domestic ferry operation.
KEYWORDS: Domestic RoPax Ferry, Safety issues, accident causation model,
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1.1

Introduction

Background

Ro-ro ferries are considered the most successful maritime operation in the world
from the perspective of service reliability, capacity carried and flexibility in
operation (IMO, 2014). Ferry transport has been considered by stakeholders as a
more affordable, timely service and reliable transport mode to transport passengers
and goods between islands. Its capability to provide cost effectiveness and support
other transport modes‘ operational efficiency has also led to the use of ferry transport
to connect islands and create shortcuts to reduce distance and operation time.
Ferry operation has been utilised worldwide. For developed countries, ferries are
considered as the safest form of transportation. Their safety record shows significant
achievement. For developing countries, domestic ferries have been a major backbone
for national economic activities. The common ferry type used in the developing
world is the RoPax ferry. That is the typical ferry that provides space to carry
passengers, vehicles and cargo at the same time.
In further detail, for archipelagic countries, domestic ferries play a significant role in
the timely transhipment of large numbers of passengers. They also connect islands to
provide access to commercial activity which, in the wider perspective, maintains
national integrity.
The development of technology utilised in RoPax ferry operation allows the ships to
operate as connecting bridges. RoPax Ferries are still considered as the most
affordable transport means compared to actual bridges themselves. Therefore, their
service needs to be fast, reliable, structurally robust and intact, and punctual in
operation, while at the same time, providing a sufficient level of safety.
Despite its success story, ferry operation also contains a significant degree of
operational risk. Due to the nature of operation, ferry disaster cases have the potential
to result in catastrophic consequences. The cases of the Herald of Free Enterprise
(UK, 1989), Estonia (Baltic Sea, 1992), Dona Paz (Philippine 1985), Al Salam
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Boccaccio (Red sea, 2001), and Princess Ashika (Tonga, 2009) have raised public
concern about the safety level of domestic ferry operation in developing countries.
The international maritime community has also expressed its concern following
continuous accidents involving domestic ferries despite the fact that improvements
have been introduced to every aspect of their operation. In 2006, the International
Maritime Organisation (IMO) along with the international ferry operators‘
community known as Interferry established a pilot project program to provide
technical assistance to improve safety in developing countries‘ domestic ferry
operations. The project took place in Bangladesh, which has been known for its
disastrous ferry accidents.
Significant findings following investigations into ferry-involved cases have been
provided to all ferry operation stakeholders. This was done to raise awareness of
safety issues and as a reference to develop and improve the level of safety in
shipboard operation. However, disastrous accidents continued to occur, as evidenced
by the Sewol case in South Korea in early 2014. Obviously, despite improvements to
safety following easy access to technological development, public interest and
human involvement, there is always room for error that could lead a ferry operation
to a catastrophic accident. In other words, there are factors that latently contribute but
are ignored and later accumulate into a single catastrophic accident.
As an archipelagic country, Indonesia understands well the importance of maritime
transport to support every aspect of the Nation‘s development. For Indonesia,
domestic RoPax ferries play a significant role in maintaining the nations‘ integrity.
The current system has been developed to connect its major islands and works as a
transport hub for other transport modes. In the general perspective, domestic ferries
connect islands and provide opportunities for regional development, hence
supporting the national equality development program. In a more specific view, the
transport system supports logistic distribution, and access to equalise economic
development by providing low cost transport across the nation.
Since the ferry transport system was introduced, there have been fluctuations in its
safety level as indicated by a number of incidents and mishaps. Accidents related to
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domestic ferry operation continue to occur. DGST data from 2003 to2013 indicates
that nearly every year one or more ferry accidents occur with the consequence of a
high number of fatalities, missing persons and serious injuries.
Systemic investigations into the related accidents have been conducted to determine
contributing factors and reports have also been published to increase public and
stakeholder awareness of the safety of domestic RoPax ferry operation. Investigation
reports were made public with the objective of presenting the main factors causing
the accidents. However, some of the reports did not sufficiently provide details on
the factors that contributed directly and indirectly to the accidents. Some missing
important information could be useful to present the facts pertaining to the current
issues of ferry operation. To some extent, investigation reports themselves are
considered insufficient to analyse and properly identify the factors contributing to
accident/incidents. Therefore, additional analysis by adopting a sufficient accident
causation model could enhance the outcome of the investigation and provide
feedback to the investigation process itself (Wiegmann & Shappel, 2001).
It is necessary to identify and understand how the accidents developed starting from
small operational and management issues that occurred in the past and contributed to
the development of risk that resulted in the accident itself. The aspect of emergency
response from both shipboard and shore based activities also plays an important role
in determining whether the consequences of the incident could have been mitigated
or whether the response resulted in greater loss.
To sum up, concerning the significant role of the domestic ferry in every aspect of
the country‘s development, there should be greater awareness to improve the level of
safety of its operation. However, there are still issues that might not be properly
identified and result in the continuation of tragic accidents involving Indonesian
domestic ferries. A thorough analysis of the previous mishaps in RoPax ferry
operation by utilising proper assessment tools is deemed necessary. Following this
reason, the writer has been motivated to conduct this study
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1.2

Objectives

Following the background information mentioned above, the dissertation attempts to
identify the current safety issues involved in the operation of domestic ro-ro
passenger ferries in the Indonesian domestic ferry operation system. As a more
specific goal, the dissertation provides related information with regard to safety
issues involved in domestic ferry operation including, but not limited to, the
following topics.


To identify critical safety factors existing in domestic ferry accidents by
developing and utilising an accident analysis model.



To analyse the main safety issues that contribute to domestic ferry accidents



To identify the adequacy and comprehensiveness of accident investigation
reports to provide a reference for related parties to improve the investigation
system in the future.



To propose recommendations for related stakeholders to improve the safety of
domestic ferry operation in Indonesia, and possibly internationally.

1.3

Scope of works and methodology

The dissertation does not attempt to present all related information on Indonesian
domestic ferry operation issues. In order to sufficiently achieve the objectives stated
above, the dissertation only focuses on analysing accidents involving domestic
ferries operating in Indonesian waters, based on 16 RoPax ferry related accident
investigation reports issued by the National Transportation Safety Committee
(NTSC) during the period 2003 – 2013.
In addition, the dissertation covers the following:


A literature review on domestic ropax ferry operation systems from a
regulatory perspective to support domestic ferry operation, which will be cross
referenced with relevant international resolutions, regional agreements,
accident development processes, and concepts of safety analysis
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An exploration and review of accident causation models by utilising them in
different cases



An Identification and analysis of safety issues by utilising the SEMOMAP
model on the selected investigation reports.

1.4

Structure and organisation

In order to accomplish the main goals of the dissertation, the structure has been
arranged in the following order
Chapter I presents the background and main objective of the dissertation by briefly
describing its general concept and methodology.
Chapter II is mainly focused on the literature review to present the general aspects of
the domestic ferry operation system. It covers the rules and regulations for domestic
ferry operation, the technology involved, and the operational pattern utilised.
Chapter III provides brief information on the current domestic Ro-ro ferry operation
in Indonesia focusing on the development of policy, fleet status, transport
productivity, operation pattern and recognised operational issues.
Chapter IV presents general concepts to identify safety issues in maritime transport.
This covers the concept of accident development, discussion of the tools used to
analyse accidents and introduction to the SEMOMAP as the main model used to
analyse the safety issues in domestic ferry operation. The chapter discusses briefly
the idea of accident analysis from the perspective of both a formal investigation
method and an accident causation model. In addition, the chapter introduces the
features of the SEMOMAP model by explaining its general concept and
development, its operational workflow and terminology used in the model.
Chapter V provides an overview of the accident cases that are used in the model. The
chapter also discusses and summarises the outcome of the SEMOMAP model to the
cases used and analyses the outcome to determine the factors related to the operation
of Indonesian Domestic RoPax ferries.
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Chapter VI discuss and analyse the SEMOMAP outcome and provide comparison
with other similar analysis results published by other institutions. Lastly, comments
on the issues and improvements regarding utilisation of the model are presented.
Chapter VII presents a conclusion to the information and, based on the analysis of
the issues involved in domestic RoPax ferry operation, recommendations are
proposed.
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2

Domestic Ferry Operation System

The chapter presents general information on the nature of ferry transport from the
perspective of technology, operation, regulation development and common issues
that take place in the operation of domestic RoPax ferries.

2.1

Past and present domestic ferry operation development

Recently, speed, reliability, safety, efficiency and environmental sustainability have
been the major factors demanded by transport users. Considering the aforementioned
requirements, ferry transport is the best solution since Ferry transport is able to
provide shortcuts in terms of time and distance, as well as being flexible in operation
and affordable.
Globally, there were about 1,162 units ferry ships with size more than 1000 GT, with
a total capacity of 1.15 million passengers and car capacity of 226,210 or equal to
769,210 lane metres of commercial vehicles. Combined gross tonnage was 12.8
million and the average age of the fleet was 21 years. According to ShipPax data, in
2009, more than 2 billion passengers, 251 million cars, 32 million trailers were
carried by ferries globally. Interferry database records show there were 1300 ferry
ships above 1000 GRT operating globally (Interferry, 2014).
Ferry operation can be traced back historically by observing its service in ancient
times. The first modernised ferry was built in 1849 when the Leviathan provided a
connection for the railway line from Dundee to Aberdeen, UK (Marshall, 1989). The
main reason for the development of the new transport system was that existing bridge
technology was incapable of supporting rail traffic in the region. In addition, during
its early application, the ferry system was renowned for providing short distance
transport from port to port. It also opened access to movement and ease of commerce
activity where centres were divided by waters. Later, following increased demand for
higher capacity transport, the ferry system was also considered as support for other
modes of transportation such as railways and land transport.
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During World War II, typical ferry operations of landing ship tank (LST) were used
to support the transhipment of troops, military vehicles and trains across European
countries, the Mediterranean region, Greek islands and English Channel. During that
time, ferry transport played a significant role as it was flexible and required no
additional infrastructure such as port facilities or complex berthing operations. After
the World War, the ferry transport system developed to continuously support and
even accelerate the overall transport process, commercial activity and logistics
supply.
In Europe, Ro-ros have also proved extremely popular in association with pleasure
activities and for private car owners and have significantly contributed to the growth
of tourism. Until the early 1950s someone wishing to take a car from one country to
another by sea had to get it loaded into a ship's hold by crane, a time-consuming and
expensive process. The development of the ro-ro car ferry changed all of that and
many ports boomed as a result.
Today the world ro-ro fleet can be subdivided into a number of different types. They
include ships designed to carry freight vehicles only, and those designed to carry a
combination of containers and freight vehicles and to transport cars without
passengers. There are various other types and freight-only Ro-ro ships form about
two thirds of the world ro-ro fleet at present.
The term ―domestic ferry‖ is strongly related to the type of operation and legal
jurisdiction that applies to the ship. More specifically, for instance, under the
Canadian system, the term ―domestic ferry‖ defines a vessel that is entitled to fly the
Canadian flag, carries passengers on a regular schedule and operates on a route set
out in a schedule. Since the ship is operated within the State‘s jurisdiction, local legal
regulations apply to all aspects of its operation such as structure, registration,
manning, operating route and other relevant regulations.
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2.2

Technology, safety and operational patterns involved in Domestic Ferry
operation

There are various types of ferries. According to the guidelines for ferry transportation
service issued by the Transport Research Board of the USA, there are three ferry
types, namely:


Water Taxis: small watercraft that typically serve short cross-waterways or
waterway circulation routes;



Passenger Ferries: larger vessels that have higher passenger capacity and
speeds than water taxis and typically serve short- to moderate-length routes;
and



Auto Ferries: also known as roll-on, roll-off ferries, these ferries transport
vehicles as well as passengers. They are typically used on longer routes across
major bodies of water and on low-volume rural roads crossing rivers.

The RoPax ferry is one type of ferry. The acronym ROPAX (roll-on/roll-off
passenger) describes a RO-RO vessel built for freight vehicle transport along with
passenger accommodation. Passenger ferries are larger vessels that have more
passenger capacities and speeds than water taxis and that typically serve short to
moderate-length routes. The RoPax ferry also has distinctive technology, safety
system and operation pattern.
2.2.1 Ship structure
From the ship-structure perspective, a ferry ship has its own technical characteristics
to support its operation pattern. For the purpose of carrying vehicles in an affordable
number, the ship is designed to have a continuous deck over its entire length
(Dokkum, 2012). A RoPax ferry can also be easily identified by its ramps, which are
located either at its forward/after end and/or on its side. The ramps work as
connecting means for vehicles from the port to the ship, unlike early ferries, which
required massive and complex crane operation. However, from hull type and vessel
dimensions point of view, ferry ships have adopted similar types of hull shape such
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as monohull, catamaran, hydrofoils, and any other hull form (Transit Cooperative
Research Program, 2003).
In terms of propulsion installation, ship designers consider the functionality of the
ferry. Therefore, most RoPax ferries have double ended structures to ease their
operations when berthing. Each end is equipped with one or more propulsion
systems. To ease its operation, propulsion types such as azimuth thrusters, and void
Schneider, are also installed so the ship is easier to handle and manoeuvre (Dokkum,
2012).
According to its main function, a RoPax Ferry is required to have space to carry
vehicles and or trains on board its deck. Roll-on/Roll-off shipping is usually reserved
for larger cargo ships since it takes considerable space to deliver vehicles with this
method and also requires enough vehicles to be moved at once for it to be financially
feasible. The cardeck space can be an open space type or fully enclosed type. The
selection of cardeck construction type depends on the route and type of operation.
For example, a fully enclosed cardeck is designed for the ferry to protect its cars
when it is transiting in open seas that have higher waves. Relevant to the function of
the ramp door, all openings in the enclosed space deck should be watertight. The
open space cardeck is normally for short distance ferries that are transiting coastal
areas or engaging in short distance voyages.
The ferry cardeck, as its main cargo compartment, is measured by its carrying
capacity in Line per Meter (LiM) (Dokkum, 2012). The cardeck is also specifically
designed to support the weight of the vehicles and its cargo. Therefore, information
on the details of the cargo and the vehicles is considered of importance for ferry
operation.
Since it also carries passengers, the Ropax ferry ship provides accommodation space.
The accommodation structure highly depends on the type, length, time and area of
operation. For instance, short distance ferries only provide passenger space similar to
waiting rooms; meanwhile, cruise-like ferries can provide comfortable cabins for
passengers to stay in during lengthy operations.
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2.2.2 Safety onboard ropax ferry
Since the ropax ferry ship is mixture like cargo (auto-carrier) vessel and passenger
type ship, there are some parameters to indicate safety of its operation.
Stability
Stability is known as the main issue for ferry operation. The spacious and full length
cardeck can create enormous effects when there are shifting cargoes or additional
weight comes into effect such as from flooding. Flooding can create a stability
phenomenon called free surface effect (FSE). The free surface effect worsens ship
stability due to the large quantity of fluid moving to the direction in which the ship is
heeling. The condition creates large heeling moment and resulted in a quick negative
stability (reference).
There are a number of capsize cases indicating ferry vulnerability to FSE. Therefore,
special regulations in SOLAS chapter II-1 on subdivision and damage stability were
adopted to mitigate the issue. As general idea, the subdivision standard requires the
ships to be able to survive if one watertight compartment is flooded.
In addition, the modern ro-ro ferry is installed with an anti-heeling system to allow
water to automatically distribute between two opposing ballast tanks to keep the ship
upright (Dokkum, 2012).
To prevent the flooding and reduce the risk of capsize, SOLAS requires all openings
door/ramp door should be watertight. In addition, additional measures should be
provided such as an inner door behind the bow door or visor to prevent water
entering car deck - for example, through doors leading to other parts of the ship.
Following the higher possibility of the flooding, most of the Ro-ro ferries are
installed with special drainage systems. For enclosed cardecks, SOLAS requires a
system that allows drainage to be controlled by the crew from the bridge instead of
operated directly in the engine room. On the other hand, an open space cardeck
should be fitted with a sufficient number of scuppers to allow the water to freely
discharge overboard.
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Cargo securing system
Due to ship movement, unsecured or improperly secured vehicles onboard a ferry,
could compromise ship stability and possibly damage other cargo. To secure the
vehicle deck, there are securing points known as lashings that should comply with
guidelines for Securing Arrangements for the Transport of Road Vehicles on Ro-Ro
Ships under IMO resolution A.581 (14). The guidelines apply to Ro-Ro ships which
carry road vehicles on either long or short international voyages in unsheltered
waters and are applicable to: Road vehicles with an authorized total mass of vehicle
and cargo between 3.5 and 40 t, Articulated road trains with an authorized total mass
not more than 45 t.
Local rules such as Indonesian standard for minimum ferry service require certain
space arrangements for cars to provide easy access for the crew during ship
operations and emergency situations.
Fire protection
Ferry also considered vulnerable to fire accident. The level of complexity in fire was
rising due to the cargo and passenger carried onboard.
In more specific, IMO adopted resolution A.327 (IX), concerning fire safety
requirements for cargo ships. The resolution recommends the implementation of
improved fire safety requirements in addition to those incorporated in SOLAS 60 and
SOLAS 74 (which at that time had not entered into force).
In addition, SOLAS regulations specify the minimum protection for typical
passenger ship to have levels of fire protection equivalent to machinery spaces
(Transit Cooperative Research Program, 2003), that is:
–

Must be limited by class A boundaries (in steel or equivalent material)

–

Closed spaces to be protected by a fixed fire extinguishing system, typically
CO2 in cargo ships and sprinklers (DeLuge system) in car ferries

–

Smoke detection system

–

Open cargo decks do not require a fixed fire extinguishing system

–

Portable systems and hoses
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Life saving appliance
RoPax ferries are also required to comply with standards for life saving appliances
such as ensuring an adequate number of liferafts and lifejackets for crew and
passengers that are ready to access during emergency situations. There are different
applications of the requirement since some countries also developed non-SOLAS
safety standard.
2.2.3 Berthing operation
The main idea of ferry terminal design is to provide access for passengers and
vehicles to proceed from the ferry to access a mode of continued travel. The internal
layout of international facilities should reflect this concern for the convenience of
passengers and their vehicles by providing simple and direct passenger/vehicle flow
routes through well designed facilities (Transit Cooperative Research Program,
2003).
The Transit Cooperative Research Program (2003) provides the general concept of
the berthing operation for ferries. The vessel capacity of the berth, or loading area, is
dependent upon two key components: the arrival service time and the departure
service time. Arrival service time, given in seconds per vessel, is the sum of the
vessel clearance time, plus the passenger disembarking time. Similarly, departure
service time is the embarking time plus clearance time of the vessel to allow for other
vessels to use the dock area. Disembarking and embarking time is a function of a
number of factors, including passenger or auto demand, fare collection methods, and
the design of the embarking and disembarking facilities, such as the dimensions of
the gangways and walkways.
The vessel and loading design may also enable the embarking and disembarking
times to be overlapped.
A.

Passenger boarding operation

Passengers‘ travel time is the duration from leaving the origin to arrival at the
destination. Design elements include docks, shelter, queuing areas, and fare
collection. All of these elements should be arranged to provide safety and reliability
13

and to reduce time as much as possible. For international ferry connections, some
additional facilities such as custom clearance and immigration service might also be
provided.
Above all, the main idea for a passenger manifest system in Ro-ro ferry operation is
to identify the exact number of total passengers boarded. There should be sufficient
identification since the ship is limited to a certain number passengers due to safety
and comfort.
B.

Vehicle loading operation

The process of vehicle loading and unloading is time consuming and hence demands
proper loading facilities and circulation provisions at the terminal (Transit
Cooperative Research Program, 2003).
To support its operation, some RoPax ferry ports are also equipped with specially
built transport facilities known as movable bridges (MB). The MB can be adjusted to
accommodate the tide of the water with the ship draught and allow vehicles easy
access to and from its cargo deck. Docking configurations largely depend upon the
vessel and the design parameters for capacity and overall travel time. Since there are
no standard designs for ferry terminals (as there are standard highway designs), great
care must be taken to configure terminals to work for the ferry system and the ferry
vessels.
Bruzzone (2012) state that concerning safe and secure handling for the vehicle and
its cargo loaded while they are transported onboard ferry, there should proper
identification of the cargo and its weight. Therefore, the ferry terminal is ideally
equipped with vehicle-cargo weighing facilities and cargo inspection facilities. The
shipper is also required to provide detailed document declaration of its type and size.
Hence, the ferry crew can set up proper handling for the concerned vehicles. For
instance, reefer cargo is mostly not allowed to use its independent cooling system.
Therefore, vehicles with reefer cargo should be located near an electrical power port
provided onboard the ferry ship.
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2.2.4 Operational pattern
In order to maintain its effective operation, some ferry operations are maintained on
a daily basis. Most RoPax ferries are operated regularly under an assigned schedule.
In some ferry ports, there is a strict time of port operation due to high berthing
occupancy of the berth facilities.
Referring to operational patterns, ferry operation can be divided into the following
types (Bruzzone, 2012):


Direct connection to connect two ports and working similarly to a floating
bridge.



Multiple connections system: developed to connect more than two points of
call within a group of islands.



Coastal and shortcut ferry: coastal ferry established to provide access and short
cut of two points within the coastal region that its access is blocked by different
condition.

In addition, in terms of its service, a ferry can be also categorized into the following
(Transit Cooperative Research Program, 2003):
• Transit (no vehicle access):
- Ferry Urban consisting of scheduled service between points within a city or
metropolitan area.
- Ferry Intercity consisting of scheduled service between metropolitan areas.
• Highway
- Ferry Essential consisting of scheduled service between points outside a
metropolitan area or between metropolitan areas and providing vehicle access
almost always in areas without direct roadway access.

2.3

Development of rules and regulations for domestic RoPax ferry operation

RoPax ferries are not subject to exemption from any regulations. In fact there are
stricter regulations since they carry passengers and possibly dangerous cargo in
addition to vehicles. Similarly, almost all regulations to improve the safety and
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effectiveness of Ro-ro transport are derived from near misses, incidents, and
accidents in the past. For instance, the development of the international safety
management (ISM) code was strongly attributed to the Herald of Free Enterprise
accident.
In general, shipping regulations should includes technical design, construction
parametric, repair, operations standard and system, standard for manning, training,
environmental impact, security and regular inspections throughout a vessel‘s life.
Adequate and thorough inspections should examine deeply the stability information,
hulls condition, propulsion system and performance, states of other machinery,
electrical systems, lifesaving appliances and arrangements, fire prevention and fire
fighting systems, navigation systems and communications systems (Interferry, 2014)
The IMO conference in 1995 adopted numbers of amendments to SOLAS, based on
proposition by member states and highlighted by the Panel of Experts on the safety
of roll on – roll off passenger ships.
The most significant changes relate to the stability of ro-ro passenger ships stipulated
in Chapter II-1 of the convention. The SOLAS 90 related to damage stability
standard was extended to existing ships in accordance with an agreed phase-in
programme.
A new regulation 8-2 was adopted under the convention during the conference. It
contained special standard for ro-ro passenger ships carrying 400 passengers or
more. This main objective of the additional regulation is to scrap ships built to a
single compartment standard and ensure the concept of two main compartments so
the ship can survive without capsizing when flooded following damage occurred.
Amendments also included changes to Chapter III, which related with life saving
appliances and arrangements, including the addition regulation that requiring ro-ro
passenger ships to be equipped with public address (PA) mechanism.
Other amendments were also made to Chapter IV on the radio communications;
Chapter V on the safety of navigation that also including a special requirement that
all ro-ro passenger ships should have an established working language - and Chapter
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VI on carriage of cargoes. The IMO conference 1995 also adopted a resolution which
permits regional arrangements to be made on special safety requirements for ro-ro
passenger ships.
It is obvious that SOLAS, MARPOL, STCW and other international convention
requirements should be fully satisfied and complied with by typical passenger ships
as well as RoPax ferries that engage in international voyages. However, since most
domestic ferries operate within inland waterways and/or coastal service, international
regulation implementation is limited but does not prevent the shipowner or the ship
operator from applying it.
For most domestic ferry operations in developing countries, financial constraints are
the main issue for RoPax ferry operators to comply fully with SOLAS requirements.
Therefore, to provide legal protection and ensure safety is maintained at a
satisfactory level, most State maritime administrations have developed a standard
operating procedure that is equal to international conventions or depends on the
policy of the country itself. The typical regulation is commonly referred to as nonconvention vessel standard or regulation. Therefore, following the conditions,
stipulated standards for ferry operation can be different from country to country.
For instance, following the tragic accident of Estonia in 1994, the EU developed a
comprehensive policy for regional ferry transport by issuing the Council Directive
98/18/EC dated 17 March 1998 on safety rules and standards for passenger ships as
amended by Directive 2003/24/EC dated 14 April 2003. The rules apply to domestic
and inland water way transport that also includes passenger ferry transport in the
European region.
In the United States, U.S. Coast Guard approval is always required for the operation
of for-hire passenger vessels. The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Title 46
contains regulatory requirements applicable to the design, construction, and
operation of ferries operating in U.S. waters.
Other regions, under IMO technical assistance support, are encouraged to develop
local rules on domestic ferry operation. Indonesia Government issued standard for
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Non-Convention vessels in 2009. The standard was developed under joint
cooperation between Directorate General of Sea Transportation and Australian
Maritime Safety Authority. The standard is considered sufficient to provide
alternative for Non-Convention vessel flying Indonesia Flag in complying the level
of safety based on the capability of local operators.

2.4

Typical domestic RoPax ferry operation issues

2.4.1 Policy and operational issues
Lawson and Weisbrod (2005) stated that ferry transport is a key element of economic
development for many nations due to their main reliance on ferries for the transport
of people and goods—hence the critical importance of ferries also goes for jobs
opportunity and as a catalyst of national economic growth (Lawson & Weisbrod,
2005). Lawson and Weisbrod also mentioned that the nations where high rates of
fatality incident occur, ferry transport is indispensable to the lives of the local social
community. Ferry transport main developed based on the geographic features, such
as nations with island archipelagos, unbridgeable straits, riverine deltas, poor road
transport, or a combination of these geographic features. Concerning the importance
of ferry transportation as the basis of economic development, the lack of safety is
economically devastating.
The fire onboard Egyptian flag passenger ferry El Salam Boccaccio 98 in the Red
Sea in February 2006 indicated insufficient maintenance, out dated technology for
onboard emergency response and insufficient crew capability during emergency
situation strongly contributed to the large number of casualties. On the other side,
unavailability of shore based emergency response also proved to allow the severer
consequence of a large number of fatalities.
The investigation into the Capsize of Princess Ashika off Tonga in 2009 also
indicated a lack of shore-based influence to overall safety contributed significantly to
the accident. In addition, improper maintenance and lack of safety regulations were
also found to contribute to the accident (TAIC, 2010).
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There are numerous studies on accidents involving domestic RoPax ferries in
developing countries. Following the studies, it is possible to find commonalities
among the cases. In their research, Dalziel et.al (2012) identified the repeated causes
of ferry incidents: (Dalziel & Weisbrod, 2013):


Overloading



Inadequate Vessel Design and Maintenance



Sudden Hazardous Weather



Human Error



Lack of communication (alerting/location)



Inadequate rescue response

Due to the distinct operation of RoPax ferries, from a shore based operation
perspective, OSHA of the United States identified several factors that contribute to
injuries and damage to property, including (OSHA, 2010):


Lack of training



Lack of awareness



Fatigue



Inattention



Inadequate traffic controls



Lack of training



Lack of awareness



Fatigue



Inattention



Inadequate traffic controls

In addition, following a thorough examination of a number of ferry accidents in
different regions, Lawson et.al (2009) discussed a common approach to identify
safety issues in ferry operations for developing countries. This was done in two main
aspects of prevention and response, and post-event responsibilities for ferry safety in
developing countries. The prevention and response focused on the regulatory
approach, vessel design related to its fitness, and sufficiency in standard operating
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and emergency response procedures that cover both shipboard operation and shore
based response (Table 2-1).
Table 2-1: prevention and response for ferry safety in developing countries. Source: Lawson &
Weisbrod, 2005.

Under post event responsibilities, the issues mainly relate to the reactive actions of
related parties, including the investigation of the accident, documentation and
records of the event, imposed penalties for any violation that resulted in the accident,
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and post incident victim support such as insurance support and compensation (Table
2-2).
Table 2-2: Post event responsibilities for States operating domestic ferry Source: Lawson &
Weisbrod, 2005.

Obviously the issues of ferry safety in the developing world will remain if there are
no proper actions taken by all parties. The international maritime and ferry
communities are required to stand ready to offer their assistance and capacitybuilding know-how.
During a regional forum on domestic ferry safety held in Bali Indonesia on 6-7
December 2011, issues that take place in ferry operation were discussed. This was
mainly focused on lack of enforcement, insufficient regulation, administration
monitoring of fleet operation, lack of safety management and non-existence of a
safety culture in every aspect of ferry operation (IMO, 2011).
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2.4.2 RoPax safety issues from a technological perspective
From a technological perspective, IMO has identified significant issues based on an
analysis of ferry mishap data (IMO, 2014).
1. The lack of internal bulkheads
The hull was divided into some watertight compartments so when one of the
compartment breached, the ship will remain afloat. The watertight bulkheads
structure will stop or delay the flooding, providing sufficient time for evacuation of
the passengers and crew. Where the structure considered intact, it will stop ship to
capsize at all. The main problem with Ro-ros is the length and spacious cardeck that
nearly impossible to install internal bulkhead mainly due to operational reason. The
huge vehicle decks make it possible for water to enter very rapidly and fire can also
spread very quickly for the same reason.
2. Cargo access doors
Rampdoor considered as the weak point due to number of capsize accident the
seawater inrushes from non watertight door. During the cargo operation, such doors
can also be damaged or twisted.
3. Stability
Ro-ro stability has been studied since it is found too vulnerable with such condition
such as movement of cargo on the vehicle deck. The sudden and rapid inrush of
water following damage to the hull or failure of watertight doors can be even more
serious. Lack of condition of freeing port can also be a significant factor to ship
stability as it allows water accumulated in the spacious cardeck. In addition, larger
upper water superstructure means that the ship can also be more influenced by wind
and bad weather.
4. Low freeboards
To ease the vehicle loading operation, cargo access doors fitted on cargo-only ro-ros
are normally designed close to the waterline. The issues appear when the ship was
loaded in maximum or having excessive trim by stern or even waves which could
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result in a sudden inrush of water (if the door is open or the structure was not
watertight). Subsequently, the condition could result in the list increasing and a
possible capsizing of the ship.
5. Cargo stowage and securing
When the ship experience excessive heel angle, the cargo inside can easily shifted
and break loose if it is not correctly stowed and secured. The tight operation schedule
urge the ship crew to commenced the securing in timely manner. Proper securing
equipments are required to support this condition. Tight arrangement of the vehicle
should be highly considered to provide sufficient access to the ship crew when
emergency situation developed such as fire or spillage dangerous cargo from the
tipped over vehicle.
6. Life-saving appliances
The high structure of the ro-ros, including passenger ships, could create serious
issues regarding LSA: as the life boat stowed higher, it can be difficult to launch,
especially if the ship is heeling badly.
7. The crew
The tight schedule, monotonous and typical operation can affect the crew. The
typical ship regular and scheduled operation in certain conditions allows the ship not
to be manned with sufficient number of crew. However, the factors referred to above
indicate that ro-ros are highly sophisticated ships which require very careful
handling. The situation makes the ship exceptionally vulnerable to human error.

2.5

Conclusion

To summarise, ferry transport is considered as the most successful maritime transport
due to its flexibility, punctuality, and ease to connect with other transport modes.
Due to its nature of operation, domestic ferry regulation has been developed in a
stricter way.
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For developed countries, ferry transport has achieved a sufficient level of safety
following its operational, technological and regulatory improvements. However,
studies have identified that there are safety areas in need of consideration for ferry
operation in developing countries.
The international community has expressed its concern by providing assistance and
technical support to the concerned ferry transport stakeholders in developing
countries.
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3

Indonesian domestic RoPax ferry operation

The following chapter provides an overview of Indonesian domestic RoPax ferry
operation including its historical development, statistical activity data, current fleet
condition, current policy and general overview of challenges that currently exist.

3.1

Indonesian policy and regulation on Domestic RoPax ferry transport

For archipelagic countries, maritime transport plays a significant role in all aspects of
the Nation‘s development. It provides connection and open access to all parts of the
country. Since Indonesia‘s policy and concept of the oceans is not to divide the
nation but to connect all islands, maritime transport is considered as the keeper of
National integrity and the main support for the economic equality development
program. In addition, maritime transport in Indonesia provides the opportunity to
reach 5000 inhabited remote islands spread across the country.
The Ro-ro is considered the most appropriate transport mode for Indonesia since it
provides flexibility, low fare, and affordable technology. The Ro-ro can also access
inland waters that require low draft ships. On the other hand, coastal ferries in some
areas in Indonesia also play a significant role in saving time and increasing regional
interconnectivity.
3.1.1 Indonesia domestic ferry policy
The history records that during the end of the Dutch colonising era in the early
1900s, the first modernised ferry port in Indonesia was established to connect the
railway line from Merak Port of Java Island to Bakauheni port of the southern part of
Sumatera island (Rizal, 2011). Later, following increased traffic and vast
development across the country, the ferry service shifted from only being a
connection to rail transport to focusing on the transport of passengers and connecting
other land transport modes.
The Indonesian government considers Ro-ro transport as an integral part of the road
transport network. It provides opportunities to enhance the overall reliability of
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transport services since it is capable of connecting all islands. Thus, it supports
national social and economic activity (DGLT, 2005).
According to the long term development plan issued by the ministry of
Transportation of Indonesia, the nation‘s ferry transport policy mainly focuses on to
the following agenda (MoT, 2008):


Development for mass transport



Connection between islands, working similarly to a bridge



Even growth and distribution of regional development and reduction of cost
disparity



Support for national logistic distribution



Maintenance of national political and social stability; even further, avoidance
of national social gap and disintegration.

In addition, the Indonesian Shipping Act no. 17/2008 and Government Decree no.
22/2010 on water transportation stipulated clearly the main function of ferry
transport:


Ferry transport is a floating bridge that connects road transport and railway
transport systems that have been divided by water to transport passengers and
vehicles and their cargo.



Ferry transport development is also directed to open and provide access to
remote and under developed inhabited islands. Future plans also attempt to
provide alternatives to saturated road transport.

To interpret the policy stated in the act, the Ministry of Transportation developed a
national blueprint for ferry transportation in 2009. The blueprint comprises the stages
of a plan for improving ferry transport services. This focused on three main
strategies:


Revitalisation of the existing ferry service focused on the port facility and fleet
retrofits.
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Optimisation and capacity improvement of existing commercial ferry lanes
including improvement to the capacity of ferry service based on the growth of
transport demand for passengers, vehicle and cargo transport



Development of new ferry service to connect remote islands

3.1.2 Indonesia domestic ferry route network
According to the national blueprint for ferry transport in Indonesia, ferry lanes are
considered to integrate with other land transport systems and attempt to provide
connections to every island in Indonesia. Therefore, the Indonesian government
decided to focus the operation of the ferry lane into three main lanes known as North,
Middle and South Belt (Figure 3-1).

Figure 3-1: Indonesian domestic ferry transport lane system. Map obtained from DGST. Copyright
2009. Reprinted with permission

The north belt connects the road transport system of the northern part of Sumatera
Island to the road transport system in the northern part of Kalimantan, North of
Sulawesi and links the road transport network to the northern part of Papua Island.
The middle belt provides connections for the road transport network from and to the
middle part of Sumatera Island, Bangka Belitung, south to east coast road transport
network of Kalimantan island, centre of Sulawesi, Seram Island and the west part of
Papua. The South belt provides connections from and to Sumatera interstate highway
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network, Java island road network, Nusa Tenggara (lesser Sunda) islands, and the
southern part of Papua province.
To integrate the three main belts and enhance transport network connectivity, the
government also set up inter-connections through the long voyage ferry service.
In accordance with the Indonesian maritime transport policy stated above, the
government continuously maintains ferry services throughout the country. According
to the land transportation statistical data, there are a total of 217 ferry lanes across the
country that are comprised of 48 commercial lanes and 169 lanes under the
subsidiary of local municipalities or under the management of the central
government as part of a pioneer service program. In terms of distance, the shortest
ferry lane covers 530 Nm (DGLT, 2014).
The ferry routes are serviced by 258 units RoPax ferry and 15 pioneer ships with
total loading capacity of 50,460 passengers and 6,885 vehicles. Among the RoPax
ferry numbers only 11% are owned and managed by the ferry authority and 88% of
the total fleet is owned and operated by the private sector (DGLT, 2014).
To support ferry operation, in 2013, the Indonesian Government built 210 ferry ports
across the nation. In detail, there were 34 ferry ports operated under the management
of the state owned company, Indonesian Ferry, through a public-private partnership
system, and 4 ports established under direct management of the directorate general of
land transportation, via public service. In addition, the central government also
supports local municipalities to operate 106 ports under a subsidiary support system,
and in the meantime, there were another 66 ports in the process of construction
(DGLT, 2014).

3.2

Indonesian RoPax ferry operation information

3.2.1 Productivity
With regard to transport productivity, Indonesia domestic ferry transport has
achieved a significant outcome. In 2013, the domestic RoPax ferry transported a total
of 62,036,587 passengers. The total transported passengers indicate a significant
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increment of 20% compared to the previous year of 2012, during which 58,673,855
passengers were transported (DGLT, 2014).
For 2013, the transport productivity data also indicates a significant increment. There
were 7,713,925 motor cycle units transported by national ferry services. Compared to
2012, the number represents an increase of about 15%. The total number of vehicles
transported also increased. In 2013, there were 7,443,459 units of different types of
vehicle transported by ferry service. Vehicle transport activity increased by 30% in
2013 compared to data from 2012,
Table 3-1 presents the five busiest ferry services in Indonesia. In terms of passengers
and cargo transported, the Merak-Bakauheni ferry lane is the most productive ferry
service with 15 million passengers and 3 million vehicles transported. In terms of the
number of trips, Ketapang – Gilimanuk ferry service is the busiest ferry service with
119,670 trips in 2013.
Table 3-1: Top 5 ferry lane productivity data in Indonesia year 2013. Data obtained from DGLT
copyright 2014

Ferry lane

Trip

Pax

Motor

Vehicle

Merak - Bakauheni

63,680

18,597,804

587,873

3,317,524

Ketapang – Gilimanuk

167,230

14,204,920

1,431,310

2,204,577

Ujung - Kamal

34,245

6,620,924

1,561,671

199,179

Padangbai - Lembar

19,978

2,065,308

260,707

306,646

Kayangan - Pototano

25,301

2,636,174

324,725

295,874

Total

310,434

44,125,130

4,166,286

6,323,800
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1. Merak - Bakauheni
3. Ujung - Kamal
4. PadangBai - Lembar
2. Ketapang - Gilimanuk
5. Kayangan - Pototano

Figure 3-2: The top 5 busiest ferry service in Indonesia year 2013. Data DGLT copyright @2014.
Reprinted with permission

3.2.2 Minimum standard for domestic ferry service
In order to standardise ferry operation, the government had issued standard operation
for ferry transport service in Indonesia under Director General of Land
Transportation decree no 73/AP005/DRJD2003 year 2003. This covers passenger
service, vehicle loading operation, transit service and standard for schedule
accomplishment.
The main features of the above standards are detailed as follows (DGLT, 2003):


Ship service speed standard
 Minimum service speed for economy class should be not less than 10 knots
 Minimum service speed for non-economy class should be not less than 15
knots
 Ship speed for short distance ferry route or less than 6 nautical miles can be
adjusted accordingly



Vehicle loading standards and procedure:
 Maximum weight for the vehicle and its cargo shall not exceed 17.5 tonnes
 Thus cardeck spaces shall also be constructed accordingly to withstand the
above mentioned weight limit.
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 The highest stack shall not exceed 2.5 metres for small cars, 3.8 metres for
small lorries and 4.7 metres for container carrier lorries.
 The shortest distance between vehicles on the cardeck shall not exceed 60
cm for side end and 30 cm for both forward and after end.
 Securing lines for vehicles are required for ferries that transit routes with a
probability of ship inclination up to 10 deg due to local sea state.
 The driver and passengers are not allowed to stay inside the car during the
voyage. Open fire activity as such smoking is prohibited on the car deck.
Any kind of machinery onboard vehicles shall be kept on while the ship is
underway.
Director General of Land Transportation Decree no. 2681AP.005/DRJD/2006
regulates berth operation for ferry. The standard requires the ferry port operation
divided into four main parts that is:
 Approaching time (15 minutes started from approaching area)
 Cargo operation time that divided into two Unloading time and Loading
time (30 minutes)
 Departure preparation (15 minutes)
All the ship operators require to observed port operation time. This was developed to
improve the port productivity and maintain the ferry operation schedule.

3.3

Identified challenges in Indonesian domestic ferry operation

As a typical developing country, Indonesia faces many challenges in its domestic
ferry operation
3.3.1 Fleet condition
Domestic RoPax ferries in Indonesia are old. Data from DGLT (2014) indicates that
the age of the ships varies from 1 year to 50 years. More than50% of the national
ferry fleet is over 25 years old, whereas only 5% is under 5 years. To some extent,
this condition could affect the efficiency of the overall operation. An older ship
requires costly operation and longer time for maintenance. The lengthy time for
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maintenance also affects the ferry operation schedule. On some occasion, exemptions
to the ferry conditions were issued by the relevant authority to the ferry ships, with
the objective of fulfilling the transport demand during high peaks. Obviously this
condition could increase the risk of operation since the maintenance schedule was
not followed properly.
Indonesian ferry operation time is low. The average speed of operation was 8-9
knots. This condition does not comply with the ferry operation standard as mentioned
above. Among the registered vessels, the highest speed RoPax ferry was only 15
knots and the lowest was 4 knots. This great disparity of speed has also influenced
overall ferry service operation. For instance, the difference in speed could create
congestion of ferry traffic in the waiting areas since they have to wait for slower
ferries to be berthed by the port controller (NTSC, Investigation report into collision
between Singapore registered gas carrier MV. Norgas Cathinka with Indonesia
registered ropax ferry MV. Bahuga Jaya at Sunda Strait on 26 September 2012,
2013).
The Indonesian government has also attempted to revitalise the ferry fleet by
ordering new ships annually (DGLT, 2005). However, since the newly built ships are
only operated by the state owned Ferry Company the project will take time to
sufficiently support the entire ferry fleet, considering the large coverage area and
number of the ferry routes. In addition, the capacity of the private sector to acquire
brand new vessels is limited. As a result, the private sector will continuously operate
old ships as second hand priced ships are cheaper.
3.3.2 Effect of climate change in ferry operation
It is commonly known that tropical regions are facing issues of climate change more
than other regions. One of the significant effects is change to sea state. Indonesian
waters used to be relatively calm. However, recently storms have frequently
approached and created significant sea states. The condition has caused rising
concern for ferry operators and has affected the schedule. For instance, ferry
authorities occasionally stop all ferry operations due to heavy weather.
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Relevant to this issue, Indonesian ferry operation has also been affected by this
situation. Data from DGLT indicates that most of the ferries servicing the long
distance ferry routes are built with open space cardecks. Specifically, there is an
issue when the sea state worsens, and the probability of seawater entering the cargo
space is higher. This condition requires higher attention from ferry operators to
conduct thorough inspections of the ships‘ structure, particularly of the stability
related constructions such as bulkheads, scuppers and cargo securing systems.
The other issue relevant to the weather change is related to the suitability of the ferry
design. Indonesian ferry fleet data indicates that most of the ferries operated were
bought from Japan (DGLT, 2014). In Japan, the ferries serve ferry routes that are
limited to the inner waterways or coastal ferries. This translates to the ferries being
designed to operate in calm waters with a wave height not higher than 1.5 m.
3.3.3 Opening new ferry service
Until 2013, of the total ferry service lanes proposed in the national blue print for
ferry transportation, there were still 29 ferry routes that were not yet fully
operational. This condition occurred due to a lack of private sector interest in
operating ferry routes. On the other hand, the government is still attempting to
optimise the existing routes as its main priority.
The issues affect the sufficiency of the nation‘s fleet to accommodate transport
demand. Compared to the transport demand across the country, the ferry port
facilities are considered insufficient. The government has been limited by budget
constraints to continuously provide proper infrastructure for ferry operation.
(Alimoeso, 2009)
On the other hand, low maintenance is the major problem for ferry port facilities in
Indonesia. Financial support mostly contributes to this condition. Some terminals do
not have sufficient capacity to provide comfort of service to transport users.
3.3.4 Low tariff and competition with other transport modes
Indonesian ferry tariffs are low compared to similar ferry operations in the South
East Asian region (Haryo, 2013).Haryo implies that from the consumer perspective,
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the government is concerned with the purchase power of the transport user.
However, the local ferry operator needs to smartly manage the company to improve
the quality of service with its current income state.
Current ferry transportation development implies that there is clear competition
between ferry operators and road and air transport. For instance, there was a
significant decrease in ferry productivity due to the establishment of a connecting
bridge on the Ujung – Kamal ferry route (DGLT, 2014).

3.4

Conclusion

To summarise, domestic ferry transport plays a significant role in the nation‘s
development effort. Taking the example of typical ferry operation in a developing
country, ferry transport in Indonesia does not just provide safe, fast, comfortable, and
environmentally friendly transport for the user, but it is also utilised and developed to
maintain national integrity, thus providing opportunities for national development
equality. Challenges as indicated above should be overcome to improve overall ferry
performance such as safety itself.
Despite the success story of its productivity, statistical data shows that accidents and
mishaps involving domestic RoPax ferries continue to occur despite some
improvements and developments in every aspect of operation. NTSC maritime
accident and incident data 2003 – 2013 indicates that very serious ferry accident
occurred nearly every year. Most of the accidents have resulted in severe
consequences, including loss of life and damage to property. Therefore, there should
be a proper analysis to sufficiently identify the safety issues involved in its operation.
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4
4.1

Assessing safety issues in domestic RoPax ferry operation

Overview

Safety has always been considered the main critical feature in domestic RoPax ferry
operation. As described above, due to the nature of its operation, gaps and
deficiencies in operation could lead to severe and catastrophic consequences. Safety
systems are developed to prevent injury or loss of human life, damage to property
and adverse consequences to the environment (Qureshi, 2008).
Maintaining the safety level in domestic ferry operation can be done in many ways
but the main focus is on two factors:

Preventive action and Reactive action.

Preventive action is mostly related to any activity to mitigate risk involved in ship
board operation such as design, procedure, inspection or any other hazard control
method. On the other side, reactive action is any activity taken to reduce the severity
of an accident by conducting investigations, search and rescue, or imposed penalties.
Preventive action is critical to mitigate the risk of an incident developing into a
greater harmful event. However, accidents themselves have proven that there are
gaps in the safety system which are known as safety issues.
ATSB defines safety issues as safety factors that:
(a) can reasonably be regarded as having the potential to adversely affect the
safety of future operations, and
(b) are a characteristic of an organisation or a system, rather than a
characteristic of a specific individual, or characteristic of an operational
environment at a specific point in time.
Safety issues in a maritime operation can be identified by analysing the previous
mishaps and incidents/accidents. This can be done by analysing the statistical data,
developing an accident causation model and investigating the mishaps. As a result,
important information related to the causal factors can be unveiled to the interested
parties to improve overall shipboard safety performance. On the other hand, it can
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also provide feedback to the designer (policy, procedure, tools) to stimulate
validation and refinement of the system (Vassalos, et al., 2003).
To a further extent, Vassalos et al (2003) explains that the result of an analysis of
safety issues in an accident also ―pulls‖ together not only developing and updating
the knowledge of accident model analysis tools but also provides comprehensive
information on gaps in assessment of structural safety, survivability, passenger
evacuation, seaworthiness and fire safety.
This chapter presents the systematic methodology utilised in this dissertation with the
main objective of identifying safety issues in domestic RoPax ferry operation. Proper
justification for the use of the SEMOMAP model is briefly explained by presenting
the main concept, system workflow, methodology, and comparison with other
models widely used for analysis of safety in the maritime field.

4.2

Concept of maritime transport accident/incident and need of investigation

The disaster of the Herald of Free Enterprise and many others Ro-ro passenger ship
accidents remind maritime stakeholders how these accident bring great loss of life
and damage to property and the environment.
Heinrich (1931) defined ―accident‖ as a result of a chain of several undesired events,
whilst the seriousness of the accident is a compound set of technical failures,
operating errors, fundamental design errors, and management errors. The removal of
any contributing links, or causes, may be sufficient to prevent accidents. This idea is
considered as the basic concept for systemic investigation.
An accident is mostly a complex system that occurs through the accumulation of
factors and failures. Reason (1999) in his accident model suggests that adverse
events occur when multiple contributors, considered weaknesses in the established
safety defence, align. Hollnagel (1998) emphasises the failure of barriers that are set
up to prevent risk being carried out or a harmful event from taking place characterise
the accident itself.
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It is understood that even a small mishap should not be accepted in maritime
operation. However, in the safety concern, an accident or incident is a learning
opportunity to improve safety in maritime transportation.
4.2.1 Investigation into maritime casualty
Investigation into maritime casualties serves several purposes depending on the
institution that conducts the investigation namely civil, criminal, administrative, or
other.
Investigation into accidents/incidents is a natural approach to analyse the weaknesses
or gaps in the overall transportation performance that led to the accidents.
Traditionally, most accident investigations focused on the question of ―who‖ instead
of asking ―how‖ and ―why‖. This condition derived from the public desire to simply
blame and assign liability to a person or institution, thus considering the case
concluded.
Investigations adopt a retrospective concept that can identify the gaps that led to the
event, unlike during the design or development stage. The designer or policy maker
can only foresee the likelihood of risk in the operation and fails to entirely identify
weaknesses in their design or policy. Proper and comprehensive investigation looks
into the development of an event and attempts to analyse its causal factors.
In terms of safety improvement, an investigation into a maritime casualty could be
used to enhance safety by determining what happened, how it happened and why it
happened. In addition, the information gained from the process of investigation can
be used to improve safety of transport operation in view of (ATSB, 2008):
•

Identifying safety issues that could adversely affect the safety of future
operations, and encouraging or facilitating safety action by relevant
organisations to address these issues.

•

Providing information about the circumstances of the occurrence, and the
factors involved in the development of the occurrence, to the transportation
industry.
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•

Providing information for an occurrence database, which can then be combined
with information from other occurrences and used for research and trend
analysis purposes.

Under the international maritime regime, investigation is a key process to maintain
and improve maritime safety performance. Investigation into casualty matters has
been sufficiently described in the IMO‘s four pillars of SOLAS, MARPOL, STCW
and MLC.
The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) under SOLAS has made casualty
investigations mandatory by adopting IMO Resolution MSC. 255 (84) on the
adoption of the code of the international standards and recommended practices for a
safety investigation into a marine casualty or marine incident. The Amendment of
SOLAS outlines a code for the investigation of marine casualties and incidents in an
annex to Resolution A.849 (20) (27 November 1997). This document states the
following:
―The objective of any marine casualty investigation is to prevent similar
casualties in the future. Investigations identify the circumstances of the
casualty under investigation and establish the causes and contributing factors,
by gathering and analysing information and drawing conclusions. Ideally, it is
not the purpose of such investigations to determine liability, or apportion
blame. However, the investigating authority should not refrain from fully
reporting the causes because fault or liability may be inferred from its
findings‖.
The code attempts to provide a common approach for member States to conduct
safety investigations into marine casualties. The code mainly focuses on standard
reporting, evidence collection, coordination and cooperation among different
substantial interested States.
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However, there are cases when an investigation itself is unable to provide
comprehensive information; nonetheless, a systemic formal investigation is
thoroughly conducted. Some examples show that an investigation report itself serves
only to satisfy the public‘s hasty demand.
Wiegmann et.al (2002) discussed the cycle of the investigation process and how
prevention efforts fail to stop accidents from occurring again. The outcome of the
analysis underlined that each of the factors involved in the cycle is insufficient and
incomprehensive in terms of providing information for the improvement of safety.
Thus, any intervention or prevention program as a result of an accident analysis is
considered insufficient. For instance, most accident investigations tend to focus on
determining what happened instead of why it happened and are not supported by
sufficient procedures. Insufficient database systems and lack of analysis of the data
also take part in the ineffective prevention program (Wiegmann & Shappel, 2001).

Intervention
and
prevention
program

Research and
development

Authority and
stakeholders
support initiative

Prevention

Mitigation

Contributing
Factors (Gaps,
lack, failures)

ACCIDENT

Accident
Investigation

Accident
Database

Database
Analysis

Feedback

Figure 4-1: General process of investigation and preventing accident. The chart reproduced and
adapted from a human error analysis of commercial aviation accidents using the human factors
analysis and classification system by Wiegmann and Shappel. Copyright 2001

ATSB in 2008 conducted close scrutiny of the outcome of its investigation reports.
The outcome of the analysis indicated that the method of analysis has been a
neglected area in terms of standards, guidance and training of investigators in most
organisations that conduct safety investigations, despite its importance, complexity,
and reliance on investigators‘ judgements. The analysis results also pointed out that
many investigators primarily used their experience and intuition in conducting
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analyses, which is not based on, or guided by, a structured process. Other issues
appeared to be related to the limited time available for producing reports, meaning
that the analysis process is normally conducted while the investigation report is being
written. As a result, the writing process can become inefficient; supporting
arguments for findings may be weak or not clearly presented, and important factors
can be missed (ATSB, 2008).
Accordingly, it is necessary to enhance the factors of response cycles by improving
the methods of the investigation and providing additional supportive analysis
processes which then could identify the factors that might not be considered during
the investigation process.
4.2.2 Accident causation models
An accident causation model is commonly a complex system that requires a
sufficient level of knowledge so it can be used to determine the factor or issues that
took place to increase risk of accident. Accident causation studies promise significant
opportunity for those who are interested in developing the pertinent theory.
At present, theories of accident causation are conceptual in nature and, as such, are of
limited use in preventing and controlling accidents. With such a diversity of theories,
it will not be difficult to understand that there does not exist one single theory that is
considered right or correct and is universally accepted.
In 1931, Heinrich introduced the first systemic approach known as the Domino
model to analyse accidents in the industrial sector. The model was developed
according to behaviour based safety which later identified that unsafe acts
contributed majorly to workplace accidents (Heinrich, 1931).
Hollnagel (2004) reviewed the historical development of accident modelling based
on traditional and modern approaches.
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Traditional approach
Originally, the traditional accident causation model looked at the accident by its
direct cause and attempted to view the entire event in a singular/one way order.
There are two common approaches under the traditional model.


Sequential/event based model
The event based model was developed following the chain reaction concept,
which explains an event in chronological order. The model highlights that an
accident is caused by multiple events that occur one after another. It is a simple
linear model that determines the causes as independent to every event in the
main process. The model mostly focused on the failure and malfunction of the
independent causes. The model suggests that prevention of accidents can be
accomplished by eradicating one or more of the links so the event does not
develop into an accident. The Domino theory by Heinrich (1931) (Figure 4-2)
and Fault tree model are examples of event based models.

Figure 4-2: Domino theory model by Heinrich 1931. The figure taken from Heinrich: Industrial
accident prevention. Copyright McGraw-Hil 1931.
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Epidemiological
The epidemiological accident model was originally based on biological
research on the disease spread process. It attempts to identify the main cause of
the disease by tracing back the entire cases or other event occurred randomly in
the different circumstance. The epidemiological model identified that accidents
(spread of disease) occur through the contribution of latent factors. Unlike the
sequential model, the epidemiological model adopts a complex linear model
that determines the cause as an interdependent factor. The concept sees the
development of accidents due to errors in the safety defence/barrier that has
been set up to prevent them.

Figure 4-3: Swiss cheese model by James Reason (1997)

The generic barriers are commonly categorised into organisational factors, line
management and precondition. The error of an individual factor (sharp end) is
seen as an active failure, contributed to by previous misses and gaps in defence
(blunt end). When all errors in each defence align, an accident occurs. The
model made it possible to identify which safety defence was not working by
observing the functionality of the barriers when the accident occurred. Hence,
the prevention action is focused on strengthening the defence/barrier. The
Swiss cheese model of James Reason is the prominent model in the
epidemiological system.
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Modern approach
Systemic models
Systemic models developed due to known insufficiency in the traditional approach.
The systemic model sees the system as a whole as a contributor to the accident. The
model adopts a non-linear model concept where all factors involved couple and
interact coincidentally in a specific time (Hollnagel, 2004). The systemic models
observe accidents as emergent phenomena that arise due to the complex interactions
between system components that may lead to the degraded performance of the
system, resulting in the accident. The tightness of the component coupling is one of
the indicators to determine the health of the system.
In the systemic models, the system is seen as an entity of dynamic interaction among
the components (technical, human, organisational and management) which was set
up independently to support and maintain the operation of the system in achieving
the goal. Leveson (2004) stated that accidents are treated as the result of flawed
processes involving interactions among people, social and organisational structures,
engineering activities, and physical and software system components.
Some examples of the accident causation model using the systemic concept are
TRACEr of Kirwan and Shorrock (2001), STAMP of Leveson (2003), CREAM of
Hollnagel (1998).
Qureshi (2008) argued that traditional accident modelling approaches are not
adequate to analyse accidents that occur in modern sociotechnical systems, where
accident causation is not the result of an individual component failure or human
error.
The Swiss cheese model is also a useful method to provide a comprehensive
overview of an accident by considering it via a generic group of categories. The
Eurocontrol Experimental Centre (2006) mentioned that the model can be used for
heuristic communication models, framework of accident analysis and basis of
measurement. However, some scholars dispute the effectiveness of the models in
explaining the interrelation of the factors in every stage of the models. Shappel and
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Wiegman (2000) stated that Reason‘s ‗Swiss cheese‘ model of accident causation
had a few details on how to apply it in a real-world setting but never clearly
mentioned the definition of the ‗holes in the cheese‘.
To some extent, systemic models are able to provide a comprehensive picture of the
factor/component correlation in a complex socio-technical system. However, the
systemic model requires extra effort to properly identify the multi non-linear
relations.
Obviously, there is no ―best‖ accident causation model that applies to all kinds of
accidents. The description above does not attempt to define which accident model is
the most appropriate; instead, it provides an overview of models applicable to certain
conditions of events, with the similar main objective of acquiring information that
can be a useful reference for determining the factors that affect the safety
performance of a system.

4.3

The SEMOMAP

4.3.1 General concept and development
The sequential model of the maritime process (SEMOMAP) was originally
developed by Schroeder under his PhD research thesis in 2003. The concept of the
model adopts the sequential process, which mainly focuses on the overall accident
process but also on analysing critical events at every stage of accident development
(Schroeder, 2004). It also focuses on the question as to why some accidents result in
total loss, whereas others can be mitigated to prevent, up to a certain point, greater
consequences. This was deemed necessary since the model can be used to a further
extent to analyse the possibility of an event in shipboard operation before it actually
occurs and determine which factors are associated with higher risk of operation.
The approach of SEMOMAP is based on the Model of Human Recovery and Human
Error Management developed by Van Der Schaaf in 1992.
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Figure 4-4: SEMOMAP v1 workflow by Schroder (2003)

In 2014, the model was developed to accommodate broader applicability, resulting in
SEMOMAP v2 (Schroeder et al, 2014). Adopting the concept in the previous
version, the SEMOMAP v2 generalises an accident into four main stages:
Contributory stage, development of risk of accident, called ―beginning of accident‖,
the accident itself and the evacuation stage (Figure 4-5).
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Figure 4-5: SEMOMAP concept for accident/incident development

Each stage is developed into more detailed sub-stages by adopting a number of
independent taxonomies that are considered appropriate.
Under phase-0 of the Contributory factor, SEMOMAP attempts to identify the factor
responsible for affecting the degrading performance of shipborne operation. The
phase also describes the event where improper systemic factors take place and lead to
a higher risk of accident/incident. The phase utilises an improved HFACS taxonomy
to sufficiently assess each possible factor in the perspective of shipboard operation.
The SEMOMAP considers that the identified factors could influence different
aspects of ship operation, mainly focused on two main elements, human and
technical. Under each element, the SEMOMAP defines the list of subjects as
follows:
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SUBJECTS

LEVEL – 1 CF

HUMAN SUBJECTS

Organisational
Influence (OI)

Captain – Officers
Navigators
Other Crew
Engineers
Supervision (SV)

LEVEL – 2 CF






Resource Management
Organisational Climate
Organisational Process
Statutory Factors






Inadequate Supervision
Planned Inappropriate
Operations
Failed to Correct Known
Problems
Supervisory Violations





Environmental Factors
Crew Condition
Personnel Factors




Error
Violation



TECHNICAL SUBJECT

Pre-Condition

Bridge – Deck
Engine Room
Ship Structure, equipment and
design
Unsafe Act

Figure 4-6: Scope of analysis under CF phase of SEMOMAP

Under the CF phase, the SEMOMAP categorises the actions taken by the human
subjects. Under SRK models of Rasmussen (1999), the SEMOMAP categorises the
action into two types of error and violation. As shown in Figure 4-6, within each
level there are numerous specific types of contributing safety factors. Details of the
taxonomy used for SEMOMAP under phase CF can be seen in Appendix-3
During phase-1 to phase-3, the SEMOMAP sees the process as an action of the
shipboard element to react with the current state of the operation. SEMOMAP
utilises the concept of Simple Model of Cognition developed by Hollnagel in 1998 as
well as the model of information processing by Wickens (1992). Both models
generate similar concepts on how human as operator reacts/behaves in complex
situations as well shipboard operation. Both models incorporate the information
processing stage which later results in decisions and action taken.
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ENCODING

CENTRAL PROCESSING

REACTION

ATTENTION

SENSORY
PROCESSING/
RECEPTORS

DECISION AND
RESPONSE
SELECTION

PERCEPTION

RESPONSE
EXECUTION

WORKING MEMORY

LONG-TERM
MEMORY

FEEDBACK

Figure 4-7: Wickens‘ model of information processing (1994)

Wickens provides a detailed concept of cognition by adding memory based action
and information processing events to the cognitive process.

Interpretation

Planning/Choice

Observation

Action/Execution

Data/
Measurement

Actions/
Observations

Figure 4-8: Simple Model of Cognition by Hollnagel (1998)

According to Hollnagel, human performance in critical situations would generally
complete four main steps of observation, interpretation, planning/selection of action
and, lastly, executing the action selected.
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From the cognitive process models above, SEMOMAP extends the process and
modifies the models of human cognitive process into four steps of accident
assessment process: indication - detection - analysis – action/preventive measure.
The cognition models describe all action taken onboard prior to or post event based
on the perspective of the subject involved during the cognition process. It also
recognises that the party involved during the cognition process could be from
anywhere such as onboard or ashore or even offboard (other ships). This can also
originate from the human aspect or equipment aspect.
Human

Equipment

Onboard/Ashore/Offboard

Indication

Detection

Analysis

Selection of Action

Information Recording

Information Reception

Information Reception

Communication

Information
Transmission

Information Evaluation

Planning

Timing and Sequence

Information
Transmission

Decision Making

Quality and Selection

Figure 4-9: Cognition model under SEMOMAP

During the indication stage, SEMOMAP identifies gaps that might take place and
assesses whether information is recorded and thus transmitted properly. When there
is a failure during the main cognitive process, the SEMOMAP model also makes it
possible to identify the source of the failure which can be human failure or
equipment failure. Additionally, by utilising the Error Mode under the TRACEr
model, the SEMOMAP model makes it possible to identify the contributing factors
that affect the cognitive process.
During the detection stage, the SEMOMAP considers the information transmission
process as the key point in determining the success of the process. The information
transmitted from the previous stage is the main reference during the detection
process. Overall, the assessment process during the detection stage involves
information reception, evaluation process and information transmission. The activity
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could involve humans or equipment installed either onboard or ashore. The
SEMOMAP also assesses the error/failure for each sub-stage by utilising Error Mode
under the TRACEr model.
Analysis of the threat is the main activity in the cognitive process. It differs with
regard to outcome, either successfully anticipating the threat or increasing the risk in
shipboard operation. The analysis process involves information reception, setting up
planning and decision making. The analysis of the information is possibly conducted
by shipboard personnel or other sources. The key ingredient for the success of this
stage is the information transmitted from the previous stage and also the capability of
the subjects involved. Similar to the previous stage, SEMOMAP observes error and
failure during the entire process, using the possible features listed in the human
reliability assessment under the TRACEr model.
Selection of action is the final step under the cognitive process. The SEMOMAP
differentiates the action based on the risk of each type of accident. To analyse the
success of cognitive process under the selection of action stage, SEMOMAP divides
the cognitive process into three main sub-stages: communication process, timing and
sequence, and quality and selection. Each sub-stage is reviewed from the
perspectives of human and equipment failure. Each failure is also observed by each
of the contributing factors to determine the root causal factor.
4.3.2 Taxonomy involved
As explained in the previous section, two major taxonomies are utilised to support
the main process of SEMOMAP model. The following section provides brief
information about both HFACS and TRACEr model.
HFACS
Shappel and Wiegmann developed the Human Factors Analysis and Classification
System (HFACS) in 2000. The model is developed based on the sequential or chainof-events theory of accident causation and was derived from Reason‘s (1990)
accident causation model. It was originally developed for use within the United
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States military, both to guide investigations when determining why an accident or
incident occurred, and to analyse accident data.

Figure 4-10: HFACS framework by Shappel and Wiegmann (2000)

The HFACS classification system focused on four hierarchical levels, (under the
SEMOMAP so called Level-1):
1) Organisational influences:
Under organisational influence, originally HFACS provide three main categories of
Level-2 including resource management, organisational climate and organisational
process. For further detail, the taxonomy expanded each factor under level-2 into
detail factor of Level-3. The SEMOMAP extended the detail of taxonomy into level4 for each factor under level-3, with further detail can be found in the Appendix-3
2) Unsafe supervision
Under supervision, HFACS expand the category into four sub-categories of Level-2
namely Failed to Correct Known Problems, Inadequate Supervision, Planned

51

Inappropriate Operations and Supervisory Violations. Under factors level-2, the
SEMOMAP extend the factors into marine related factors of Level-3. Level- 4 of
each factor is also developed with further detail can be found in the Appendix-3.
3) Preconditions for unsafe acts
Under precondition, HFACS taxonomy divided into three different categories of:
environmental factors, Crew Conditions and Personal factors.
4) Unsafe acts of operators.
HFACS categories the unsafe act into two main factors of Error and Violation. Under
Errors type, HFSC adopt SRK models of human error developed by James Reason
and divided the factor into Skill-based, Rule Based and Knowledge based Error. For
Violation type, there are two sub-categories namely Exceptional and Routine
Violation
For every level of HFACS, causal categories were developed that identify the active
and latent failures that occur. Theoretically, there should be at least one failure occur
at each level and resulted in adverse condition.
HFACS was originally developed to assess human performance in the aviation
industry. Schroeder et al (2011) modified the HFACS taxonomy to be applicable to
research in the maritime sector, more specifically to analyse explosions and fires in
the machinery space (Schroeder, Baldauf, & Ghirxi, 2011). The modification mainly
focused on the fifth level on top of organisational influence. The term ―statutory‖
was added in order to observe the influence of safety regulations in shipping. Full
details of the taxonomy used, including its definition for SEMOMAP models, can be
found in Appendix-3.
TRACEr
The technique for the retrospective and predictive analysis of cognitive error
(TRACEr) was developed by Kirwan and Shorrock in 2000. The model is based on
the Human Factor Information Processing paradigm, but draws extensively from a
range of Human Factors and error causation models. It was based on a task analysis
of the controller activities via Hierarchical Task Analysis. TRACEr contains a
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number of flowcharts to help the analyst determine what errors could occur, what
their causes might be, and their relative recovery likelihood.
The original TRACEr has a modular structure, comprising eight taxonomies or
classification schemes. There are three main types of taxonomy: those describing the
context within which the error occurred (Shorrock & Kirwan, 2002). Table 4-1
below indicates classified human error by TRACEr.
Table 4-1: Generation of TRACEr Internal Error Model. The tables reproduced from Development
and application of a human error identification tool for air traffic control by Steven T. Shorrock and
Barry Kirwan. Copyright (2002).

The SEMOMAP adopted the TRACEr taxonomy to identify operator-machine
interaction and suggests that incidents are often triggered by cognitive and
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psychological error by the operator. The operator is furthermore influenced in his
performance by external and internal factors.
From the human failure taxonomy above, SEMOMAP adopted every phase of
cognition. Details of the taxonomy can be found in Appendix-3
4.3.3 SEMOMAP System methodology
Along with the objectives in this dissertation, the following section provides a
general overview of how to utilise the SEMOMAP model.
Phase-0: Contributory factors (CF)
As explained above, the SEMOMAP begins with CF as its initial step. In compliance
with the concept of HFACS, the first step under the phase is to focus on and identify
which human and/or technical element plays a significant role and is mostly affected
by the deficiencies and gaps in the contributory factor(s) in the four main groups.
Each factor in detail in the Level-4 taxonomy is reviewed and selected in accordance
with the information provided in the investigation reports.
The model‘s workflow can be seen in the Appendix-1.
Phase-1: beginning of accident
The beginning of accident phase under SEMOMAP attempts to explain in detail how
the shipboard or shore side reacted to the presence of risk in the ship operation. The
SEMOMAP uses the term ―Threat‖ to indicate the important factors that affect the
risk of ship operation.
As some issues were not resolved during the initial stage, the shipboard operation is
subsequently led to the possible risk of accident/incident. SEMOMAP categorises
risk of accident/incident into four main sections: Navigational risk, Onboard Incident
and Entire Vessel risk. Under each main category, the details are as follow:
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Shipboard operational
risks

Navigational Accident/
Incident





Collision
Grounding
Contact

Onboard Accident/
Incident








Entire Vessel
Accident/Incident




Fire
Explosion
Structure Failure
Engine Failure
Loss of Control
Equipment
Damage

Capsize/Listing
Flooding/
Foundering

Personnel Incidents



Occupational
Accident

Figure 4-11: shipboard operational risk category under SEMOMAP v2

By adopting the cognitive process, the SEMOMAP amends the process under phase1 into following order.
Recordable
Threat Indication
Transmittable

Human and/or
Equipment factors

Threat Detection

Evaluation

Human and/or
Equipment factors

Transmittable
Receivable
Threat Analysis

Human and/or
Equipment factors

Planning

Error Mode Type

Receivable

Decision making
Communicable
Preventive Action

Timing and sequence

Human and/or
Equipment factors

Selection and quality

Figure 4-12: Cognitive process under phase-1 beginning of accident of SEMOMAP v2 model.

Indication of the threat could come from a variety of sources, either onboard ship,
including ship equipment, different types of sensors; or ashore, including warning
information from a shore-based agency. Each of the involved indicators is reviewed
and analysed to find out whether the process was successful or failed. The process
continues following the cognitive process as one type of iteration.
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In most of accidents, there could be a series of events that occur concurrently,
leading to failure, which results in the escalation of risk. The SEMOMAP model
makes it possible to analyse each of the events by looping the event until all the
processes are either resolved or continue to develop into the event of an accident.
Phase-2: Accident Phase
Phase-2 is as a result of improper or insufficient preventive action taken by the
shipboard parties to mitigate the risk. Similar to Phase-1, SEMOMAP defines the
event‘s progress based on the cognitive process workflow.
Since the threat was not properly mitigated and has become an accident, the
SEMOMAP changes the term ―threat term‖ to ―health system‖. This is to define the
state of the shipboard operation after the main event of the accident/incident occurs.
The concept is that the crew would initiate efforts to reduce the consequences after
the accident by reviewing and assessing overall or partially affected ship
components.
Phase-2: Accident Phase
The phase-2 is as a result of improper or insufficient preventive action taken by the
shipboard party to mitigate the risk. Similarly like Phase-1, SEMOMAP define the
event progress based on the cognitive process workflow.
Since the threat was not properly mitigated and has considerably been change into
accident, the SEMOMAP change the threat term in to ―health system‖. This to define
the state of the shipboard operation after the main event of accident/incident
occurred. The concept is the crew would start initiate their effort to reduce the
consequence after the accident by reviewing and assessing overall or partial ship
affected component.
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System Health
Indication

Recordable
Transmittable

Human and/or
Equipment factors

System Health
Detection

Evaluation

Human and/or
Equipment factors

Transmittable
Receivable
System Health
Analysis

Human and/or
Equipment factors

Planning

Error Mode Type

Receivable

Decision making
Communicable
Emergency
Action

Timing and sequence

Human and/or
Equipment factors

Selection and quality

Figure 4-13: Cognitive process under phase-2 of SEMOMAP v2 model

Similar to the cognitive process during phase-1, the SEMOMAP provides tools to
assess failure during each stage. Under phase-2, the action considerably related to
mitigating the consequences after the accident happens. When the event is not
properly assessed and evaluated, the event later could develop into initiation of the
evacuation process.
Phase-3: Evacuation Phase
SEMOMAP considers phase-3 as a consequence of unsuccessful mitigation effort
during phase-2. The events occurring are seen as a continuation of the previous
action taken under the emergency stage. During this stage, the shipborne operation is
focused on the operation to reduce the consequences caused by the event in phase-2.
Most of the resources are used to either evacuate the personnel and/or continue the
action to reduce the consequences, while the evacuation process is underway.
Therefore, the SEMOMAP model is slightly modified from the two previous stages.
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or
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Human and/
or
Equipment
factors

Figure 4-14: Cognitive process under phase-3 of SEMOMAP v2 model

Like two previous phases, the model attempts to identify and analyse the failure/error
source that takes place during the process of evacuation.
In detail, the complete workflow SEMOMAP analysis process can be found in
Appendix-2.

4.4

Methodology to utilise the model

After determining the proper accident causation models of SEMOMAP, the
dissertation used selected investigation reports issued by a formal investigative body
in Indonesia. Following the objective of the dissertation, the selection will only
review cases related to the operation of domestic RoPax ferries. The selected reports
comprise

the

factual

information,

accident

chronology,

findings

and

recommendations.
The coding is conducted based on the available information in the report by the
writer. Graphical breakdown and results are only shown for levels 1 to 4a of the
taxonomy. Level 4b and 5 have not been analysed graphically, as they are reliant and
dependant on coder reliability –i.e. – different people might disagree with the
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taxonomy options selected for level 4b and 5; instead, however, levels 4b and 5 are
described and discussed very broadly and subjectively.
It is acknowledged that in comparison with the model, some information in the
investigation reports could have been unavailable for various reasons. Additional
supporting information is subject to obtained in order to support the analysis in the
accident causation model of SEMOMAP.
Obviously, the correct interpretation of the writer is of importance to sufficiently
select factors under each phase. In addition, ideally it requires the work of groups
comprised of experts in every aspect of shipborne operation to sufficiently interpret
the information listed in the investigation reports. Therefore, in order to have proper
results, the SEMOMAP system requires comprehensive knowledge of the users in
the sense of the investigation process, concept of accident process, human factor
analysis, and maritime operation. In this thesis, however, the report was singlehandedly coded by the writer. Therefore, to ensure the validity and accuracy of the
SEMOMAP result, background of the writer is necessary to mention.
The writer has background and knowledge in naval architecture and ship
engineering. He also has extensive experience in marine casualty investigation and
has attended formal one year comprehensive training in ATSB. In addition, the
writer was also involved in most of the investigations of the cases used in this thesis
and contributed in producing the investigation reports.
Following the outcome of the SEMOMAP analysis, the dissertation attempts to
identify which safety factors are considered dominant in every stage of the accident.
This is done by observing the cases based on the nature of the accidents: fire,
sinking/capsize and collision.
In particular for collision cases, the coding mainly focused on crew behaviour and
performance on the Ropax ferry instead of covering all the involved ship behaviours.
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4.5

Conclusion

Obviously, accident causation model analyses and formal investigations are two
separate methods but they have the same paramount objective of identifying gaps
and weaknesses in maritime operation that lead to accidents and propose
improvements to the system to prevent recurrence in the future. For this reason,
applying both methods could create a more comprehensive outcome. Therefore, the
need to analyse investigation reports by adopting a proper accident causation model
is of utmost importance.
The SEMOMAP is considered an appropriate model to analyse the safety issues in
typical ship board accident/incidents such as events involving domestic ferries. The
SEMOMAP has been successfully developed to provide a clear picture of how an
accident develops from a small event into a greater consequence/s. The model is
thoroughly integrated with adequate prescriptive established taxonomies to
understand complex situations in a temporal event.
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5
5.1

Model Results

Domestic RoPax ferry accident investigation reports 2003 – 2013

The dissertation reviews and utilises sixteen investigation reports related to domestic
ferry accidents/incidents in Indonesia issued by the NTSC during the period of 2003
– 2013 as the main references. The selected cases were considered to provide
sufficient information to view the issues in domestic ferry operation. The variety of
consequences among the selected accidents also made it possible to conduct
benchmarking between two different cases with two different outcomes. Most of the
selected cases are high profile due to their contributing factors and the consequences
resulting from the accidents.
In terms of the nature of the accidents, the selected cases comprise 8 fire accidents, 5
sinking/capsize cases and 3 collision cases.
Under IMO category for occurrence categorisation (IMO, 2008), there are 11 cases
of very serious marine casualty, 3 cases of serious marine casualty and 2 cases of less
serious marine casualty. In the case of fire accidents, the selected cases can be
categorized by the location where the fire started. There are 3 cases in the engine
room and 5 cases in the cardeck/accommodation space.
Following the ferry service types of short and long distance ferry routes, the selected
cases were categorised into 5 cases occurring on short distance ferry services and 11
cases occurring on long distance ferry services. Figure 5-1 below indicates the
location where the accidents occurred.
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: Collision
: Fire
: Capsize/Sunk

Figure 5-1: Selected accident case by its location and nature of the accident

Overall ship data can also be distinguished by age and ship size at the time of the
accident. With regard to the ships‘ age at the time of the accident, the average age for
involved ships is 23 years old, where the youngest ship in the population is 10 years
old and the oldest ship is 40 years old. In terms of the ship size, the involved ships
were comprised of 4 ships with size less than 1000 GT, 8 ships between 1000 GT to
5000 GT and 4 ships above 5000 GT.
Information related to all selected investigation reports used in this dissertation can
be seen in Appendix 4.
The selected cases were thoroughly reviewed in accordance with the workflow in the
SEMOMAP v2 models. Under Phase-0: Contributory Factor, the model identified
the issues that occurred and contributed significantly to the development of the
increased risk of accident. Under phases 1, 2 and 3, the model focused on personnel
performance and their interaction with the system and surroundings. In Phase-1, the
SEMOMAP models identified how the crew reacted to the existing risk and analysed
the gaps and misses in their performance which later increased the risk of accident.
Phase-2 and phase-3 examine the related parties‘ performance to reduce or prevent
further consequences after the accident occurred.
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In order to provide sufficient overview of the outcome of the model to the selected
cases, analysis results are divided by the nature of the accident: fire, sinking/capsize
and collision.

5.2

SEMOMAP result for Fire category accident

Under the SEMOMAP model, the analysis result focused on the affected human and
technical factors as described in the previous chapter. The SEMOMAP identified
parties based on the interaction of the factors according to the HFACS. Since each of
the contributory factors interacts differently in each element, the outcome of the
result is divided into two main components of contribution: Human element
interaction and technical element interaction
5.2.1 Identified contributory factors for Fire category accidents
Factors affecting human element under fire category accidents
From a review of 8 fire accident cases, SEMOMAP records 592 interactions between
9 major human element subjects and 24 factors under level 3 of the HFACS system.
The human element includes the captain and navigational officers, ordinary seaman
and engine department officers.
Under the category of Organisational Influence, the results indicate that the factor of
poor equipment/facility resources (25%) had the highest effect on human
performance during the fire accidents, whereas the factor of lack of oversight under
organisational process (27%) contributed to the behaviour of the human element and
increased risk of fire in ferry operation.
With regard to the Supervision issue, there were 183 interactions of the factors, in
which Planned Inappropriate Operation (36%) is considered as the most significant
factor. Poor Shipborne Operation is the second factor that influences human
performance in relation to risk of fire accident.
Under the Preconditions category, poor crew interaction (30%) under personnel
factors is found to influence human performance in relation to risk of fire. On the

63

other hand, poor technological environment (29%) also contributed highly to the
presence of risk of fire onboard the ferry ship.
All the factors above were later found to contribute to the presence of unsafe acts
where skill based error (38%) was mostly identified and increased the risk of fire
accident, whereas exceptional violation was also be found to contribute significantly
to the presence of fire risk in ferry operation. Further details of the recorded
interaction among each factor are shown in Table 5-1 below.
Table 5-1: Identified factors under HFACS level 2 that influence the Human Element performance for
fire type accidents
Factors
L1

L2
Resource Management
Organisational Climate

Organisational
Influences (i)

Organisational Process

Statutory Factors

Inadequate Supervision
Supervision (ii)

Planned Inappropriate
Operations
Failed to Correct Known
Problems
Supervisory Violations
Environmental Factors

Preconditions (iii)

Crew Condition
Personnel Factors

Errors
Unsafe Acts (iv)
Violations

L3
Lack of Human Resources
Poor Equipment/Facility
Resources
Disorganised Structure
Poor Work Culture

Total Identified
Factors
30
44
1
21

Poorly Designed Operations

9

Inappropriate Procedures
Lack of Oversight
Poor International/ National
Standards
Inadequate Flag State
Implementation
Poor Shipborne and Shore
Supervision

9
29

Poor Shipborne Operations
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Shipborne Related
Shortcomings
Shipborne Violations
Poor Physical Environment
Poor Technological
Environment
Negative Cognitive Factors
Poor Physiological State
Poor Crew Interaction
Poor Personal Readiness
Skill-based errors
Decision and judgement
errors
Perceptual errors
Routine
Exceptional
Total

64

10
22
48

52
9
14
53
20
2
55
41
24
14
4
4
17
592
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Figure 5-2: identified HFACS level-2 factors that influenced each involved Human performance in
the fire category accident

The Figure 5-2 above indicates that among 8 human elements identified as the most
affected and playing a major role in the presence of risk of fire accident, the Captain
is the most affected human element due to misses and gaps in the systemic process.
1st/chief officer and Chief Engineer are in the second position and play a significant
role under the same circumstance.
Under organisational influence, the SEMOMAP identified lack of human resources
such as training and selection as the factor that most influences the insufficient
performance of the Captain. Similarly, the chief officer and chief engineer are
identified as being affected by such conditions (Figure 5-2 A).
Under the supervision category, the factor of Planned Inappropriate Operations is
the key factor that contributed to the deficient performance of the captain, chief
officer, chief engineer and ordinary seaman, whereas the factor of Failed to Correct
Known Problem was another significant issue in supervision affecting the same
human element (Figure 5-2B).
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Factors affecting technical elements under fire category accidents
The SEMOMAP records five main elements that played significant roles during the
fire accidents. These include alarm panels and systems, main engine, ballast water
pumps, separators and other technical elements (covers fire fighting equipment for
both fixed system and portable extinguishers). Deficiency in the technical element
performance is contributed to by 23 factors under HFACS level-3 with a total of 171
interactions.
Under the organisational influence category, the factor of poor equipment/facility
resources (35%) such as engineer support and failure to correct known design flaws
contributes most significantly to the performance of the technical element. The
factor of lack of oversight such as failure to monitor and check resources to ensure
safe work environment is also known to influence the performance of the technical
element and contributed to the increased risk of fire in the Roro ferry operation. The
factor of inadequate flag state implementation (17%) is the next factor that
significantly influenced the condition of the technical element. This was mostly from
lack of class and statutory surveys.
Under the Supervision category, the factor of shipborne related short comings (39%)
is known to be the most influential factor to the technical element and includes the
factor of failed to correct safety hazard. Another factor that also contributes
significantly to the issues in the technical element is poor shipborne operations
(36%). This includes the factor of lack of risk assessment and limited recent
experience shown by the crew.
Poor technological environment (71%) under the Precondition category is another
factor that is influential to the weakness of the technical element condition. This
covers mainly the factors of faulty equipment, incorrect modification to the
manufacturer’s procedures and issues on control and switches.
It is interesting to note that human behaviour also contributed to the degrading
performance of the technical element. Judgement errors under unsafe act/behaviour
were found to affect the technical element performance.
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Table 5-2: Identified factors under HFACS level 2 that influence the Technical Element performance
for fire category accident

Factors
L1

L2

Resource Management

Organisational Climate
Organisational
Influences (i)
Organisational Process

Statutory Factors

Inadequate Supervision
Supervision (ii)

Planned Inappropriate
Operations
Failed to Correct Known
Problems
Supervisory Violations
Environmental Factors

Preconditions (iii)

Crew Condition
Personnel Factors
Errors

Unsafe Acts (iv)
Violations

L3
Lack of Human Resources
Poor Technological Resources
Poor Equipment/Facility
Resources
Inadequate Policies
Poor Work Culture

Total Identified
Factors
7
3
30
1
5

Poorly Designed Operations

4

Inappropriate Procedures
Lack of Oversight
Poor International/ National
Standards
Inadequate Flag State
Implementation
Poor Shipborne and Shore
Supervision

5
14

Poor Shipborne Operations

12

Shipborne Related
Shortcomings
Shipborne Violations
Poor Physical Environment
Poor Technological
Environment
Negative Cognitive Factors
Poor Crew Interaction
Poor Personal Readiness
Skill-based errors
Decision and judgement
errors
Routine
Exceptional
Total

4
12
6

13
2
5
32
1
2
5
2
3
1
2
171

The SEMOMAP also records that other elements such as fire fighting equipment
were the most affected technical elements due to gaps and misses in the systemic
process, whereas the main engine is the 2nd most affected technical element. The
main issues in the fire fighting system stemmed mostly from factors of resource
management, planned inappropriate operations and environmental factors.
Inadequacy in the main engine performance was found to be affected by issues in

67

resource management, planned inappropriate operations and environmental factors.
On the other hand, some errors in handling the main engine were also found to
contribute to degrading performance of the main engine (Figure 5-3).
B. Supervision
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Figure 5-3: Influence of Contributory factors to the involved technical element for fire type accident

5.2.2 Phase-1 result for fire category accidents
Since the SEMOMAP adopts cognitive processes to overview the element of
behaviour while assessing the risk of accident, the outcome of the model is
categorized by the nature of accident and based on each phase and each stage of:
Indication-detection-analysis-action. The outcome focuses on the particular stage that
had the most issues and influences to mitigate the risk of fire accident.
From 8 fire cases reviewed, the SEMOMAP recorded 78 events of accident
assessment process during phase-1 (Figure 5-4). The risk of fire was identified to
escalate since there were failures in every step of the cognitive process. During the
indication stage, failure was identified mostly during the transmission process, which
involved human as the indicator. During the detection stage, the failure mostly took
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place in the evaluation stage, where it comes from human failure such as ignoring the
threat or omitted action.
Frequency of fail/safe during cognitive process under Phase-1 of Fire type accident
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Figure 5-4: frequency of fail (red block) /safe (blue block) accident assessment process under phase-1
of fire type accident

During the threat analysis stage, failure mostly occurred when setting up a plan to
handle the presence of risk of fire. The issues mostly resulted from human failure as
a result of insufficient planning due to confusion, distractions, forgetting long term
training and lack of vigilance to the situation.
For the fire category, the data indicates the most of the failures occurred during the
threat prevention action with most of the failures caused by lack of human
performance such as action taken too late due to lack of vigilance and situational
awareness. There are 5 actions most frequently taken to prevent fire such as cutting
off oxygen supply, reducing heat, and shutting down the engine, but there is also
evidence to mention that there was no action taken to prevent fire from developing.
Failure in human performance was also found in the inappropriate action taken
during the selection and quality stage. During this crucial stage, most of the evidence
shows that the crew provided too little action to prevent the fire from spreading.
Detailed particulars for phase-1 can be found in Table 0-74, Appendix-5.
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A. Threat Prevention Action taken under Phase1 cognitive process of Fire type accident
Cut off oxygen supply to
flammable area

4%

35%

Other

27%

Reduce heat
11%

23%

Shut down engine
No Threat Prevention
Action

B. Threat Prevention Action cognitive sub-stage
Fire-Phase1

C. Threat Prevention Action failure source
Fire-Phase1

30

14

25

12
10

20
8
15

6
10
4

5

2

0

0
Communication
Applicable?
Applicable

Timing & Sequence
Applicable?

Applicable but Not Successful

Selection & Quality
Applicable?

Communication
Applicable?

Not Applicable

Timing & Sequence
Applicable?

Equipment Failure - Specify

Selection & Quality
Applicable?

Human Failure - Specify

Figure 5-5: Threat prevention action data for fire category accident

5.2.3 Phase-2 result for fire category accidents
Under phase 2, SEMOMAP recorded 84 events of accident assessment processfrom
the total reviewed fire cases. The data shows that since the accidents occurred most
of the indications have become obvious. However, the issues later took place at the
next stage of cognition.
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Figure 5-6: frequency of fail (red block) /safe (blue block) accident assessment process under phase-2
of fire type accident

During the system health detection, the issues are found to totally come from human
failure as a result of factor of confusion, fail to see the information and forget longterm training. Time pressure also found influencing the analysis process.
Similarly to the system health indication, the human failure is also identified as the
most factors resulting in the fall of the analysis process. The condition takes place
during planning and decision making. This was mainly caused by factors of
confusion, distraction, forget long-term training, lack of vigilance and other factors.
During the system health detection, the issues are found to result completely from
human failures as a result of factors of confusion, failure to see the information and
forgetting long-term training. Time pressure was also found to be an influence in the
analysis process.
Similarly to the system health indication, human failure was also identified as the top
factor resulting in the fall of the analysis process, specifically during planning and
decision making. This was mainly caused by factors of confusion, distraction,
forgetting long-term training, lack of vigilance and other factors.
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During phase-2 in fire type accidents, there were 7 actions commonly taken: fire
fighting (57%), other action (25%) and shutting down the engine (4%). However,
failures also occurred during the action taken to handle the emergency situation. The
data shows that from the total 84 events during the cognition process under this
phase, 40% were found to be caused by human failure (76%) and equipment failure
(24%) (See Figure 5-7). The issues mainly took places in timing and sequences, and
also during selection and quality. Under timing and sequence, the evidence shows
that most of action taken was too late, mostly as a result of confusion, distraction,
forgetting long-term training and time pressure. On the other hand, too little action
taken was found to be the major factor under human failure that caused the fire
accident to continue to develop.
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Figure 5-7: Detailed particulars for emergency response under phase-2 in fire type accident

From the 8 fire cases reviewed, 2 cases indicating proper situation handling during
phase-2 that was able to mitigate the event, preventing is from developing into
further consequences..
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5.2.4 Phase-3 results for fire category accidents
In phase-3 for fire type accidents, the SEMOMAP recorded 66 events of cognition
(see appendix-5, Table 0-74). The data shows that failure occurred continuously
during the emergency situation and evacuation process.

Frequency of fail/safe during cognitive process under Phase-3 of Fire type accident
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Figure 5-8: frequency of fail (red block) /safe (blue block) accident assessment process under phase-3
of fire type accident

From 23 failures identified in phase-3, 74% were caused by human failure which
mostly occurred under selection and quality factors and timing and sequence factors
(Figure 5-9).
The factors of action too little and action too late were the main human factors that
took place in the failure, and were contributed to by the conditions of confusion,
distraction, forgetting long-term training and procedure, and tunnel vision..
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Figure 5-9: Detailed information for emergency response and evacuation action under phase-3 for fire
type accident.

From the 8 cases reviewed, there are 2 cases that showed the event was mitigated up
to phase-2, whereas the other 6 cases developed up to phase-3. For the cases
developed up to phase-3, the final consequences of the cases were also varied.
SEMOMAP records 4 cases of severe loss with casualty/s, 1 case with severe loss
without casualty and 1 case of total loss without casualty.

5.3

SEMOMAP results for Capsize/Listing category accidents

5.3.1 Identified contributory factors for Capsize/Listing type accidents
Factors affecting human element under Capsize/Listing category accidents
From the 5 capsize cases reviewed, SEMOMAP recorded 26 factors of HFACS level
3, affecting 5 main human element performances (Table 5-3).
Under the Organisational Influence category, factors of lack of human resources and
poor equipment/facility resources were the two main factors that contributed to the
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failure of the human element performance, increasing the risk of operation
particularly for risk of capsize accident. The SEMOMAP also recorded the factors of
lack of training and lack of safety value as the two most influential issues for crew
performance in responding to the risk of capsize.
Table 5-3: Identified factors under HFACS level 2 that influence the Human Element performance for
Capsize/Listing type accident
Factors
L1

L2
Resource Management

L3
Lack of Human Resources
Poor Technological Resources
Poor Equipment/ Facility Resources

Organisational Climate
Organisational
Influences (i)
Organisational Process

Statutory Factors

Inadequate Supervision
Supervision (ii)

Planned Inappropriate
Operations
Failed to Correct Known
Problems
Supervisory Violations
Environmental Factors

Preconditions (iii)

Crew Condition
Personnel Factors
Errors

Unsafe Acts (iv)
Violations

Disorganised Structure
Inadequate Policies
Poor Work Culture
Poorly Designed Operations
Inappropriate Procedures
Lack of Oversight
Poor International/ National
Standards
Inadequate Flag State
Implementation
Poor Shipborne and Shore
Supervision
Poor Shipborne Operations
Shipborne Related Shortcomings
Shipborne Violations
Poor Physical Environment
Poor Technological Environment
Negative Cognitive Factors
Poor Physiological State
Poor Crew Interaction
Poor Personal Readiness
Skill-based errors
Decision and judgement errors
Perceptual errors
Routine
Exceptional
Total

Total Identified
Factor
18
1
17
3
9
8
13
3
13
5
5
17
23
19
5
12
10
18
2
22
15
17
14
3
3
7
282

Under the Supervision category, the selected cases indicated issues of poor
Shipborne operations as the most affecting factor to crew performance, whereas the
factor of Shipborne related shortcomings was the second most influencing factor.
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More specifically, the factors of lack of formal risk assessment and loss of
supervisory situational awareness are common issues that affect human element
performance in terms of risk of capsize/listing accidents.
Poor ship movements and manoeuvres under environmental factors are the most
common issues under the Preconditions category.

From the perspective of the

human factor issue, pattern of poor risk judgment is considered the second most
influential factor related to human performance onboard ferry ships.
Under the unsafe act category, the data identifies skill based error factors such as
poor technique/seamanship and inadvertent use of equipment as two common errors
shown by the human element
The chart below indicates the human elements most affected by the gaps and misses
in the system. Based on the reviewed cases, SEMOMAP recorded the captain, chief
officer, helmsman, AB and bosun as the most affected human elements during
capsize/listing type accidents. The data shows that under organisational influence,
the master‘s performance was mostly affected by the factors of resource
management and organisational process, whereas the chief officer, responsible for
cargo preparation and management, was affected mostly by personnel factors under
the supervision category (Figure 5-10).
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Figure 5-10: identified HFACS level-2 factors that influenced each involved Human performance in
the capsize/listing type accident

Factors affecting technical element under Capsize/Listing category accidents
From the review of the 5 cases of Ropax ferry capsize/listing, SEMOMAP identified
the 7 technical elements most involved and affected by the issues at the systemic
level. The SEMOMAP also recorded 133 interactions of the 17 HFACS level-3
factors with the involved technical elements.
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Table 5-4: Contributory factor influencing technical element for capsize/listing type accident
Factors
L1

L2
Resource Management
Organisational Climate

Organisational
Influences (i)

Organisational Process

Statutory Factors

Inadequate Supervision
Supervision (ii)

Preconditions (iii)
Unsafe Acts (iv)

Planned Inappropriate
Operations
Failed to Correct Known
Problems
Supervisory Violations
Environmental Factors
Personnel Factors
Violations

L3
Lack of Human Resources
Poor Technological Resources

Total Identified
Factor
3
7

Poor Equipment/Facility Resources

28

Poor Work Culture
Poorly Designed Operations
Inappropriate Procedures
Lack of Oversight
Poor International/ National
Standards
Inadequate Flag State
Implementation
Poor Shipborne and Shore
Supervision

9
6
1
10

Poor Shipborne Operations

9

Shipborne Related Shortcomings

7

Shipborne Violations
Poor Physical Environment

1
5

Poor Technological Environment

22

Poor Personal Readiness
Exceptional
Total

1
2
133

5
12
5

As regards organisational influence, the factor of poor equipment/facility resources
under resource management was the most influential aspect to the degrading
performance of the technical element. This factor mostly affects hull condition and
other technical elements such as scupper/freeing port in the car deck, and watertight
openings (ramps, doors). Factors of inadequate flag state implementation such as
class and statutory survey were considered as the second most influential factor to
the performance of involved technical element.
Under the supervision category, the factor of poor Shipborne operations was
identified as affecting the technical element, whereas the factor of Shipborne related
shortcomings was the second influential factor (Figure 5-11 A). The factors mostly
influence the technical elements of hull, steering equipment and other types as
mentioned in the previous paragraph.
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The factor of poor technological environment was identified as the most influencing
factor to the degrading performance of the involved technical element. More
specifically, faulty equipment was the factor that mostly took place in the hull,
steering equipment, and freeing port in the car deck, thus increasing the risk of
capsize/listing in Ropax ferry operation.
Unsafe acts were also found to influence the degrading performance of the technical
element. The data indicates that factors of exceeding limits of system and
unauthorised to operate beyond design criteria under exceptional violation type were
the two factors that took place in the capsize/listing type accidents.
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Figure 5-11: Identified HFACS level-2 factors that influenced each involved technical performance in
the capsize/listing type accident

5.3.2 Phase-1 result for the Capsize/Listing type accidents
From the review of 5 Ropax ferry capsize accidents, SEMOMAP recorded 90
cognitive processes. During phase-1 for capsize/listing type accident, failure was
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found in every stage of the cognitive process, but mostly took place during the last
step of threat prevention action (Figure 5-12).
Frequency of fail/safe during cognitive process under Phase-1 of Capsize type accident
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Figure 5-12: frequency of fail (red-block) and safe (blue-block) of accident assessment process under
phase-1 for capsize/listing type accident

During phase-1 of capsize/listing type accident, human failure is identified as the
main factor compared to equipment failure. From 54 failures that increased the risk
of capsize in ferry operation during phase-1, 93% came from human failure, whereas
7 % came from equipment failure.
Under phase-1, human failure took place more during threat analysis and threat
prevention action. There are 4 main subjects involved in the stage including: master
(83%), officer on watch (7%) and other crew (Figure 5-13 A). During threat analysis,
failures occurred during the setting up planning and decision making process, such as
failure in planning and decision making or partial/unclear planning. The factors that
influenced failure in decision were mostly those of expectation bias, desire for
harmony, lack of vigilance and time pressure.
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Figure 5-13: detailed information on the threat analysis action under phase-1 for capsize/listing type
accident

The SEMOMAP records four main actions taken to prevent capsize from occurring:
altering speed, stabilising and securing cargo and other actions such as reduce stop
ship movement, and pumping out flooding (Figure 5-14 A). However, failures
occurred during this stage. Most of the failures identified took place due to timing
and sequence (action too late), and selection and quality (action too little). For human
failure, causal factors were confusion, forgetting long-term training, time pressure,
and lack of vigilance.
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Figure 5-14: Detailed information on the threat prevention action under phase-1 for capsize/listing
type accident

5.3.3 Phase-2 result for the Capsize/Listing type accidents
During phase-2 for the 5 cases of capsize/listing Ropax ferry, SEMOMAP recorded
12 events of cognitive process.
From the observed cases, the first two steps of cognition (system health indication
and system health detection) successfully responded to the situation by providing
proper detection of the potential system health issue after the accident took place.
However, the data shows that failures during the accident assessment process under
system health analysis occurred. The failures were observed mostly from humans,
whereas equipment contributed less during that stage. The Master is known to take
all responsibility during the analysis process; however, the data indicates that failures
mostly occurred during the decision making stages. This was caused by factors of
confusion, distraction, and lack of vigilance and, since the accident had started, time
pressure existed as well.
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Frequency of fail/safe during cognitive process under phase-2 of Capsize type accident
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Figure 5-15: frequency of fail (red-block) and safe (blue-block) of accident assessment process under
phase-2 for capsize/listing type accident

Failure in taking emergency response action was also observed. Altering speed is the
most common action taken by the crew after becoming aware of compromised
stability. However, the issues existed not just in the timing and sequence (such as
action too late), but also in its selection and quality (action too little). Human failure
is identified to contribute to the failure during the stage of action taking (Figure 5-16
C). The common human factors that influence failure are mostly confusion, lack of
vigilance, and distraction.
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Figure 5-16: Detailed information on the emergency response action under phase-2 for capsize/listing
type accident

Up to phase-2, the accident data shows no proper mitigation action taken by the
related parties. Hence, most of the cases reviewed continued to the next phase of the
accident.
5.3.4 Phase-3 result for the Capsize/Listing type accidents
From the 5 cases of Ropax ferry capsize/listing accidents, SEMOMAP recorded 33
event of accident assessment process to deal with the emergency situation. The data
compiled shows that emergency response was taken mostly by the muster personnel,
lowering MES (marine emergency system)/liferafts and call for SAR services. From
the data compiled, failure during the phase continued to occur. Failures observed
mostly during stage of emergency response and evacuation action (Figure 5-17). This
condition is considered to influence the process of evacuation, whether successful or
causing more loss of life.
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Frequency of fail/safe during cognitive process under Phase-3 of Capsize type accident
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Figure 5-17: frequency of fail (red-block) and safe (blue-block) of accident assessment process under
phase-3 for capsize/listing type accident

Failures were identified mainly during the process of evacuation itself. SEMOMAP
records factors of timing and sequence, and selection and quality as still the most
common issues. Failure was also observed to take place during the stage of analysis,
specifically during the planning and decision making process. Human failure was
also the source of failure that resulted in the overall problem in the evacuation stage
(Figure 5-18). The human factors that commonly existed and affected the failure
were delay in planning and taking decisions, due to factors of confusion, expectation
bias, time pressure and distraction.
From the reviewed cases, due to insufficient effort and mitigation of the issues, all
cases resulted in total loss with casualty/s.
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Figure 5-18: Detailed information on the emergency response and evacuation action under phase-3 for
capsize/listing type accident

5.4

SEMOMAP results for Collision type accidents

5.4.1 Identified contributory factors for collision type accidents
Factors affecting human element under Collision category accidents
For the 3 cases of ropax ferry involved collision accidents, SEMOMAP recorded 188
interactions between 5 human elements involved in the collision accident with 26
factors of HFACS level-3. In particular, for collision type accidents, Pilot is another
human element present as a support during the navigational process.
Under the organisational influence category, factors under resource management are
the most influential for crew performance in handling the risk of collision. Lack of
human resources (in terms of training and manning), and presence of poor
equipment/facility resources are found to be the most common issues affecting crew
behaviour when dealing with risk of collision (Figure 5-19A). The captain, the
officer on watch and helmsman are the common human elements affected.
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Under the supervision category, the factor of Shipborne related shortcomings is
known to develop risk of collision and affect crew performance when handling this
kind of situation. The most identified factor that took place was failure to identify
corrective action and failure to correct inappropriate/risky behaviour. The issues
affected the captain, chief officer, OOW, helmsman and pilot (Figure 5-19 B).
Table 5-5: Identified factors under HFACS level 2 that influence the Human Element performance for
Capsize/Listing type accident
Factors
L1

L2
Resource Management

Organisational
Influences (i)

Organisational Climate
Organisational Process

Statutory Factors

Inadequate Supervision
Supervision (ii)

Planned Inappropriate
Operations
Failed to Correct Known
Problems
Supervisory Violations
Environmental Factors

Preconditions (iii) Crew Condition
Personnel Factors
Errors
Unsafe Acts (iv)
Violations

L3
Lack of Human Resources
Poor Technological Resources
Poor Equipment/Facility
Resources
Disorganised Structure
Inadequate Policies
Poor Work Culture
Poorly Designed Operations
Lack of Oversight
Poor International/ National
Standards
Inadequate Flag State
Implementation
Poor Shipborne and Shore
Supervision

Total Identified
Factors
5
3
6
2
1
6
3
11
4
6
12

Poor Shipborne Operations

13

Shipborne Related Shortcomings

23

Shipborne Violations
Poor Physical Environment
Poor Technological Environment
Negative Cognitive Factors
Poor Physiological State
Poor Crew Interaction
Poor Personal Readiness
Skill-based errors
Decision and judgement errors
Perceptual errors
Routine
Exceptional
Total

2
10
5
7
1
23
10
14
10
6
1
4
188
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Figure 5-19: identified HFACS level-2 factors that influenced each involved human performance in
the collision type accident

Under the precondition category, personal factors are identified as common issues in
the escalation of risk of collision. Most of the factors are poor crew interaction and
poor personal readiness to handle the risk of collision. Another significant factor is
lack of cross-monitoring performance mainly indicated during the critical stage of
operation and the risk of collision becoming prominent. The factors were identified
to affect all involved human elements as mentioned in the previous paragraph. The
environment factor as well as ship movement and manoeuvres are other significant
factors that influence crew performance in handling risk of collision.
Under the unsafe act category, the errors are the prominent factors observed, whereas
some violations were also identified during the handling of risk of collision. Poor
techniques/seamanship is the obvious factor under skill based error shown by the
crew when handling risk of collision. The data also identified perceptual errors as
another symptom of error by the crew.
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Factors affecting technical element under Collision type accidents
From the 3 cases of Ropax ferry collision, SEMOMAP recorded 15 interactions
between two technical elements with 10 factors of HFACS level-3. The hull and
main engine are the technical elements that were most involved during the risk of
collision.
Under organisational influence, poor equipment/facility resources as well as
organisational climates are the two common issues in Ropax ferry operation that
increase risk of collision (Table 5-6). More specifically, Lack of engineer support,
issues in acquisition policies/ design process, Failure to correct known design flaws
under resource management is identified to influence the technical element such as
ship hull and main engine.
Under the supervision category, two factors of poor shipborne operations and
shipborne related shortcomings are found to affect the condition of the hull and main
engine which later increased the risk of collision.
Table 5-6: Identified factors under HFACS level 2 that influence the Human Element performance for
Capsize/Listing type accident
Factors
L1

L2
Resource Management

Organisational
Influences (i)

Organisational Climate

Statutory Factors

Supervision (ii)

Preconditions (iii)

L3
Poor Technological Resources
Poor Equipment/Facility
Resources
Poor Work Culture
Lack of Oversight
Poor International/National
Standards
Inadequate Flag State
Implementation

Planned Inappropriate
Poor Shipborne Operations
Operations
Failed to Correct Known
Shipborne Related Shortcomings
Problems
Poor Physical Environment
Environmental Factors
Poor Technological Environment
Total
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Total Identified
Factors
1
3
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
2
15

Factors of poor physical environment and poor technological environment, such as
ship movement and faulty equipment, were also identified to contribute significantly
to the degrading performance of hull and main engine.
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Figure 5-20: identified HFACS level-2 factors that influenced each involved technical performance in
the collision type accident

5.4.2 Phase-1 result for the collision type accidents
Following the review of the sequence of events for 3 cases of Ropax ferry collision,
SEMOMAP recorded 51 cognition processes (Figure 5-21).
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Frequency of fail/safe during cognitive process under Phase-1 of Collision type accident
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Figure 5-21: frequency of fail (red-block) and safe (blue-block) of accident assessment process under
phase-1 for collision type accident

There are five common components identified to indicate risk of collision, which are
AIS, Lookout, and other equipment such as radar and Sea chart. The SEMOMAP
result shows that there was no failure of indication of risk of collision by all relevant
and available means.
However, failure in handling risk of collision was mostly identified during the stage
of analysis of the threat of collision. Under this stage, most of the failures were
observed to take place during the planning and decision making process. These were
identified as human failures, including mistakes and delays in planning and making
decisions. More specifically, human factors such as confusion, distractions,
forgetting long term training and procedures, and lack of vigilance are identified as
the common issues involved in the failure of the cognitive process.
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Figure 5-22: detailed information on the threat analysis under phase-1 for collision type accident

Failures during this stage of analysis contributed to the failure to take preventive
action. The SEMOMAP recorded 6 common actions taken to prevent the risk of
collision from developing. On the shipboard side, reverse thrust, steering and
manoeuvring, and altering speed were the common actions taken; meanwhile, on the
offboard side, other vessels took actions such as altering course and altering speed.
However, failures were indicated mostly under timing and sequence and also under
selection and quality. Under timing and sequence, action too late is the common
problem indicated by crew performance to deal with the risk of collision. This was
mainly caused by human factors of distraction, expectation bias and forgetting longterm training. The human factors were mainly the result of desire for harmony,
discrimination failure, distraction and forgetting long-term training and procedure.
The data indicates that due to improper handling at every stage of cognition to the
risk of collision, the events later developed into accidents
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5.4.3 Phase-2 result for the collision type accidents
During phase-2, SEMOMAP recorded a total of 27 cognition processes from 3
collision cases observed (Figure 5-23).
Frequency of fail/safe during cognitive process under phase-2 of Collision type accident
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Figure 5-23: frequency of fail (red-block) and safe (blue-block) of accident assessment process under
phase-2 for collision type accident

Since the collision become obvious, all indicative measures showed sufficient
information to determine the status of the ship after the accident. All related
indicators such as hull damage sensor, stability indicator, the crew and even
passengers themselves were involved in the stage. However, the failures came to
exist during the next step of cognition.
During the system health detection stage, failures were observed mainly during the
evaluation stage where the human was the main source of the issues. Typical causes
of human failures were factors of confusion, distraction, forgetting long-term
training, tunnel vision and expectation bias. Other crew as a common source of
system health detection shows the factor of confusion as the common human factor
in place.
Improper handling of events after the collision worsened the situation by other
failures that happened during system health analysis. The master was identified as
the major human element during this stage. The data shows that most of the failures
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occurred during the planning and decision making process. Key factors were delay in
planning and decision, commonly due to human factors of distraction, discrimination
failure, and expectation bias.
A. System health Analyser under Phase-2
cognitive process of Collision type accident
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Figure 5-24: detailed information on the system health analysis under phase-2 for collision type
accident

Even though errors and failures took place at every stage of the cognitive process,
not all collisions ended up with severe consequences. The SEMOMAP recorded 1
case that concluded with mitigated loss but, unfortunately, with casualty as a result.
From the cases of Ropax ferry collision, it was also observed that the event of
collision is a trigger for development of other events. For instance, 1 case of collision
resulted in the over heeling of the ferry that allowed seawater ingress to the cardeck
and later the event of capsize developed. Another case shows that fire broke out
after the event of collision. Hence the subsequent evacuation effort was related to the
fire accident.
During the emergency response under phase-2 for collision cases, SEMOMAP
identified 6 common actions taken namely: contained hull damaged, stability and
secure cargo, sprinkler system, and fire fighting. Failures were observed during the
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process which mostly occurred under timing and sequence factor (action too late),
and quality and selection (action too little). The failure data shows that the failures
came from common human factors such as confusion, distraction, forgetting longterm training and procedure.
5.4.4 Phase-3 result to the collision type accident
Since the outcome of phase-2 varies due to different development of accidents, the
data also provides different information of response. For instance, as one collision
did not result in severe consequences, no further phase was developed. However, in
the other cases, failures were observed to occur in different stages of cognition
during phase-3
Frequency of fail/safe during cognitive process under Phase-3 of Collision type accident
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Figure 5-25: frequency of fail (red-block) and safe (blue-block) of accident assessment process under
phase-3 for collision type accident

SEMOMAP recorded 6 common emergency actions taken during the evacuation
process such as call SAR service, muster personnel and lower MES/liferaft.
However, as fire was also found to develop after collision, of fire fighting was also
performed during the phase.
During the emergency response, failure was observed to occur. Failures were
identified during all cognitive processes of the emergency process: communication,
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timing and sequence, and selection and quality (Figure 5-26 C). From the cases
reviewed, the human is identified as the sole source of the failures, which were due
to factors of confusion, distraction, forgetting long-term training and procedures and
other factor such as being overwhelmed due to the panic situation of passengers.
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Figure 5-26: detailed information on the emergency response and evacuation action under phase-3 for
collision type accident

Failures were also observed during the system health analysis stage which mainly
took place during the planning and decision making stage. Human is observed as the
main source of failure. The captain takes a major role in analysing the situation
during the emergency stage as the captain is the person in charge when the situation
becomes worse. From the cases reviewed, delay in decision making contributed to
the failure of the evacuation process. In addition, common factors that influenced the
failure of the master were confusion, expectation bias, and forgetting long term
training and procedure
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Of the SEMOMAP records for the two cases that developed into phase-3, one case
developed into severe loss and the other concluded with an event of total loss.
Unfortunately, both cases resulted in a number of casualties.

5.5

Conclusion

The results of the SEMOMAP are too comprehensive to describe individually.
However, detailed results of SEMOMAP to all cases are provided in the appendix.
From the SEMOMAP data above, failure in every phase of accidents influences the
next process of cognition and results in greater consequences. While the data
identifies human failure as the main source of failure due to common human factors,
equipment also contributed significantly.
Most of the failures were found to occur during the most critical stages of the
cognition process such as analysis and action taking to prevent or mitigate the issues.
In more detail, planning and decision is the area where most failures occurred.
In summary, the table below provides the different outcomes for the reviewed cases.
Table 5-7: list of reviewed cases based on its nature of the accident and the final outcome

No
1

Type of
Accident
Fire

No of
cases
8

2
3

Capsize
Collision

5
3

End result of the case
4 severe loss with casualty/s
2 mitigated loss without
casualty
1 severe loss without casualty
1 total loss without casualty
5 Total loss with casualty
1 mitigated loss
1 total loss with casualty
1 severe loss with casualty
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Location of accident
3 Engine room
5 Cardeck/Acc space

6

Discussion and analysis of the SEMOMAP result

The previous chapter provided an overview of the results of the SEMOMAP to the
selected cases of domestic ropax ferry accidents. However, it would be meaningless
without any proper interpretation of the information. Thus, the following section
provides cross relation information and analyses the information to achieve a
comprehensive outcome.
Referring to the objectives of the dissertation stated earlier, the interpretation of the
SEMOMAP outcome focused on the identification of major systemic issues under
HFACS category, identification to typical sources of failure that contributed to the
accidents, the shipborne performance in handling and mitigating the consequences,
and comparison with other analysis results issued by another organisation..

6.1

Identified major systemic issues and their influence on the shipboard
element

Reason‘s SCM recognises systemic issues as the latent factors that increase the risk
of accident in the operation system. Therefore, accident prevention or even safety
improvement programs should consider the contributory factor as the first target
instead of focusing on the sharp end (operator).
Following the outcome of the SEMOMAP, the contributory factors for accidents
involving domestic ropax ferries were identified. However, to avoid lengthy
discussion due to fine details and too many different categories, this dissertation only
focuses on explaining the most frequent factors.
Since the ropax ferry has a typical operation, the discussion generalises the result of
the contributory factor by combining all recorded events and analyses to identify the
influence pattern of the factors on human and technical shipborne operation
elements.
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6.1.1 Organisational influence
Organisational influence is considered the first barrier where the risk should be
mitigated. The SEMOMAP results highlight a stronger relationship between the
factors under HFACS mostly affecting the Captain, the chief officer and chief
engineer.
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Climate

Lack of Human
Resources
Poor Technological
Resources
Poor Equipment/Facility
Resources

Captain
Chief Officer/1st
Officer
2nd Officer
3rd Officer

Disorganise Structure
Other Officer
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Poor Work Culture
Pilot

Organisational
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AB

Poorly designed
operation

Bosun

Lack of oversight
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Inappropriate
Procedures

Statutory Factors

Ch. Engineer
2nd Engineer

Poor International/
National Standards
Inadequate flag state
implementation

Other Engineer

Figure 6-1: illustration to the relationship between human element with identified HFACS factor
Level-3 under Organisational influence category

Under organisation influence, poor equipment/facility resources are considered to be
the most influencing factors, while lack of human resource and lack of oversight are
the other factors identified as affecting human element performance. For instance,
poor equipment was observed mostly in the fire type category, where there was a
lack of sufficient engineer supports and there was no backup from the organisational
side to correct design flaws. In more detail, during fire Case No. 6 (refer to Table
0-73), the installation of non-marine use cables had resulted in higher risk of
electrical malfunction. The company was not able to supply adequate parts for
engineers to maintain the safe operation of ship electricity (NTSCb, 2007). Another
pertinent example of poor equipment was found in the case of capsizes. In most of
the cases of capsize, improper water freeing port was the biggest technical faulty
identified during the course of the investigation since accumulated water in the car
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deck is an obvious factor affecting ship stability. The freeing port issues were mostly
connected to lack of maintenance, and failure to observe the condition regularly.
In terms of lack of human resources, the issues mostly took place due to lack of
training. The strongest relations were indicated in the fire accidents. In fire accidents,
most of the investigation reports indicate that either regular basis training or even
single training was not sufficiently provided to the crew. Ferry operation is wellknown for its heavy and tight schedule. The investigation also established that even
when training was found to be regularly held, it was not sufficient to provide crew
with real time conditions. This was evidenced during fire fighting operations, when
most of the crew failed to put out the fire in time. Another indication shows that, due
to lack of training, most of the crew forget how to perform properly in emergency
situations and allow the passengers to react on their own behalf. Lack of control of
passengers is another indication of low competency of the crew due to insufficient
training provided by the ship management.
Another factor that is considered of importance is the statutory factors. Substantial
evidence indicated that lack of implementation of the safety regulation has
contributed indirectly but significant to the risk of accident. For instance, lack of
inspection of cargo onboard vehicles during the loading process has resulted in
dangerous cargo entering unnoticed. Investigations into the accidents identified this
issue took place in most of cases of fire, in which the fire started from a vehicle.
The factor of lack of oversight is another significant issue influencing the shipborne
elements. The issues are mainly related to the factors of no proper monitoring,
checking of resources climate and processes to ensure safe work environment. For
instance, a common issue in domestic ropax ferry operation is tightness of schedule.
The ferry operation authority provides limited time for berth operations as stipulated
in standards for port ferry operation. The standard operation time is considered
insufficient to accomplish handling of the cargo and departure preparation by the
ship crew. A number of cases indicate that, due to these issues, factors of omission
and lack of vigilance took place, increasing risk of operation to some extent.
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Figure 6-2: illustration of the relationship between technical element with identified HFACS factor
Level-3 under Organisational Influence category

With regard to the technical element, the chart above presents the common ship
equipment that is affected by omissions and misses in the systemic factors. Issues in
training, poor equipment/facilities resource, and inadequate flag state implementation
were observed to influence mostly the main engine, hull and other types of technical
elements such as fixed/portable fire extinguisher system, freeing port structure, and
fire retardant layer for accommodation deck. For instance, in case no. 14, the lack of
class survey during maintenance of the ship was identified to create the degrading
condition of the hull. In another example, in case No. 13, insufficient port inspection
of the cargo stacking limit was observed to allow tight spaces in the vehicle
arrangement on the car deck (NTSCa, 2012).
Policy on second hand ship placement was also found to be critical since some of
cases indicate the issue of improper assessment to operate such kinds of ships beyond
their operating limits. Cases no. 5 and 14 are taken as examples indicating the
problem in ferry operation policy. Both ships were previously built and operated in
the coastal area of Japan which is known for its calm water conditions. Back to
Indonesia, the ferries were improperly modified and operated in waters with high
probability of high waves (NTSCb, 2012)(NTSCa, 2007). Nonetheless the weather
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was not considered as a key contributing factor; however, the decision to allocate
such type and size of ferries to the risky waters was considered inappropriate.
6.1.2 Supervision
Supervision is, under SCM, considered as the second barrier set up to prevent safety
deficiencies from occurring. The SEMOMAP results indicate factors under the
Supervision category that influence shipborne human element performance.
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Officer
2nd Officer
Inadequate Supervision

Poor Shipborne and
Shore Supervision

3rd Officer
Other Officer

Planned Inappropriate
Operations

Poor Shipborne
Operations
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Bosun
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Shipborne Violations

OS
Ch/1st Engineer
2nd Engineer
Other Engineer

Figure 6-3: identified Supervision’s factors that influence involved human element in the Indonesian
domestic ferry operation

The most identified factors under the supervision category are poor shipborne and
shore supervision, poor shipborne operation and shipborne related short comings.
Under level-4 of HFACS under SEMOMAP, lack of risk assessment was the most
significant factor influencing the performance of the human element, which mostly
affected the master and chief officer.
Risk assessment for shipborne operation is of importance to foresee and take proper
action so the risk of operation can be minimised. Lack of risk assessment was mostly
identified in the case of fire accidents. In these particular cases, where most of the
fires started from external factors such as cargo and passengers, there were limited
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formal risk assessments performed and there was no proper procedure to support the
shipboard operation in performing such action. Case no. 3 and case no. 13 are
examples of how lack of risk performance contributes to the accident.
In case no. 3, the ship designed and planned to serve inland waterway in Papua
region. However, later in the field application the ship also require to serve Merauke
port which was outside the region and to go to the port, the ship must sail in open
sea. At the time of accident, the ship experience heavy weather that was considered
beyond limits of its operation. The management later found did not properly assess
the possibility of higher weather and considered to ignore the actual field operation
issues. In case no. 13, ship management tend to ignore the risk of higher cargo
stacking loaded on the lorry. This condition resulted in narrower access to ship crew
and also public access. When fire started in a lorry on the cardeck, the crew found
difficulty to access the fire origin and hinder the overall fire fighting process.
The issues in Supervision also affects technical element. From 16 cases reviewed,
SEMOMAP identified 7 common technical elements that considerably play more
significant role during the accident (Figure 6-4).
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Supervisory Violations

Shipborne Violations

Other

Figure 6-4: identified Supervision’s factors that influence involved technical element in the Indonesian
domestic ferry operation

Factor of shipborne related shortcomings and poor shipborne operations are
identified to be the most influential issues to the technical element. The SEMOMAP
identify stronger relations among factors of factor of failed to correct a safety hazard
and failed to initiate corrective action to the technical elements of main engine, hull
and element under other category.
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The issues mainly took place during capsize and fire type accident. Under the
Capsize type, the hull is the most affected technical subject. In case no 14, condition
of scupper is being ignored by the crew that lead the seawater could not freely
discharge. Nor shore based management and shipboard crew perform sufficient
supervision to this critical issue (NTSCb, 2012). In other capsize case, where the
condition of overdraft due to overloading process is also observed took place mostly.
Supervision to this particular condition is formally taken by the chief mate that
responsible in cargo operation and in addition port inspector before issuing sailing
permit. The condition of overdraft was acknowledge, however the redundancy
condition frequently took place and resulted in higher risk of accident.
Under Fire type where the main engine affected mostly, case no. 4 shows that
improper supervision to the crew work to the engine led to the degrading
performance of the main engine. In case no. 4 and case no. 12, improper maintenance
by the ship crew led to overheat condition which was increasing risk of fire. In
cardeck fire condition, supervision in the vehicle placement operation also had led
the condition where there were no sufficient spaces due to tight vehicle arrangement
for crew during the fire fighting operation.
Significant issue of supervision also observed in case no. 1, where the port operation
could not provide sufficient weighing facility to identify the actual weight of the
vehicle and cargo. Later the condition resulted in the overloaded condition to the ship
and increased risk of capsize.
6.1.3 Pre Condition
Under HFACS system, precondition is adverse condition that could affect shipboard
element performance, conditions and result in unsafe act or unsafe situation.
SEMOMAP also consider the degrading performance of technical element affected
by factors under precondition.
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Figure 6-5: Illustration to the relationship between factors under supervision with human element

Since the importance of the factor, the discussion focused to explain each sub
category under Supervision
Environmental factors
Shappel and Wiegman noted that environmental factor is one of the key factors that
influence shipboard element which is comprises of either physical and/or
technological factors. Both sub factors can be interrelated to create unsafe condition
or unsafe error climate for. From reviewed to 16 cases of Indonesian domestic ropax
ferry accident, SEMOMAP records ship movements and manoeuvre under poor
physical environment indicates stronger relation with degrading performance of
human element in capsize type accident.
During capsize accident, most of the ship part affected by the heeled condition of the
ship. In some extent, engine and propulsion performance could have been affected
due to many reasons such as not fully submerged propeller or main engine stopped
due to problem of fuel supply since the affected fuel level in the tank. On the other
hand, unusual ship angle for passenger could start the panic situation. Another issue
on the ship manoeuvre can be also seen in case no. 1. Poor ship manoeuvre and
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movement gave limited option to the ship crew to handle ship properly. Excessive
ship movement during berthing operation had damaged the stern construction and
allow the seawater flooded the ship. Another factor identified is the factor of
temperature-thermal and stress that contributed significantly in engine room fire
accident.
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Temperature - thermal stressFire
Constrained tool useFire
Controls and switchesFire
Inaccessible maintenance areaFire
Machinery space layoutFire
Procedure not understandableFire

Figure 6-6: Identified factors f L3 under Supervision category that affecting Indonesian domestic ferry
operation

Poor technological environment also found influential to the shipboard performance
of domestic ferry. Barriers and faulty equipment is the common precondition issues
under this category. Faulty equipment not just only identified during fire accident but
also identified in capsizes type.
This significant condition under poor technological environment and poor physical
environment is relevant with identified factor of lack of engineer support and poor
equipment facility resource that identified mostly in the Organisational Influence
Category.
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When it relates with the condition of the fleet itself, most of the involved ferries are
old. Eventhough regular maintenance performed and annual docking is conducted,
the ship condition cannot be excluded by the fact that the old structure, machinery
space and all its peripherals is still giving the difficult condition for the crew. It
required a lot of effort and resource to retrofit the ship condition which is unlikely for
the shipowner to do so due to high cost project. Number of evidence showing the
technical problem found when the crew attempt to mitigate the risk of operation.
Case no. 5 can be taken as example. Faulty of watertight seal on the ramp door
resulted in the seawater to enter the car deck. another faulty equipment in different
case can also be observed in the case no. 4 where CO2 installation not work properly
when it operated to put out the fire in engine room.
Along with the challenges mentioned in the chapter 3 above, this condition is
somewhat difficult to deal with due to some factor such as financial problem for
shipowner, high demand for transport compare to supply.
Crew Condition
Crew condition play significant role in determining the safe onboard operation.
Under the category, the negative cognitive factors are the most influence factor to the
human element in the domestic ferry operation.
Under crew condition category, issue on complacency under negative cognitive
factors were identified as common factor that influence the crew performance in
most of the accident reviewed (Figure 6-7).
This reasonable to believe since ferry typical operation is monotonous and regular.
Nearly every time the personnel perform similar operation without any additional
work challenge. From 16 cases review, factor of complacency in domestic ferry
operation mostly take place in short distance voyage. Complacency takes place in
any kind of operations and could result in devastated outcome if not taken care
properly. Proper work roster, competency refreshment by providing regular training,
adequate crew management can be considered to reduced the excess of the
complacency. Case no. 1 and case no16 can be taken as example to indicate the
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severity of the complacency in ferry operation. In Case no. 1 typical berthing
operation provide ease situation the officer and not warned the damaged resulted
from excessive operation which later resulting in sea water flooded the cardeck. In
case no. 16, regular ferry movement taken in avoiding the other ship which was later
found creates critical situation. Later, the officer on watch corrected the action but
insufficient to avoid the collision
Issues in technical/procedure/knowledge mostly identified during fire accident and
capsize accident. Since no proper training was provided to the crew or proper one,
crew found trouble when handling critical situation. In capsize accident, some
findings from investigation identified that the master unable to show proper
understanding on ship stability. As a result he did not aware with consequence of his
wring recovery action to stabilise the ship. Later the ship stability worsens and
capsized the ship.
Other than those factor mentioned above some indication on the overconfidence,
channelize attention were the other factor that contributed to degrading performance
of the crew.
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Figure 6-7: identified issues on crew condition category

Inadequate rest is other factor that contributes to the degrading performance of ship
personnel. Based on the survey conducted by NTSC in 2013, most of the ferries
operation in Merak Bakauheni ferry lane adopts what so called ―two trip‖ shift or 12
hours shift. This has been done regularly. In the case no. 8, fire broke out from deck
equipment when the ship on her final stage of the voyage. The crew was identified
not to have sufficient rest hour and affecting their performance in fire fighting.
Personnel Factors
The table below indicates identified personnel factors issue from 16 domestic ferry
accident reports. Issues of cross monitoring performance and challenge and reply are
the common findings among other factors in under category of poor crew interaction,
whereas pattern of poor risk judgement and inadequate training are two common
personnel factors identified under category of poor personal readiness.
Issue in cross monitoring performance took place when no performance monitoring
conducted by the shipboard management level or shore side. Challenge and reply is
another shipboard performance issues that increase risk of operation. In most of the
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case reviewed, despite known fault condition and activity conducted performed, the
lower rank feel reluctant to remind or warning the adverse condition.
Case no. 10, 13 and 11 can be taken as example to indicate the problem. During
loading process, vehicle placement is tighten to provide chance to carry more
vehicle. The condition has been proved create problem to the crew activity during
emergency response conducted.
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Team work delegation

Miscommunication
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Task-in-progress re-planning

Pattern of poor risk judgement

Inadequate training

Time constraints

Maintenance task knowledge

Figure 6-8: factor HFACS Level 4 under personnel factors of Precondition identified in the reviewed
cases of domestic ferry accident

Pattern of poor risk judgement were identified also under poor personal readiness
category whereas inadequate training as the other factor that contributed significantly
to the degrading performance of the human element.
The chart below provides a cross reference how the factors above influence the
human element which later considered contributed to misbehaviour of the crew and
increasing risk of accident in the ferry operation.
The complex interaction Poor crew interactions found mostly during cases of capsize
and fire. Obviously, those cases require intact coordination among the crews since it

110

affecting entire ship system. During capsize, ideally all crew should have been aware
with the condition and react based on the each duty under emergency response
system, so it goes as well during fire accident. When the crew coordination was poor,
the efforts to mitigate risk become useless.
During critical situation such as handling the potential risk of fire, crew coordination
is considered utmost importance. Taking example of case no. 8, 11 and 13, the crew
unable to perform well due to the emergency response measure was not coordinated
properly due to confusion, distraction and factor of lack of training. The situation
was worsen when the fire started in inaccessible place such due to tight arrangement
of the ship
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FireOS
FireCaptain
CapsizeCaptain
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Poor Personal Readiness

CapsizeCaptain

CapsizeHelmsman

CapsizePilot
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FireCaptain

FireOS

Fire2nd Engineer

FireOther Engineer

Fire1st/Chief Officer

Fire3rd Officer

Fire1st/Chief Engineer

FireOther Officer

Fire2nd Officer

CapsizeBosun

CapsizeAB

Figure 6-9: Human element interaction with factor under Personnel factor of Supervision

6.1.4 Unsafe Act
The HFACS assume that the unsafe act condition is existed while all previous factors
were aligned to create subsequent adverse event. Errors represent the mental and
physical activities of individuals that fail to achieve their intended outcome; that is,
the result of the person‘s action was not as expected. A violation, on the other hand,
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committed when the person‘s action reflects a ―willful disregard‖ for manuals, or
standard operating procedures or regulations (Wiegmann & Shappel, 2001).
Under SEMOMAP model, the unsafe act considered as the risky behaviour that been
repeated in previous time and increase risk in the shipboard operation.
Captain
Chief Officer/1st
Officer

Error

Decision and
Judgment Error

Other Officer

Perceptual Error

Helmsman

Skill-Based Error

Pilot
AB

Violation

Exceptional

Bosun

Routine

OS
Ch/1st Engineer
2nd Engineer
Other Engineer

Figure 6-10: Identified human element‘s unsafe act

The chart above presents the list of human element that mostly involved in the
domestic ferry accident. The action by the Captain, Chief Officer, Chief engineer and
OS were the subject that identified showing the
The most prominent factor under unsafe act category from 16 reviewed cases is the
skill-based type error and decision-judgement errors. All human element involved
indicates the symptom in each type of accident. Failure in assessing risk during
operation is the most common error whereas, poor techniques/seamanship is the
second most common error identified in the reviewed cases of domestic ferry
accident.
On the other hand, factors of accepted unnecessary hazard under exceptional
violation are the common violation committed by the ship crew whereas factors of
exceeded limits of system as the second common factor.
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Figure 6-11: Unsafe act factors identified in all reviewed domestic ropax ferry accident

In most of the cases reviewed, poor seamanship technique was observed due to many
reasons such as competencies, experience and training. If it related with previous
factors start from organisational factors, supervision and precondition, this condition
is predicted to be exist. The symptom of error in seamanship technique could be seen
by indication of lack of training in the organisational influence. Issues in supervision
most likely resulted in the error in risk assessment.
Typical violation committed by the crew also can presumably originate from issues
identified in the personnel factor and crew condition. However in some cases,
inadequate supervision could have also been the factor that contributes to the
violation. Taking example of accepted unnecessary hazard, in most of the fire type
accident where it start from the cardeck, the crew experience difficulties during fire
fighting process. The hazard should have been recognised when the crew arranged
the vehicle tightly. In some other evidence indicates that the violation to the
regulation deemed necessary when the ferry frequently encountered other ship that
did not take proper manoeuvre under the applied regulation.
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In case no. 16, the ferry ships tend to have irregular movement in the strait based on
the officers on watch seamanship. While the ferry in a crossing situation, most of the
ferry tend to avoid collision with the other ship by aiming the stern of the opposed
ships. In some occasion, the action not complies with COLREGs and creates
confusion to other ship. In the particular case, the other ship assumed that the ferry
maintain its course, meanwhile at the same time the ferry already alter the course to
aim the other ships stern since the officer onboard ferry also assumes that no course
alteration were made by the other ships. The event later concluded with both ship
collide.
It interesting to notes that some unsafe act also influences the condition of technical
element. Following data of SEMOMAP, violation type exceptional and routine are
considered influence the main engine, hull type and other technical element. The
common factors under this violation type accepted unnecessary hazard and failed to
comply with manual. Investigation to case no. 6 found that the crew installed the
non-marine use cable for electrical installation which increased risk of fire in
shipboard operation.
Alarm Panel and
system
Main Engine

Decision and
Judgment Error

Error

Skill-Based Error

Hull

Separators

Exceptional

Violation

Routine
Other

Figure 6-12: identified unsafe act behaviour that influence technical element

Crew error and violation affecting technical element mostly identified in fire type
accident. In case no. 4 and 12, the crew was not following the standard manual for
main engine maintenance, thus, the maintenance conducted was not properly
performed and resulted in the degrading performance of the main engine indicated by
event of overheat.
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6.2

Pattern for failure and its typical source

During the critical event, humans and machines interact intensively as a whole
system to maintain safe shipboard operation. Failure during the interaction could lead
to either increased risk of operation, resulting in a new dangerous event or even
failure during emergency operation that leads to additional catastrophic
consequences.
The SEMOMAP data provides valuable information to demonstrate how human
performance influences the overall shipboard operation and system. Overall results
indicate that human failure is the main factor affecting shipborne operation during
the critical stages such as handling the risk, mitigating the consequence or dealing
with emergency action/response.
From 16 cases of Indonesian domestic ferry accidents, SEMOMAP recorded 1683
events of cognition from each phase and stage in different types of accidents. The
chart below shows in which phase and stage of phase failures were found to have
occurred.
Phase-1
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Information
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Communication
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Indication
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Analysis

Excecution of Action

Figure 6-13: SEMOMAP result for failure identification under phase-1 in every cognition stage for all
type of domestic ropax ferry involved accident.

During phase-1, most of the cases indicated two main cognitive areas where failure
occurred. During analysis of the threat, failure occurred mostly during decision
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making, and failure in planning occurred in similar proportion (Figure 6-13). Most of
the cases reviewed indicated that frequency of failure was observed to be higher
during executions of action, mainly in terms of selection and quality, and also in
regard to timing and sequence.
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Figure 6-14: SEMOMAP result for failure identification under phase-2 in every cognition stage for all
type of domestic ropax ferry involved

During phase-2, the pattern of failure indicates similarities compared to the failure
pattern during phase-1. The failures mostly occurred during the execution of action,
which, in this particular phase, is action to emerge from critical situation after the
accident. Failures in phase-2 were observed to take place most frequently during the
stage of timing and sequence. A similar failure pattern was also shown in phase-3.
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Figure 6-15: SEMOMAP result for failure identification in every cognition stage under phase-3 for all
type of domestic ropax ferry involved

Following the data acquired from selected reports, frequency of human failure
compared to equipment failure was found to be higher. The proportion of human
failure compared to equipment failure was various but within the range of 83% to 93
%, whereas equipment failures ranged from 7% to 17%.
Table 6-1: Failure percentage in the accident assessment process for each type of accident
Observeable process fail/safe status
Applicable &
Not Succesfull
Not Applicable
Successful
(failure)

Source of Failure
Equipment
%
Failure

No

Nature of
Accident

Accident Step
event

1

Fire

836

544

120

172

100

83%

20

17%

2

Capsize

495

291

90

114

84

93%

6

7%

3

Collision

352

226

61

65

57

93%

4

7%

1683

1061

271

351

241

89%

30

11%

Human
Failure

%

In further detail, compared to the number of the cognitive process, human failure was
also found to remain high. The proportion of human failure was found to be varied,
depending on the type of accident and stage of cognitive process.
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The table below indicates percentage of failures identified from cases of Indonesian
domestic ferry accidents compared to total cognitive processes in every stage of each
phase for different types of accidents. The percentages indicated in the table were
calculated from the number of failures observed in every phase of stage compared to
the total cognitive events recorded under same phase of stage.
Table 6-2: Percentage of failure source for different type of ropax ferry involved accident
Fire
Phase

Phase-1

Phase-2

Phase-3

Stages

Capsize

Collision

Proportion of Failure

Proportion of Failure

Proportion of Failure

Human
Failure

Human
Failure

Human
Failure

Equipment
Failure

No. of
event

Event Not
successful

No. of Event Not
Equipment event successful
Failure

No. of Event Not
Equipment event successful
Failure

Threat Indication

52

8

75%

25%

60

1

100%

0%

34

0

-

-

Threat Detection

78

12

100%

0%

90

7

86%

14%

51

5

100%

0%

Threat Analysis

78

8

100%

0%

90

23

100%

0%

51

23

100%

0%

Threat Prevention
Action

78

21

81%

19%

90

23

87%

13%

51

14

71%

29%

System Health
Indication

56

0

-

-

8

0

-

-

18

0

-

-

System Health
Detection

84

4

100%

0%

12

0

-

-

27

1

100%

0%

System Health
Analysis

84

8

100%

0%

12

6

100%

0%

27

4

100%

0%

Emergency Response
Action

84

34

76%

24%

12

8

88%

13%

27

4

100%

0%

Emergency Response
& Evacuation Action

66

23

74%

26%

33

13

92%

8%

18

8

100%

0%

System Health
Indication

44

0

-

-

22

0

-

-

12

0

-

-

System Health
Detection

66

0

-

-

33

3

100%

0%

18

0

-

-

System Health
Analysis

66

2

100%

0%

33

6

100%

0%

18

2

100%

0%

As stated in the previous chapter, failures mostly occurred during selection and
execution of action, either action to prevent the threat or emergency action to
mitigate the consequences after the accident. A similar condition occurred in the last
stage of phase-2 where most of the failures took place.
The following sections identify the contribution of failure from human and
equipment failure perspectives.
6.2.1 Human performance in critical situation
The SEMOMAP outcome of the human performance identified some aspects of
concern while they dealt with critical situations. As explained in the previous
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chapter, human performance in every step of cognition plays a significant role in
determining the consequence of the event.
The SEMOMAP models views contributing factor under systemic process contribute
and affect the shipboard element. By cross relating the data in contributory factor
relevant to the human performance behaviour, the significant relation of the factor
under Phase-0 can also be presented.
The Figure 5-2, Figure 5-10, Figure 5-19 in chapter 5 indicates how the issues in the
systemic factors contributed, influencing and affecting human element performance
in shipboard operation in domestic ferry accident. Looking at the proportion of
human failures detected in all accident, masters other crews and ERT are identified
contributed in most of the failure occurred during cognitive process.
Master of Other vessels
and port SAR service
2%
Passenger
1%

Master of Other Vessel
Alters Course
1%
Master of Other ship in
collision course
1%

Chief Mate
2%
Chief Engineer
5%
EOW
3%
ERT
13%

other crews
31%

Helmsman
4%

Master
26%

OOW
9%

No Threat Prevention
Action
1%

Fleet Monitoring Centre
0%

No Threat Detection
1%

Figure 6-16: Distribution of human failures in all reviewed cases for every phase and every step.

In views of accident step process, the chart below developed based on the total
human failure identified during all stage of cognition in different type of accident.
The chart below indicates the 6 most failures took place in the event of accident
involved domestic ferry in Indonesian water.
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From the chart below, the master conducted most of failure during Analysis and
Action stage in fire type accident stage of analysis is the stage where human failure
mostly occurs. Failure by Other Crew also found higher during analysis process in
collision category, whereas failures of Other Crew also identified mostly during
stage of Action in capsize/listing type accident.
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Figure 6-17: Distribution of human failure based on each stage of cognition process and type of
accident.

Compare to the data provided in the Contributory Factor and accident development
phases, the data found conformity. There are number of systemic factors that have
been identified influencing human element which is mostly to the captain. The
evidence later supported by number of failures in the event of accident development.
This is not to mention that a single subject should bear all responsibility to any
failures committed. However, issues in the systemic itself that should have more
attention and properly managed.
As mentioned earlier, following the cases reviewed decision making process as well
as planning are the cognitive stage where failures mostly occurred. In further detail,
factor of delayed, wrong, unclear or even no analysis is observed.
Human failures planning also mostly found in similar condition. Failures in planning
also mostly identified in the collision type accident during stage of threat analysis
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under phase-1 (Figure 6-18). Factor of wrong planning is the most frequent factor
observes in the selected 16 cases of domestic ropax ferry accident. This condition
took place due to factor of lack of vigilance, forget long-term training, incorrect
detection and time pressure.
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Health Analysis
20%

FireThreat Analysis
15%

Figure 6-18: Human failure frequency in planning based on type of accident, its phase and cognition
stage

From all SEMOMAP data on human failures, its indicates that the decision maker
was not be able to make correct decision in time during in collision type accident
during threat analysis, whereas the other condition also found during capsize/listing
type accident (Figure 6-19). The most pertinent human factor under this
circumstance is the factors of wrong decision that contributed mostly by lack of longterm training and procedures, condition of confusion, being distracted, tunnel vision
and other factors.
In case no. 14, the master unable to assess situation properly due to absent of stability
data onboard the ships. His planning to reposition the ship was considered
inappropriate and later identified worsen the ship stability.
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Figure 6-19: human failure frequency in Decision Making based on type of accident, its phase and
cognition stage.

Human failure in executing the action also found too obvious and frequent. Data of
SEMOMAP identify the area of cognition that the particular failures mostly take
place. It shows that failure in timing and sequence is observed in every stage, every
phase of cognition in every type of accident. The SEMOMAP identify that human
failure during timing and sequence is mostly observed in emergency response action
under phase-2 of fire type accident.
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Figure 6-20: Human failure frequency in Timing and Sequence based on each type of accident, its
phase and cognition stage

In more specific, fire in which started in the cardeck is the condition where the fire
fighting action failed. In case no. 13, the crew action to put out the fire was
considered too late since the emergency response time required extra effort to access
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the origin of fire. The issues in timing and sequence commonly on the factor action
too late and as a result of confusion, forget long-term training and procedures,
expectation bias, distraction.
Failure in Quality and Selection also found as the most frequent condition in
domestic ferry accident. Along with the failure observed in factor timing and
sequence, the failures in Quality and Selection also found to took place mostly
during emergency response action under phase-2 of fire type accident that also
related with more human failure observed during evacuation action under phase-3 for
same type of accident (Figure 6-21).
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Figure 6-21: Human failure frequency in Selection and Quality based on each type of accident, its
phase and cognition stage

Most cases of fire shows that the crew unable to identify exactly and reach the source
of fire. Hence, the action taken was considered too little and some other actions also
indicate that the action taken was in wrong direction. In most of the fire accidents
reviewed that resulted in severe loss or total loss, the human failure took place
mostly due to lack of training, factor of confusion, distraction, and missee.
From the discussion above, it become obvious that factor of training is crucial to
prevent the failure. Even the regulation required the ship to perform regular safe drill
and training onboard more than other type of ship, apparently there are significant
issues in how the drill was conducted. Some information in the investigation reports
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mentioned that the drill conducted was based on formality to satisfy the requirement
and not reflecting actual condition such as difficulties in fire fighting in cardeck.
6.2.2 Equipment failure
Failure in equipment is observed to be less compare to the failure of human factor in
term of domestic ferry accident. However, some failures in equipment also
considered significant and contributed more in particular cases.
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Figure 6-22: Equipment failure frequency based on each type of accident, its phase and cognition
stage.

Failure in equipment mostly observed during emergency response action during
phase-2 of fire type accident. Similar like human failure observed during same
category, equipment failure also observed mostly during aspect of timing and
sequence, and also in aspect of selection and quality. The common failed equipment
during fire accident listed as follow:
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Figure 6-23: Failed equipment identified in each stage for each type of accident

The factor of lack of maintenance and not properly installed is the common factor
that influence the performance of the equipment. In case no. 13, the investigation
found that the performance of water sprinkler where fire accident started in the
cardeck was not sufficient to suppress the fire not to spread and developed.
Under equipment failure, SEMOMAP identify that action provided offboard also
found insufficient to assist onboard operation handling the critical situation. In most
of the accident, investigation found that readiness of the SAR to provide assistance is
found improper. In particular for fire cases, the shore based response was not
considered too late due to location of the accident (NTSC, 2008).
Failure during evacuation action also observed in condition that the life jacket was
not accessible and the life raft could not be released (NTSC, 2009). Both condition
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was also contribute to the fact that fatalities were not as a result of fire but caused by
drowning while evacuating from the ship (NTSC, 2008).

6.3

Risk mitigated or continued to develop?

One of the key finding is the SEMOMAP also records successful action during
accident development step. The percentage of successful action compare to the failed
action is remained high (refer to the Table 0-74). However, the accident continuously
to develop into further extent. From this condition, despite series of successful
action, risk in shipboard operation only needs a single failure to develop into greater
event such as accident.
A correct action in handling a risky situation can provide an opportunity for the
shipboard operation to maintain the whole safe operation of the ship. This requires
total effort from the capable and qualified crew, supported by proper and sufficient
onboard resources.
From review of the selected cases, the SEMOMAP outcome can be used to do
benchmarking/comparison between saved operations with events of total loss. The
variety of the selected cases also supports the comparison process. To observe this
matter; fire cases of No. 4 and No. 12 are taken as examples (refer to Table 0-73).
The chart below was developed by observing every single accident assessment
process(Loop) to provide a comparison of the cognitive processes in both cases. In
each loop the SEMOMAP observed each shipboard performance and identified the
failure in every stage of cognition. Each case shows different onboard behaviour in
dealing with the fire situation onboard. The loop was generated based on the
information stated in the accident reports..
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Figure 6-24: Comparison of accident process for fire case no. 4 (below the line) and case no. 12
(above the line) during phase-1 and phase-2 of accident development

From the charts above, failures were observed during phase-1 which led to the event
of fire (Figure 6-24). However, significant differences can be seen when the event
proceeds to phase-2. From the loop chart of case no. 12, failures were observed
during the initial loop; however, they stopped for next loops. Case no. 4 shows the
opposite. Failures (indicated by red bars) were identified in every loop of cognition,
which was mainly during execution of action taken to reduce or mitigate the effect
after the fire occurred (Figure 6-24). SEMOMAP data indicates that failure in action
occurred mostly in terms of timing and sequence and also selection and quality.
In case no. 12, the fire was spotted in the main engine no. 2. Some initial action was
taken to put out the fire. But the first effort failed. The chief engineer later ordered
the crew to evacuate from the engine room and to close all engine room connected
openings (doors, blower etc). When all order been complied with, the chief engineer
initiated the CO2 system to stop the fire and the action was successful (NTSCa,
2012). Despite some failures in the main engine no. 2 due to lack of maintenance and
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support from the company, the crew managed to mitigate the risk of fire and contain
the damaged into a more controllable area (engine room).
In contrast, Case No.4 shows the opposite outcome. Similar contributing factors were
observed compared to Case No. 6. The indicator was obvious to provide sufficient
information about the fire. However, when the fire broke out in main engine no.2, the
crew experienced difficulties locating the origin the fire. Lack of vigilance and
awareness of the condition added to lack of training creates difficulties for the crew
to put out the fire. On the other hand, the investigation also found malfunctions in the
fixed fire extinguisher system. As a result, the fire could not be controlled and
continued to spread.
From comparison above, there are factor to consider in successful operation to
mitigate risk or threat not to develop into greater event. Failure is should not be
existed in every stage of cognition since it affecting the other stage, which might also
amplify the failure in the next cognitive stage. Obviously it requires effort and high
degree of crew performance to keep the operation safe. Crew concentration and
ability to assess the situation also significant to prevent the failure develop. This can
be done by providing continuous training and familiarisation to the crew, better
working system and environment.

6.4

Comparison with the original report of the domestic ferry safety

For the same investigation reports, NTSC issued a compilation of the results of the
main causal factors in the domestic ferry accidents. In classifying the final
contributing factor, the NTSC focused on the two main categories of human and
technical factors, without further detail of description.
From a total of 16 ropax ferry accidents, 12 were stated to have been contributed by
technical factors, whereas 4 were contributed by human factors. The SEMOMAP
results highlighted the outcome of human factors, which contributed significantly to
most of the accidents.
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There are many factors to explain why the result is different. The investigation
reports mainly exclude the complexity of socio-technical relations and tend to be
descriptive instead of analytic. The investigations also place too much focus on the
main causal factor, without extending the analysis deeper into the consequence of the
accident or action taken during the emergency situation.
As explain in the chapter 4, the nature of the investigation models is different
compare to the critical thinking utilised in the accident causation models. While the
investigation model tends to simplify the information into more general readers
consumption, the accident causation models provide details for further analysis.
By this condition mentioned above, the outcome of the SEMOMAP has deviated
from the original statement of fact issued by the particular organisation.

6.5

Area of concern

6.5.1 Data availability
The SEMOMAP relies mainly on the sufficiency of data provided in accident
investigation reports. It is nearly impossible to reinvestigate since the occurrence
happened in past time. Hence, additional data from different sources that are
considered appropriate and supportive are acquired, for instance, data from the
Indonesian Marine

Tribunal verdicts

to

the cases

used.

However, the

comprehensiveness of the SEMOMAP in providing detailed information also
requires some logical assumption, which at some point could lead to different
outcomes and interpretations.
On the other hand, SEMOMAP model outcome is found so comprehensive so it can
be used to analysis to the sufficiency of information in the investigation report.
6.5.2 Comments on utilising the models
When it tracing back the outcome of the models, the validity of the results is required
high level of concentration and consistency during coding of the cases. The
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interpretation of the SEMOMAP model also relies to the punctuality of the user
when selecting the taxonomy.
In addition, the data input is mainly relies onto the comprehensiveness of the
investigation reports. On the other side, the overall knowledge possessed by the user
is also contributes significantly to the carefulness of the factors selection. The user is
required to have sufficient background on the ship operation and human factor
concept. In addition, the user is also required to obtain sufficient knowledge in
accident causation model and investigation and also not limited to the human factor
behaviour in the accident process.
During the dissertation, the analysis conducted to the selected accident where the
event is obvious. The writer found some critical condition is not covered specifically
within the model. Therefore the Other type of factor is become more favourable to
select. To provide better validation to the model, continuous development is
required. In addition, it strongly recommended utilise near miss data to see which
area within the accident that not covered.
6.5.3 Issues in the models
Outcome of the model
The SEMOMAP able provide massive and useful data for identification of the issues
in every phase of accident. There are many of details in the outcome that can lead to
multiple interpretations. However, the SEMOMAP outcome considered as raw data
that requires additional works to filter and analyse it.
In future, it is recommended to develop a better SEMOMAP outcome and summary
so confusion and extra works in interpreting the results could be avoided.
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7

Conclusion and recommendation

The SEMOMAP data and analysis described in previous chapter is proven how
systemic process is considered of importance to sufficiently reveal the causal factor
that lies in the domestic ferry operation. Data from investigation report has been
scrutinised to identified missing information that later combined with other
references to acquired complete pictures on the safety issues in domestic ferry
operation.
The data shows that different type of accident is also contributed by different
behaviour of the system applied to prevent the accident.

7.1

Conclusion

Accident in any nature and condition shows multiple and complex interaction among
elements of shipboard operation for both shore side and onboard side.
The domestic ferry in a developing country such as Indonesia recognised as the
major backbone to support socio-economic activity and more over provide access to
the remote areas, thus maintain the nation‘s integration. Therefore, safety level of the
domestic ferry operation should be maintained and improve.
Review to the 16 different type of accident investigation report has provided
significant finding in how the safety issues exist in the domestic ferry operation. The
identified factors as mentioned in the chapter 6 indicate the trend and pattern how
accident develops from earliest stage of the operation.
Despite difference type of accident, there are similarities of identified contributory
factor that contribute to the escalation of risk in domestic ferry accident. Under
organisational influence, factor of poor equipment/facilities resources should have
more attention to deal with since it is the common issues identified in the domestic
ferry accident in Indonesia. Under Supervision category, poor shipborne and shore
supervision, factor of poor shipborne operations and shipborne related shortcomings
are the key issues that increased the risk in domestic ferry operation.

131

From the analysis to the outcome of the SEMOMAP to the ferry accident, there are
some significant points to mention that the human performance play major role in the
operation of the domestic ferries. Issues in the execution of the selected action found
to be the most prominent issues. When it related to the contributory factors, lack of
training is the significant factors while it also contributed by other factors such as
lack of proper equipment due to non-supportive shore based management.
The difference of outcome of the cases has shown and provides examples in how the
accident could have been prevented and at least mitigated to stop further extent.
The SEMOMAP development managed to provide complex but comprehensive
pictures how the accident developed and up to which stage where it considered as the
most significant point.

7.2

Recommendation

Following the identified contributing factors under the SEMOMAP models, there is
no single or individual works can be done itself to mitigate all issues. Join work and
comprehensive cooperation among the domestic ferry stakeholders required with
main objective to improve overall ferry safety performance.
Obviously, following the findings to the failures of human factors, extensive work to
improve human performance and competencies particularly in assessing the analysis
and performance in handling the critical situation are required and should have been
come to highest concern by all related parties.
Obviously to prevent the recurrence, the preventive measures should not be placed
based on each nature, since the accident can happen in any different form and nature.
Database of mishap can be a resourceful reference as benchmark to determine the
trend and identify better on accident development process. It is not surprisingly that
most of the administration had only few data for mishap. Therefore the relevant
authorities and all domestic ferry operators encourage developing a comprehensive
and thorough database system.
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Issues Domestic ferry safety will remain blurry due to lack of international attention
and common approach among interested states. But the problem of lack world level
analysis is not come as itself. Lack of data submitted by the involved states to the
relevant organisation also considered as the other factor involved. Further
enhancement to the database access and update works are required and be developed
to sufficiently understand the current trend of domestic ferry operation.
Further work required to compile more accident report to the SEMOMAP system to
acquire better the outcome of understanding the trend in ferry accident. In will be
beneficiary to use the model for other domestic ferry accident reports from different
region and different condition (regulatory, policy, operational pattern) to seek global
trend in the issues of the operation. By doing so, common approach in reducing the
risk in domestic ropax ferry operation can be developed for mutual benefit
Additionally, a more specific research, such as narrow it to each type of accident and
looking into specific phase, is recommended to observe further trend in the
operation.
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Appendices
Appendix – 1: SEMOMAP Workflow
Phase-0: Iterative process workflow under SEMOMAP models

Figure 0-1: Phase-0 SEMOMAP workflow
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Phase-1: Iterative process workflow under SEMOMAP models
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Figure 0-2: Phase-1 SEMOMAP workflow
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Phase-3: iterative process workflow under SEMOMAP models
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Figure 0-4: Phase-3 SEMOMAP workflow
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Appendix – 2: SEMOMAP v2 Model

Figure 0-5: SEMOMAP v2. The models developed by Schroeder et al (2014) under unpublished release
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Appendix – 3: SEMOMAP taxonomy code book (draft)
The coding developed based on the step by step process following the SEMOMAP
framework. The coding assist the user to acknowledge and identify the definition of
each terminology used in the Model. The code developed based on the each phase of
accident.
Level-1: the main category that contributed directly to the main phase. The definition
used for the taxonomy adopted from HFACS
Level-2: the factors that attributed and support the condition of factor in level-1
Level-3: specific factors that support the factors in level-2
Level-4: dropdown list of specific action
Level-5: more specific selection. Under Contributory Factor L5 covers shipboard
element. Under accident event assessment process, L5 taxonomy comprise list of error
mode based on the TRACEr.
General Information Taxonomy:
The general information contains involved ship‘s administration data, the occurrence
general information and consequence of accident to the ship, cargo/passengers and
environment.
L1
IMO Number
Vessel Name
Vessel type

Vessel Flag State
Classification Society
Keel Laid Year
Built at
Deadweight Ton (DWT)
Ship Length Over All (m)
Ship Beam (m)
Ship Loaded Draft (m)
Ship Height (m)
Date of Occurrence
Time of Occurrence

L2
State the IMO number of the ship
State ship name and its previous name
Classify the type of ship by its functionality to carry its cargo:
GC, Container, Bulk Carrier, Tanker, Passenger, Ro-Ro,
Others
State ship flag at the time of the accident
State the class society the ship was classified under at the time
of the accident
State the keel laid year as indicated in ship certificate
State the location (shipyard, country) the ship built
DWT of the ship
Overall length of the ship
State ship breadth
State the ship draft at the time of the occurrence
state the vertical measure of ship bottom to the upmost deck
State date of occurrence
State time of occurrence by Local time and GMT
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L1
Geographical Occurrence
Location
Type of Occurrence

L2
State the location of the occurrence by its fix gps position and
other geographical reference
Classify nature of accident with following event: Collision,
Grounding, Contact, Fire/explosion, Hull failure, Loss of
control, Ship/equipment damage, Capsize/listing,
Flooding/foundering, Ship Missing, Occupational accident,
Others, Unknown
State number of the fatalities as a result of the accident at the
point and subsequent fatality,
Provide sufficient information of the end consequences to the
ship due to accident,
Brief overview of the occurrence

Number of Fatalities /
Injuries
Consequence to the Ship
Narratives

Taxonomy for Phase-0: Contributory Factors
As mentioned earlier, the taxonomy for Phase 0 was adapted from HFACS. This section
breaks down the HFACS taxonomy, and provides descriptions of what each option. The
taxonomy used for SEMOMAP consists of 4 levels; for brevity, however, the taxonomy
definitions provided in the codebook are only for levels 1, 2 and 3 (1992).
Organisational
Influence
Resource
Management

Organisational
Climate

Organisational
Process

Statutory factor

Failed to Correct
Known Problems

Supervisory
Violations

Supervision

Inadequate
Supervision

Planned Inappropriate
Operations

Preconditions

Environmental
Factors

Crew Condition

Personnel Factors

Unsafe Acts

Erro rs

Viol atio ns

Under the phase-0, SEMOMAP taxonomy provides detail selection of element as
follow:
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Table 0-1: Affected shipboard subject

Subjects Effected by
Influencing Factors
Human Subjects

Category

Details

Captain & Officers

Navigators
Other Crew

Engineers

Technical Subjects

Bridge & Deck

Engine Room

Ship Structure &
Design

Captain
1st/Chief Officer
2nd Officer
3rd Officer
Other Officer
Helmsman
Pilot
AB
Bosun
OS
1st/Chief Engineer
2nd Engineer
Other Engineer
Steering Equipment
Navigation Aids (AIS, ECDIS, Radar,
GPS, etc…)
Communication Equipment
Alarm Panels & System
Main Engine
Auxiliary Engine
Engine Control Panel
Fuel Pumps
Ballast Water Pumps
Generators
Boilers
Hull
Separators

Level-1 Taxonomy:
Table 0-2: Contributory Factor Level-1 definition

Terminology
Organisational
Influence

Supervision
Pre-Condition

Unsafe Acts

Definition
factors in a mishap if the communications, actions, omissions or
policies of upper-level management directly or indirectly affect
supervisory practices, conditions or actions of the operator(s) and result
in system failure, human error or an unsafe situation
a mishap event can often be traced back to the supervisory chain of
command.
factors in a mishap if active and/or latent preconditions such as
conditions of the operators, environmental or personnel factors affect
practices, conditions or actions of individuals and result in human error
or an unsafe situation

Acts are those factors that are most closely tied to the mishap,
and can be described as active failures or actions committed by
the operator that result in human error or unsafe situation
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Level-2 Taxonomy
Taxonomy under Organisational influence
Organisational
Influence
Resource
Management

Organisational
Climate

Organisational
Process

Statutory factor

Table 0-3: Definition for L2 Factor under organisational influence

Parent Level
Organisational
Influence

Terminology
Resource
Management

Organisational
Climate

Organisational
Process

Statutory factors

Definition
factor in a mishap if resource management and/or
acquisition processes or policies, directly or
indirectly, influence system safety and results in poor
error management or creates an unsafe situation
Factor in a mishap if organizational variables
including environment, structure, policies, and
culture influence individual actions and results in
human error or an unsafe situation.
Factor in a mishap if organizational processes such as
operations, procedures, operational risk management
and oversight negatively influence individual,
supervisory, and/or organizational performance and
results in unrecognized hazards and/or uncontrolled
risk and leads to human error or an unsafe situation
Considered as external factor that mostly on the
policy and regulatory side

Taxonomy under supervision
Supervision

Inadequate
Supervision

Failed to Correct
Known Problems

Planned Inappropriate
Operations

Supervisory
Violations

Table 0-4: Definition for L2 Factor under Supervision

Parent Level
Supervision

L-2:
Terminology
Inadequate
supervision

Planned
inappropriate
operation

Definition
factor in a mishap when supervision proves
inappropriate or improper and fails to identify a
hazard, recognize and control risk, provide guidance,
training and/or oversight and results in human error
or an unsafe situation
factor in a mishap when supervision fails to
adequately assess the hazards associated with an
operation and allows for unnecessary risk. It is also a
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Parent Level

L-2:
Terminology

Failure in
correct known
problem

Supervisory
violation

Definition
factor when supervision allows non-proficient or
inexperienced personnel to attempt missions beyond
their capability or when crew or flight makeup is
inappropriate for the task or mission.
factor in a mishap when supervision fails to correct
known deficiencies in documents, processes or
procedures, or fails to correct inappropriate or unsafe
actions of individuals, and this lack of supervisory
action creates an unsafe situation.
factor in a mishap when supervision, while managing
organizational assets, wilfully disregards instructions,
guidance, rules, or operating instructions and this
lack of supervisory responsibility creates an unsafe
situation.

Taxonomy under Precondition
Preconditions

Environmental
Factors

Crew Condition

Personnel Factors

Table 0-5: Definition for L2 Factor under Precondition

Parent Level
Pre Condition

L-2:
Terminology
Condition of
Individual

Environmental
Factor

Personal Factor

Definition
Factors in a mishap if cognitive, psycho-behavioural,
adverse physical state, or physical/mental limitations
affect practices, conditions or actions of individuals
and result in human error or an unsafe situation.
factors in a mishap if physical or technological
factors affect practices, conditions and actions of
individual and result in human error or an unsafe
situation
factors in a mishap if self-imposed stressors or crew
resource management affects practices, conditions or
actions of individuals, and result in human error or an
unsafe situation

Taxonomy under Unsafe Acts
Unsafe Acts

Erro rs

Viol atio ns
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Table 0-6: Definition for L2 Factor unsafe Act

Parent Level
Unsafe Acts

L-2:
Terminology
Errors

Violations

Definition
Factors in a mishap when mental or physical
activities of the operator fail to achieve their intended
outcome as a result of skill-based, perceptual, or
judgment and decision making errors, leading to an
unsafe situation
Factors in a mishap when the actions of the operator
represent wilful disregard for rules and instructions
and lead to an unsafe situation. Unlike errors,
violations are deliberate.

Level-3 Taxonomy
Taxonomy under resource management
Resource
Management

Poor Equipment/
Facility Resources
 Inadequate safe
manning
 Selection
 Training

Poor Technological
Resources

Poor Equipment/
Facility Resources

 Excessive cost cutting
 Financial resources/
support

 Engineer support
 Acquisition policies/
design process
 Attrition policies
 Accession/ selection
policies
 Poor engine-room
design
 Poor engine-room
machinery design
 Purchasing of
unsuitable equipment
 Failure to correct
known design flaws
 Shortage of tools

Table 0-7: Definition for L3 Factor under Resource Management

Parent Level
Resource
Management

L-3: Terminology
Lack of human
resource
Poor technological
resources

Poor
equipment/facility

Definition
Issues that directly influence safety include
selection (including background checks),
training, and staffing/manning
Are factors in a mishap when ship design
factors or automation affect the actions of
individuals and result in human error or an
unsafe situation
issues related to equipment design, including
the purchasing of unsuitable equipment,
inadequate design of workspaces, and failures
to correct known design flaws
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Taxonomy under organisational climate
Org anisati onal
Climate

Disorgani sed Struct ure

Policies

 Chain-of-command
 Communication
 Accessibil ity/ visibilit y
of supervi sor
 Del egation of
aut hority/ rigidity
 Formal accountabil ity
for actions

 Promot ion
 Hiring, firing and
retention
 Drugs and alcohol
 Accident and incident
investigation

Poor Work Culture

 Norms and rules
 Organisat ional
customs, beliefs and
at titudes
 Safety as a value

Table 0-8: Definition for L3 Factor under Organisational Climate

Parent Level
organizational
climate

L-3: Terminology
Disorganised
Structure

Inadequate
Policies

Poor Work
Culture

Definition
a factor when the chain of command of an
individual or structure of an organization is
confusing, non-standard or inadequate and this
creates an unsafe situation
A course or method of action that guides present
and future decisions. Policies may refer to hiring
and firing, promotion, retention, raises, sick leave,
drugs and alcohol, overtime, accident
investigations, use of safety, equipment, etc. When
these policies are ill-defined, adversarial, or
conflicting, safety may be reduced
a factor when explicit/implicit actions, statements
or attitudes of unit leadership set unit/organizational
values (culture) that allow an
environment where unsafe mission demands or
pressures exist
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Taxonomy under Organisational Process
Org anisati onal
Pro cess

Poorly Desi gned
Operat ion

 Operat ional tempo/
workload
 Incentives
 Time pressure
 Schedules

Inappropriat e
Procedures
 Performance
standards
 Clearl y defi ned
objectives
 Procedural guidance/
publicat ions
 Informational
resources/ support

Lack of Oversight

 Doctrine
 Established safety
programmes/ risk
management
programmes
 Monitoring and
check ing of
resources, climate
and processes to
ensure safe work
environment

Table 0-9: Definition for L3 Factor under Organisational Process

Parent Level
Organisational
Process

L-3: Terminology
Poorly designed
operation

Inappropriate
procedures

Lack of oversight

Definition
a factor when the potential risks of a large program,
operation, acquisition or process are not adequately
assessed and this inadequacy leads to an unsafe
situation.
a factor when written direction, checklists, graphic
depictions, tables, charts or other published
guidance is inadequate, misleading or inappropriate
and this creates an unsafe situation
a factor when programs are implemented without
sufficient support, oversight or planning and this
leads to an unsafe situation

Taxonomy under statutory factor
Statutory factor

Poor International/
National Standards

Inadequate Flag State
Implementation
 Link with vessel/
company
 Delegation of
authority to RO
 Class and statutory
surveys
 Communication

 Rule-making process
 Regulations

Table 0-10: Definition for L3 Factor under Statutory Factor

Parent Level
Statutory

L-3: Terminology
Poor

Definition

Factor that inadequate standards and regulations
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factor

international/
national standards
Inadequate flag
state
implementation

cause an unsafe condition or situation
Factor in a mishap if the implementation of the
flag state such as audit/survey/enforcement
considered insufficient so it create unsafe
condition

Taxonomy under Inadequate Supervision
Inadequate Supervision

Poor Shipborne and Shore
Supervision
















Leadership/ supervision/ oversight inadequate
Supervision - modelling
Local training issues/ programmes
Supervision - policy
Supervision - personality conflict
Supervision - lack of feedback
Failed to provide current public/ adequate technical data or procedures
Failed to provide adequate rest period
Lack of accountability
Perceived lack of authority
Failed to track qualifications
Failed to track performance
Over-tasked/ untrained officer at management level
Loss of supervisory situational awareness
Lack of communication with company representatives

Table 0-11: Definition for L3 Factor under Inadequate Supervision

Parent Level
Inadequate
supervision

L-3: Terminology
Poor shipborne
and shore
supervision

Definition
a factor when the availability, competency, quality or
timeliness of leadership, supervision or oversight does
not meet task demands and creates an unsafe situation
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Taxonomy under planned inappropriate operations
Planned Inappropriate Operations

Poor Shipborne Operations











Ordered/led maintenance beyond capability
Poor crew interaction
Limited recent experience
Limited total experience
Proficiency
Lack of risk assessment - formal
Authorised unnecessary hazard
Failed to provide adequate brief time / supervision
Failed to provide adequate opportunity for crew rest
Excessive tasking/ loading

Table 0-12: Definition for L3 Factor under planned inappropriate operations

Parent Level
Planned
inappropriate
operations

L-3: Terminology
Poor shipborne
operations

Definition
a factor in a mishap when supervision fails to
adequately assess the hazards associated with an
operation and allows for unnecessary risk

Taxonomy under failed to correct problems
Failed to Correct
Known Problems
Shipborne Related
Shortcomings








Failed to correct inappropriate/risky behaviour
Failed to correct a safety hazard
Failed to initiate corrective action
Failed to report unsafe tendencies
Failed to update manual
Parts / tools incorrectly labeled

Table 0-13: Definition for L3 Factor under Failed to correct known problems

Parent Level
Failed to
correct known
problems

L-3: Terminology
Shipborne related
shortcomings

Definition
a factor when the supervisor selects an individual
who‘s experience for either a specific manoeuvre,
event or scenario is not sufficiently current to permit
safe mission execution.
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Taxonomy under supervisory violations
Supervisory
Violations
 Shipborne Violations







Engaged unqualified crew
Failed to enforce rules/regs
Violated procedures
Willful disregard of authority
Inadequate documentation

Table 0-14: Definition for L3 Factor under Supervisory violations

Parent Level
Supervisory
violations

L-3: Terminology
Shipborne
violations

Definition

Is a factor in a mishap when supervision while
managing organizational assets wilfully disregards
instructions, guidance, rules, or operating
instructions and this lack of supervisory
responsibility creates an unsafe situation

Taxonomy under supervisory violations
Environ me nta l Facto rs

Poor Physical Environment

Poor Technological Environment






















 Temperature - thermal stress
 Artificial light
 Vibration
 Ship movements and manoeuv res
 Tox ins and cleanliness in machinery
space
 Noise i nterference

Controls and switches
Automati on
Machinery space layout
Communication equi pment
Barriers
Faulty equipment
Const rained tool use
Complex faul t
Inaccessible maintenance area
Machinery space configuration variabi lity
Parts unavai lable
Parts i ncorrect ly labeled
Easy to instal l incorrectly
Machinery space system knowledge
Procedure not understandable
Procedure unavailable/ inaccessibl e
Incorrect procedure
Too much/ conflicting information
Process/ procedure update not carried out
Incorrectly modified manufacturer's
procedures

Table 0-15: Definition for L3 Factor under Environmental Factors

Parent Level
Environmental
factors

L-3: Terminology
Poor physical
environmental

Definition
Physical environment are factors in a mishap if
environmental phenomena such as weather, climate,
white-out or dust-out conditions affect the actions of
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Parent Level

L-3: Terminology

Poor
technological
environment

Definition
individuals and result in human error or an unsafe
situation
Technological environment are factors in a mishap
when cockpit/vehicle/workspace design factors or
automation affect the actions of individuals and result
in human error or an unsafe situation

Taxonomy under crew condition
Crew Cond itio n

Negative Cognitiv e Factors




























Poor Physiological State

 Effects of PoM and OTC (Medicinal
Drugs)
 Operat ional injury/ illness
 Sudden incapacitation/
unconsciousness
 Physical fatigue
 Seasickness
 Hypoxia
 Hyperventilat ion
 Dehydration
 Physical t ask oversaturation
 Intoxication
 Nutrit ion
 Inadequate rest
 Unreported disqualified medical
condition
 Overexcertion while off duty
 Misplaced motivation
 Inadequate mot ivation
 Pre-exist ing physical illness/ injury/
defi ci ent
 Motor skill/ coordinat ion or timing
defi ci ent
 Insufficient reaction time

Inattention, repet itive and monotonous
Channelised at tention
Confusion
Distracti on
Check list interference
Emotional st ate
Personality styl e
Overconfidence
Pressing
Complacency
Overagressiv e
Excessi ve motivation to succeed
Get-there-itis
Response set
Burnout
Fatigue - mental
Circadian rhy thm desynchrony
Misperception of operational condition
Misinterpreted/ mi sread instrument
Expectancy
Auditory cues
Other cues
Al ert ness (drowsi ness)
Peer pressure
Technical/procedural knowledge
Negative transfer

Table 0-16: Definition for L3 Factor under Crew Condition

Parent Level
Crew
condition

L-3: Terminology
Negative
cognitive factors

Poor
physiological
state

Definition
Are factors in a mishap if cognitive or attention
management conditions affect the perception or
performance of individuals and result inhuman error or
an unsafe situation
Are factors when an individual‘s personality traits,
psychosocial problems, psychological disorders or
inappropriate motivation creates an unsafe situation
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Taxonomy under personnel factors
Personnel Factors

Poor Crew Interaction

Poor Personal Readiness

 Machinery space leadership
 Cross-monitoring performance
 Team work delegation
 Rank gradient/power distance
 Assertiveness
 Communicating critical
information
 Challenge and reply
 Maintenance plan
 Maintenance plan briefing
 Task-in-progress re- planning
 Miscommunication






Inadequate training
Maintenance task knowledge
Time constraints
Pattern of poor risk judgment

Table 0-17: Definition for L3 Factor under Personnel Factors

Parent Level
Personnel
factors

L-3: Terminology
Poor crew
interaction

Poor personal
readiness

Definition
Refer to interactions among individuals, crews, and
teams involved with the preparation and
execution of a mission that resulted in human error or
an unsafe situation
factors in a mishap if the operator demonstrates
disregard for rules and instructions that govern the
individuals readiness to perform, or exhibits poor
judgment when it comes to readiness and results in
human error or an unsafe situation
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Taxonomy under errors
Errors

Decision and judgement
errors

Skill-based errors













Inadvertent use of
equipment, control and
switches
Task overloadFailure to
see and avoid
Distraction
Poor techniques/
seamanshipOver/
under-control of the
system
Over-reliance on
automation
Negative habit
Checklist error
Omitted step in
procedure
Procedures not used
Failed to prioritise
attention








Risk assessment during
operation
Task misprioritisation
Necessary action –
rushed
Necessary action –
delayed
Warning ignored
Wrong decision making
during operation

Perceptual errors




Error due to
misperception
Error due to misjudged
parameters

Table 0-18: Definition for L3 Factor under Errors

Parent Level
Errors

L-3: Terminology
Skilled based
errors

Decision and
judgement errors

Perceptual errors

Definition
Are factors in a mishap when errors occur in the
operator‘s execution of a routine, highly
practiced task relating to procedure, training or
proficiency and result in an unsafe a situation
Are factors in a mishap when behaviour or actions of
the individual proceed as intended yet the
chosen plan proves inadequate to achieve the desired
end-state and results in an unsafe situation
Are factors in a mishap when misperception of an
object, threat or situation, (such as visual,
auditory, pro prioceptive, or vestibular illusions,
cognitive or attention failures, etc), results in
human error
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Taxonomy under violations
Violations

Routine









Exceptional




Violation based on risk
assessment
Inadequate briefing for job
Operated when
unauthorised
Violated training rules
Failed to comply with
manuals
Violated standing orders
and regs
Failed to inspect after
alarm




Exceeded limits of system
Accepted unnecessary
hazards
Not qualified
Unauthorised to operate
beyond design criteria

Table 0-19: Definition for L3 Factor under Violations

Parent Level
Violations

L-3: Terminology
Routine

Exceptional

Definition
a factor when a procedure or policy violation is
systemic in a unit/setting and not based on a risk
assessment for a specific situation. It needlessly
commits the individual, team, or crew to an unsafe
course-of-action. These violations may have leadership
sanction and may not routinely result in
disciplinary/administrative action. Habitual violations
of a single individual or small group of individuals
within a unit can constitute a routine/widespread
violation if the violation was not routinely disciplined
or was condoned by supervisors
a factor when an individual, crew or team intentionally
violates procedures or policies without cause or need.
These violations are unusual or isolated to specific
individuals rather than larger groups. There is no
evidence of these violations being condoned by
leadership
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Taxonomy for phase-1: Risk of Accident
Risk Of Accident

Navigational
Incidents

Onboard
Incidents

'Entire-Vessel'
Incidents

Personnel
Incidents

Phase I under navigational incidents
Threat Indication

Threat Detection

Threat Analysis

Table 0-20: Taxonomy for threat indication under navigational incidents

L2B

L2C

L2D

Equipment

Threat Indication

Onboard

Human

Equipment
Ashore
Human

L2E
Radar
Echo Sounder
AIS
ECDIS
Sea Charts
GPS
Other
Lookout
OOW
Other Crew Member
Passenger
Other
Foghorn
Lighthouse
Bouy/Navigational Aid
Other
VTS
Coastguard
Other
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Preventive Action

Table 0-21: Taxonomy for threat detection under navigational incidents

Threat Detection

L2B

L2C

L2D
Equipment

Onboard
Human
Ashore

Human

L2E
Decision Support System
Other
Master
OOW
Other
VTS
Other

Table 0-22: Taxonomy for threat analysis under navigational incidents

Threat Analysis

L2B

L2C

L2D
Equipment

Onboard
Human
Ashore

Human

L2E
Decision Support System
Other
Master
OOW
Other
VTS
Other

Table 0-23: Taxonomy for threat prevention action under navigational incidents

Threat Prevention
Action

L2B

L2C

L2D

Onboard

Action

Offboard

Action

L2E
Steering & Maneuvering
Altering Speed
Dropping Anchor
Reverse Thrust
Other
Other Vessel Alters Course
Other Vessel Alters Speed
Other

Taxonomy for On-board incidents
Table 0-24: Taxonomy for threat indication under Onboard incidents

Threat Indication

L2B

L2C

L2D

Equipment
Onboard
Human

L2E
Fire Alarm System
Heat Detector
Smoke Detector
CCTV & Cameras
Other
Lookout
OOW/EOW
Other Crew Member
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L2B

L2C

L2D

Equipment
Ashore
Human

L2E
Passenger
Other
Fleet Monitoring System
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other

Table 0-25: Taxonomy for threat detection under Onboard incidents

Threat Detection

L2B

L2C

L2D
Equipment

Onboard
Human
Ashore

Human

L2E
Decision Support System
Other
Master
OOW/EOW
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other

Table 0-26: Taxonomy for threat analysis under Onboard incidents

L2B

L2C

L2D

Threat Analysis

Equipment
Onboard
Human
Equipment
Ashore
Human

L2E
Decision Support System
Other
Master
OOW
Other
Fleet Monitoring System
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other

L2B

L2C

L2D

Threat Prevention

Table 0-27: Taxonomy for threat prevention action under Onboard incidents

Onboard

Action

L2E
Cut off oxygen supply to flammable area
Close fire doors
Move flammable goods to safe place
Reduce heat
Shut down engine
Shut down affected systems
Other
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Type of risk under 'Entire-Vessel' Incidents
Table 0-28: Taxonomy for threat indication under 'Entire-Vessel' Incidents

L2B

L2C

L2D

Threat Indication

Equipment
Onboard
Human

Equipment
Ashore
Human

L2E
Alarms & Warning
Stability Indicators
Water Level Indicators
CCTV & Cameras
Other
Lookout
OOW
Other Crew Member
Passenger
Other
Fleet Monitoring System
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other

Table 0-29: Taxonomy for threat detection under 'Entire-Vessel' Incidents

L2B

L2C

L2D

Threat Detection

Equipment
Onboard
Human
Equipment
Ashore
Human

L2E
Decision Support System
Other
Master
OOW
Other
Fleet Monitoring System
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other

Table 0-30: Taxonomy for threat analysis under 'Entire-Vessel' Incidents

L2B

L2C

L2D

Threat Analysis

Equipment
Onboard
Human
Equipment
Ashore
Human

L2E
Decision Support System
Other
Master
OOW
Other
Fleet Monitoring System
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other
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Table 0-31: Taxonomy for threat prevention action under 'Entire-Vessel' Incidents

Threat
Prevention
action

L2B

L2C
Onboard

L2D

L2E
Altering Speed
Stabilize & Secure Cargo
Seal Hull Compartments
Other

Action

Taxonomy for phase-2: The Accident
Accident

Navigational
Inci dents

Onb oard
Inci dents

'Entire-Vessel'
Inci dents

Per son nel
Inci dents

Phase-2 Taxonomy for Navigational Incidents
System Health
Indication

System Health
Detection

System Health
Analysis

Table 0-32: Taxonomy for system health indication under Navigational Incidents

System Health Indication

L2B

L2C

L2D

Equipment
Onboard
Human

Equipment
Ashore
Human

L2E
Hull Damage Sensors
List Indicators
Water Level Indicators
Stability Indicators
Other
OOW
Other Crew Member
Passenger
Other
Fleet Monitoring System
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other

L2B

L2C

System
Health
Detectio
n

Table 0-33: Taxonomy for system health detection under Navigational Incidents

Onboard

L2D
Equipment
Human

L2E
Decision Support System
Other
Master
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Emergency
Action

L2B

L2C

L2D

Equipment
Ashore
Human

L2E
OOW
Other
Fleet Monitoring System
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other

Table 0-34: Taxonomy for system health analysis under Navigational Incidents

System Health Analysis

L2B

L2C

L2D
Equipment

Onboard
Human
Equipment
Ashore
Human

L2E
Decision Support System
Other
Master
OOW
Other
Fleet Monitoring System
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other

Table 0-35: Taxonomy for emergency response under Navigational Incidents

Emergency
Response

L2B

L2C

L2D

Onboard

Action

Offboard

Action

L2E
Contain Hull Damage
Contain Equipment Damage
Drop Anchor
Reverse Thrust
Other
Tug Vessel
Other

Phase-2 Taxonomy for On-board Incidents
Table 0-36: Taxonomy for system health indication under Onboard Incidents

System Health Indication

L2B

L2C

L2D

Equipment
Onboard
Human

Ashore

Equipment

L2E
Fire Alarm System
Heat Detector
Smoke Detector
CCTV & Cameras
Other
Lookout
OOW/EOW
Other Crew Member
Passenger
Other
Fleet Monitoring System
165

Human

Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other

Table 0-37: Taxonomy for system health detection under Onboard Incidents

System Health
Detection

L2B

L2C

L2D
Equipment

Onboard
Human
Ashore

Human

L2E
Decision Support System
Other
Master
OOW
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other

Table 0-38: Taxonomy for system health analysis under Onboard Incidents

System Health Analysis

L2B

L2C

L2D
Equipment

Onboard
Human
Equipment
Ashore
Human

L2E
Decision Support System
Other
Master
OOW
Other
Fleet Monitoring System
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other

Table 0-39: Taxonomy for emergency response under Onboard Incidents

Emergency Response

L2B

L2C

L2D

Onboard

Action

Offboard

Action

L2E
Fire-fighting
Sprinkler System
Muster Crew
Move flammable goods to safe place
Cut off oxygen supply to flammable area
Close fire doors
Shut down engine
Shut down affected systems
Other
Fire-fighting vessel
Other
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Phase-2 Taxonomy for 'Entire-Vessel' Incidents
Table 0-40: Taxonomy for system health indication under 'Entire-Vessel' Incidents

System Health Indication

L2B

L2C

L2D

Equipment
Onboard
Human

Equipment
Ashore
Human

L2E
Alarms & Warning
Stability Indicators
Water Level Indicators
CCTV & Cameras
Other
Lookout
OOW
Other Crew Member
Passenger
Other
Fleet Monitoring System
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other

Table 0-41: Taxonomy for system health detection under 'Entire-Vessel' Incidents

System Health Detection

L2B

L2C

L2D
Equipment

Onboard
Human
Equipment
Ashore
Human

L2E
Decision Support System
Other
Master
OOW
Other
Fleet Monitoring System
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other

Table 0-42: Taxonomy for system health analysis under 'Entire-Vessel' Incidents

System Health Analysis

L2B

L2C

L2D
Equipment

Onboard
Human
Equipment
Ashore
Human

L2E
Decision Support System
Other
Master
OOW
Other
Fleet Monitoring System
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other
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Table 0-43: Taxonomy for emergency response under 'Entire-Vessel' Incidents

Emergency Response

L2B

L2C

L2D

Onboard

Action

Ashore

Action

L2E
Altering Speed
Stabilize & Secure Cargo
Seal Hull Compartments
Seal Watertight Compartments
Ballast Water Stabilisation
Other
Tug Vessel
Other

Taxonomy for phase-3: Phase III- Evacuation
Emergency response
and evacuation action

System health
Indication

System health detection

System health Analysis

Phase-3 for Navigational Incident
Table 0-44: Taxonomy of Emergency response and evacuation for phase-3 under navigational incident

Emergency Response &
Evacuation

L2B

L2C

L2D

Onboard

Action

Offboard

Action

L2E
Contain Hull Damage
Contain Equipment Damage
Drop Anchor
Reverse Thrust
Lower Lifeboats
Lower MES/Liferafts
Muster Personnel
Other Emergency Response Measure
Other Evacuation Measure
Call Tug Vessel
Call SAR Services
Other

Table 0-45: Taxonomy of system health indication for phase-3 under navigational incident

System Health Indication

L2B

L2C

L2D

Equipment
Onboard
Human

Ashore

Equipment

L2E
Hull Damage Sensors
List Indicators
Water Level Indicators
Stability Indicators
Other
OOW
Other Crew Member
Passenger
Other
Fleet Monitoring System
Other
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Human

Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other

Table 0-46: Taxonomy of system health detection for phase-3 under navigational incident

System Health Detection

L2B

L2C

L2D
Equipment

Onboard
Human
Equipment
Ashore
Human

L2E
Decision Support System
Other
Master
OOW
Other
Fleet Monitoring System
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other

Table 0-47: Taxonomy of system health detection for phase-3 under navigational incident

System Health Analysis

L2B

L2C

L2D
Equipment

Onboard
Human
Equipment
Ashore
Human

L2E
Decision Support System
Other
Master
OOW
Other
Fleet Monitoring System
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other

Onboard Incident
Table 0-48: Taxonomy of Emergency response and evacuation for phase-3 under onboard incident

Emergency Response & Evacuation

L2B

L2C

L2D

Onboard

Action

Offboard

Action

L2E
Fire-fighting
Sprinkler System
Muster Crew
Move flammable goods to safe place
Cut off oxygen supply to flammable area
Close fire doors
Shut down engine
Shut down affected systems
Lower Lifeboats
Lower MES/Liferafts
Muster Personnel
Other Emergency Response Measure
Other Evacuation Measure
Call Fire-fighting vessel
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L2B

L2C

L2D

L2E
Call SAR Services
Other

Table 0-49: Taxonomy of system health detection for phase-3 under Onboard incident

System Health Indication

L2B

L2C

L2D

Equipment
Onboard
Human

Equipment
Ashore
Human

L2E
Fire Alarm System
Heat Detector
Smoke Detector
CCTV & Cameras
Other
Lookout
OOW/EOW
Other Crew Member
Passenger
Other
Fleet Monitoring System
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other

Table 0-50: Taxonomy of system health detection for phase-3 under onboard incident

System Health
Detection

L2B

L2C

L2D
Equipment

Onboard
Human
Ashore

Human

L2E
Decision Support System
Other
Master
OOW
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other

Table 0-51: Taxonomy of system health analysis for phase-3 under onboard incident

System Health Analysis

L2B

L2C

L2D
Equipment

Onboard
Human
Equipment
Ashore
Human

L2E
Decision Support System
Other
Master
OOW
Other
Fleet Monitoring System
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other
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Phase taxonomy for 'Entire-Vessel' Incidents
Table 0-52: Taxonomy of Emergency response and evacuation for phase-3 under 'Entire-Vessel' Incidents

Emergency Response & Evacuation

L2B

L2C

L2D

Onboard

Action

Ashore

Action

L2E
Altering Speed
Stabilize & Secure Cargo
Seal Hull Compartments
Seal Watertight Compartments
Ballast Water Stabilisation
Lower Lifeboats
Lower MES/Liferafts
Muster Personnel
Other Emergency Response Measure
Other Evacuation Measure
Call Tug Vessel
Call SAR Services
Other

Table 0-53: Taxonomy of System health indication for phase-3 under 'Entire-Vessel' Incidents

System Health Indication

L2B

L2C

L2D

Equipment
Onboard
Human

Equipment
Ashore
Human

L2E
Alarms & Warning
Stability Indicators
Water Level Indicators
CCTV & Cameras
Other
Lookout
OOW
Other Crew Member
Passenger
Other
Fleet Monitoring System
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other

Table 0-54: Taxonomy of system health detection for phase-3 under 'Entire-Vessel' Incidents

System Health Detection

L2B

L2C

L2D
Equipment

Onboard
Human
Equipment
Ashore
Human

L2E
Decision Support System
Other
Master
OOW
Other
Fleet Monitoring System
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other
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Table 0-55: Taxonomy of system health analysis for phase-3 under 'Entire-Vessel' Incidents

System Health Analysis

L2B

L2C

L2D
Equipment

Onboard
Human
Equipment
Ashore
Human

L2E
Decision Support System
Other
Master
OOW
Other
Fleet Monitoring System
Other
Fleet Monitoring Centre
Other
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Error Mode for each Phase
Specify whether the step was Applicable and Successful – Level 3A & 3B
This stage firstly breaks down each step into smaller ‗sub-steps‘, as follows:
Step
Indication
Detection

Analysis

Action

Sub-Steps
Information Recording
Information Transmission
Information Receiving
Information Evaluation
Information Transmission
Information Receiving
Planning
Decision Making
Communication
Timing & Sequence
Selection & Quality

Once again, these steps and sub-steps are self-explanatory.
At this stage, the user must determine whether each sub-step was applicable or not. If
it was not applicable (for instance, if the threat indicator and detector are the same
person and there is therefore no transmission or receiving or information; or if there
was no threat detection) the user does not need to answer any more questions, and
can move to the next sub-step or step. Alternatively, if a sub-step was applicable, and
successful, in that case too, the user can move to the next sub-step without going into
further stages of the sub-step.
If, however, a sub-step is applicable, and unsuccessful, the user must answer further
questions, and moves to stage 5.
Note here that successful means success in the context of the sub-step – and not in
the context of the entire accident or incident; a successful action might still be a
wrong action in terms of the accident, but it was ‗successful‘ because in itself, it was
done correctly, but may, for example, have been based on wrong information from
the previous step.
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Specify whether Human or Equipment Failure – Level 4A
If a sub-step was unsuccessful, the user can select in this stage if it was due to human
or equipment failure.
Specify what the Human or Equipment Failure Was – Level 4B
In this level, the user gets to specify what the exact human or equipment failure was.
It depends on the sub-step, and the phase that the user is in. Tables on the following
pages show the possible failures for each possible sub-step as defined in earlier on
this page. This taxonomy is adapted from the TRACEr taxonomy of Kirwan and
Shorrock (2002).
Table 0-56: Possible Failures for Information Recording

No Information Recorded
Unclear Information Recorded
Partial Information Recorded
Wrong Information Recorded
Delay in Information Recorded
Unnecessary Information Recorded

Incorrect Evaluation
Delayed Evaluation
Table 0-60: Possible Failures for Planning

No Planning
Unclear Planning
Partial Planning
Wrong Planning
Delay in Planning
Unnecessary Planning

Table 0-57: Possible Failures for Information
Transmission

No Information Transmitted
Unclear Information Transmitted
Partial Information Transmitted
Wrong Information Transmitted
Delay in Information Transmitted
Unnecessary Information Transmitted

Table 0-61; Possible Failures for Decision
Making

No Decision
Unclear Decision
Partial Decision
Wrong Decision
Delay in Decision

Table 0-58: Possible Failures for Information
Transmission

No Information Received
Unclear Information Received
Partial Information Received
Wrong Information Received
Delay in Information Received
Unnecessary Information Received

Table
0-62:
Communication

Possible

Failures

No Action Information
Provided/Recorded
Unclear Action Information
Provided/Recorded
Partial Action Information
Provided/Recorded
Wrong Action Information
Provided/Recorded
Delay in Action Information

Table 0-59: Possible Failures for Information
Evaluation

No Evaluation
Unclear Evaluation
Partial Evaluation
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for

Provided/Recorded
Unnecessary Action Information
Provided/Recorded
Table 0-63: Possible Failures for Timing &
Sequence

Action too long
Action too short
Action too early
Action too late
Action repeated
Action in wrong sequence
Table 0-64: Possible Failures for Selection &
Quality

Omission
Action too much
Action too little
Action in wrong direction
Wrong action on right object
Right action on wrong object
Wrong action on wrong object
Extraneous act
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In this level, the user gets to specify why the human or equipment made an error or
failed. It depends solely on whether a human or technical subject committed a
failure, regardless of the phase or the step. The taxonomy for this stage too (at least
for the human subjects) is adapted from TRACEr (Kirwan, Shorrock 2002).
The following tables show possible internal error modes for human subjects.
Table 0-65: possible internal error modes for human subjects
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Table 0-66: Possible Failures for decision making, action & violation
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The following tables show the possible respective psychological error modes, also
for human subjects.
Table 0-67: Psychological error modes for human subjects for perception and memory
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Table 0-68: Psychological error modes for human subjects for decision making, action and Intended
violation

With regards to equipment failures, there is no ‗taxonomy‘ per se. However, it is
broadly been identified that an equipment may cause a failure if it is not installed, if
it is turned off, is on the wrong settings, suffers from an electric failure, has a poor
maintenance record, is out-dated technology, has loose connections or unreliable
software. Some of these errors too can be traced back to human mistakes, but
primarily may be considered ‗equipment‘ failure causes.
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Stage of Indication

Information Recording Applicable?

Information Recording Successful? If
not:

Information Transmission Applicable?

Information Transmission Successful? If
not:

Table 0-69: error mode and cognitive process during stage of indication

Equipment Failure - Specify

Human Failure - Specify

Equipment Failure - Specify

Human Failure - Specify

No Threat Information Recorded
Unclear Threat Information Recorded
Partial Threat Information Recorded
Wrong Threat Information Recorded
Delay in Threat Information Recorded
Unnecessary Threat Information Recorded
Correct Threat Information Recorded
No Threat Information Recorded
Unclear Threat Information Recorded
Partial Threat Information Recorded
Wrong Threat Information Recorded
Delay in Threat Information Recorded
Unnecessary Threat Information Recorded
No Threat Information Transmitted
Unclear Threat Information Transmitted
Partial Threat Information Transmitted
Wrong Threat Information Transmitted
Delay in Threat Information Transmitted
Unnecessary Threat Information Transmitted
Correct Threat Information Transmitted
No Threat Information Transmitted
Unclear Threat Information Transmitted
Partial Threat Information Transmitted
Wrong Threat Information Transmitted
Delay in Threat Information Transmitted
Unnecessary Threat Information Transmitted
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Choose a problem based on chosen hardware - e.g. not installed, turned off, wrong settings,
electric failure, poor maintenance record, out-of-date technology, loose connections, unreliable
software

Mis-hear, mis-see, mis-read threat; ignore threat; late detection of threat; forget to monitor for
threat; forget to share information of threat; omitted action

Choose a problem based on chosen Auto. System - e.g. not installed, turned off, wrong settings,
electric failure, poor maintenance record, out-of-date technology, loose connections, unreliable
software

Mis-hear, mis-see, mis-read threat; ignore threat; late detection of threat; forget to monitor for
threat; forget to share information of threat; omitted action

Stage of Detection

Information Receiving Applicable?

Information Receiving Successful? If not:

Information Evaluation
Applicable?

Information Evaluation
Successful? If not:

Information Transmission Applicable?

Information Transmission Successful? If
not:

Table 0-70: error mode and cognitive process during stage of detection

Equipment Failure - Specify

Human Failure - Specify

Equipment Failure - Specify

Human Failure - Specify

Equipment Failure - Specify

Human Failure - Specify

No Threat Information Received
Unclear Threat Information Received
Partial Threat Information Received
Wrong Threat Information Received
Delay in Threat Information Received
Unnecessary Threat Information Received
Correct Threat Information Received
No Threat Information Received
Unclear Threat Information Received
Partial Threat Information Received
Wrong Threat Information Received
Delay in Threat Information Received
Unnecessary Threat Information Received
No Evaluation
Incorrect Evaluation
Delayed Evaluation
Partial Evaluation
Unclear Evaluation
Correct Evaluation
No Evaluation
Unclear Evaluation
Partial Evaluation
Incorrect Evaluation
Delayed Evaluation
No Threat Evaluation Transmitted
Unclear Threat Evaluation Transmitted
Partial Threat Evaluation Transmitted
Wrong Threat Evaluation Transmitted
Delay in Threat Evaluation Transmitted
Unnecessary Threat Evaluation Transmitted
Correct Threat Evaluation Transmitted
No Threat Evaluation Transmitted
Unclear Threat Evaluation Transmitted
Partial Threat Evaluation Transmitted
Wrong Threat Evaluation Transmitted
Delay in Threat EvaluationTransmitted
Unnecessary Threat EvaluationTransmitted

No or incorrect threat indication; Choose a problem based on chosen Auto. System - e.g. not
installed, turned off, wrong settings, electric failure, poor maintenance record, out-of-date
technology, loose connections, unreliable software

No or incorrect threat indication; Mis-hear, mis-see, or mis-read threat indicator; ignore threat
indicator; late detection of threat indicator; forget to monitor threat indicator; forget to ask
information of threat indicator; omitted action

No or incorrect threat indication; Choose a problem based on chosen hardware - e.g. not
installed, turned off, wrong settings, electric failure, poor maintenance record, out-of-date
technology, loose connections, unreliable software

No or incorrect threat indication; Perception Problems (Expectation bias, confusion, discrimation
failure, tunnel vision, overload of information, lack of vigilance, distractions, time pressure, desire
for harmony, group think); Memory Problems (Mis-recall information about threat; prospective
memory failure; forget temporary information; forget long term training & procedures)

Choose a problem based on chosen Auto. System - e.g. not installed, turned off, wrong settings,
electric failure, poor maintenance record, out-of-date technology, loose connections, unreliable
software

Mis-hear, mis-see, mis-read threat; ignore threat; late detection of threat; forget to monitor for
threat; forget to share information of threat; omitted action
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Stage of Analysis

Information Receiving Applicable?

Information Receiving Successful? If
not:

Planning Applicable?

Planning Successful? If not:

Decision Making Applicable?

Decision Successful? If not:

Table 0-71: error mode and cognitive process during stage of analysis

Equipment Failure - Specify

Human Failure - Specify

Equipment Failure - Specify

Human Failure - Specify

Equipment Failure - Specify

Human Failure - Specify

No Threat EvaluationReceived
Unclear Threat Evaluation Received
Partial Threat Evaluation Received
Wrong Threat Evaluation Received
Delay in Threat Evaluation Received
Unnecessary Threat EvaluationReceived
Correct Threat EvaluationReceived
No Threat Evaluation Received
Unclear Threat EvaluationReceived
Partial Threat Evaluation Received
Wrong Threat Evaluation Received
Delay in Threat Evaluation Received
Unnecessary Threat Evaluation Received
No Preventive Planning
Unclear Preventive Planning
Partial Preventive Planning
Wrong Preventive Planning
Delay in Preventive Planning
Unnecessary Preventive Planning
Correct Preventive Planning
No Preventive Planning
Unclear Preventive Planning
Partial Preventive Planning
Wrong Preventive Planning
Delay in Preventive Planning
Unnecessary Preventive Planning
No Decision
Unclear Decision
Partial Decision
Wrong Decision
Delay in Decision
CorrectDecision
No Decision
Unclear Decision
Partial Decision
Wrong Decision
Delay in Decision

No or incorrect threat indication; Choose a problem based on chosen Auto. System - e.g. not
installed, turned off, wrong settings, electric failure, poor maintenance record, out-of-date
technology, loose connections, unreliable software

No or incorrect threat indication; Mis-hear, mis-see, or mis-read threat indicator; ignore threat
indicator; late detection of threat indicator; forget to monitor threat indicator; forget to ask
information of threat indicator; omitted action

No or incorrect threat detection; Choose a problem based on chosen hardware - e.g. not
installed, turned off, wrong settings, electric failure, poor maintenance record, out-of-date
technology, loose connections, unreliable software

No or incorrect threat detection; Perception Problems (Expectation bias, confusion, discrimation
failure, tunnel vision, overload of information, lack of vigilance, distractions, time pressure, desire
for harmony, group think); Memory Problems (Mis-recall information about threat; prospective
memory failure; forget temporary information; forget long term training & procedures)

No or incorrect planning; Choose a problem based on chosen hardware - e.g. not installed,
turned off, wrong settings, electric failure, poor maintenance record, out-of-date technology,
loose connections, unreliable software

No or incorrect planning; Perception Problems (Expectation bias, confusion, discrimation failure,
tunnel vision, overload of information, lack of vigilance, distractions, time pressure, desire for
harmony, group think); Memory Problems (Mis-recall information about threat; prospective
memory failure; forget temporary information; forget long term training & procedures)
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Selection of action

Communication Applicable?

Communication Successful? If not:

Timing & Sequence Applicable?

Timing & Sequence Successful? If not:

Selection & Quality Applicable?

Selection & Quality Successful? If not:

Table 0-72: taxonomy for source of failure, error mode and cognitive process during selection of action

Equipment Failure - Specify

Human Failure - Specify

Equipment Failure - Specify

Human Failure - Specify

Equipment Failure - Specify

Human Failure - Specify

No Action Information Provided/Recorded
Unclear Action Information Provided/Recorded
Partial Action Information Provided/Recorded
Wrong Action Information Provided/Recorded
Delay in Action Information Provided/Recorded
Unnecessary Action Information Provided/Recorded
Correct action communication
No Action Information Provided/Recorded
Unclear Action Information Provided/Recorded
Partial Action Information Provided/Recorded
Wrong Action Information Provided/Recorded
Delay in Action Information Provided/Recorded
Unnecessary Action Information Provided/Recorded
Action too long
Action too short
Action too early
Action too late
Action repeated
Action in wrong sequence
Correct action timing & sequence
Action too long
Action too short
Action too early
Action too late
Action repeated
Action in wrong sequence
Omission
Action too much
Action too little
Action in wrong direction
Wrong action on right object
Right action on wrong object
Wrong action on wrong object
Extraneous act
Correct action selction & quality
Omission
Action too much
Action too little
Action in wrong direction
Wrong action on right object
Right action on wrong object
Wrong action on wrong object
Extraneous act
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No Threat analysis; Choose a problem based on chosen hardware - e.g. not installed, turned off,
wrong settings, electric failure, poor maintenance record, out-of-date technology, loose
connections, unreliable software

No Threat Analysis; Mis-hear, mis-see, mis-read instructions; ignore instructions ; forget to share
instructions; omitted action, Perception Problems (Expectation bias, confusion, discrimation
failure, tunnel vision, overload of information, lack of vigilance, distractions, time pressure, desire
for harmony, group think); Memory Problems (Mis-recall instructions; prospective memory
failure; forget temporary information; forget long term training & procedures)

No Threat analysis; Choose a problem based on chosen hardware - e.g. not installed, turned off,
wrong settings, electric failure, poor maintenance record, out-of-date technology, loose
connections, unreliable software

E.g., Mis-hear, mis-see, mis-read instructions; ignore instructions ; forget to share instructions;
omitted action, Perception Problems (Expectation bias, confusion, discrimation failure, tunnel
vision, overload of information, lack of vigilance, distractions, time pressure, desire for harmony,
group think); Memory Problems (Mis-recall instructions; prospective memory failure; forget
temporary information; forget long term training & procedures)

No Threat analysis; Choose a problem based on chosen hardware - e.g. not installed, turned off,
wrong settings, electric failure, poor maintenance record, out-of-date technology, loose
connections, unreliable software

E.g., Mis-hear, mis-see, mis-read instructions; ignore instructions ; forget to share instructions;
omitted action, Perception Problems (Expectation bias, confusion, discrimation failure, tunnel
vision, overload of information, lack of vigilance, distractions, time pressure, desire for harmony,
group think); Memory Problems (Mis-recall instructions; prospective memory failure; forget
temporary information; forget long term training & procedures)

Appendix – 4: List of selected investigation report into domestic RoPax ferry accidents and incidents
Table 0-73: list of selected Indonesian domestic ferry cases

No

Involved ship/s

1

Indonesian registered ro-ro
passenger ferry MV. Wimala
Dharma

2

Taiwan register container ship
MV. Uni Chart with Indonesian
register ro-ro passenger ferry
MV. Mandiri Nusantara

3

Indonesian registered ro-ro
passenger ferry MV. Digul

4

Indonesian registered ro-ro
passenger ferry MV. Lampung
2006
Indonesian registered ro-ro
passenger ferry MV. Senopati
Nusantara 2006
Indonesian registered Ro-ro
Passenger ferry MV. Nusa
Bhakti
Indonesian registered Ro-ro
Passenger ferry MV. Levina I

5

6

7

Location and
time

Nature of
Accident

Lombok Strait,
Nusa Tenggara
Barat, on 7
September 2003
West Surabaya
traffic lane,
Madura Strait, on
27 September
2003
Off Merauke
coast, Papua, 14
July 2005
Sunda strait, 23
November 2006

Sunk

Java Sea, 29
Desember 2006
Off Buk-buk
Beach, Bali on 13
January 2007
40 Nm northern
Tanjung Priok
Port, Seribu
Island, DKI

Collision

Consequences
Ship/Structure
Passenger
Total Loss
-

Minor damage to the
Bulk Carrier. Partial
damage to the ferry

Capsize/Sunk Total Loss

Engine room
fire

Extensive damage

Capsize/Sunk Total Loss

Engine
Room Fire
Fire
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Partial Damage

Extensive damage to
ship structure

Probable
Cause)*

Other Cargo
Loss of
Vehicle

Technical

Loss of life

-

Human Factor

Loss of life

Loss of
Vehicle

Technical

-

Loss of
Vehicle

Technical

Loss of life

-

Technical

-

-

Technical

Loss of life

Loss of
Vehicle

Technical

No

Involved ship/s

8

Indonesian registered Ro-ro
Passenger ferry MV. Dharma
Kencana I

9

Indonesian registered Ro-ro
Passenger ferry MV. Teratai
Prima

10

Indonesian registered Ro-ro
Passenger ferry MV. Mandiri
Nusantara
Investigation into fire on board
Indonesian registered Ro-ro
Passenger ferry MV. Laut Teduh
2
Indonesian registered Ro-ro
Passenger ferry MV. Salvia
Indonesian registered Ro-ro
Passenger ferry MV. Musthika
Kencana II

11

12
13

14

15

Indonesian registered Ro-ro
Passenger ferry MV. Windu
Karsa
Indonesian registered Ro-ro
Passenger ferry MV. Marina
Nusantara with Indonesian

Location and
time
Jakarta on 22
February 2007
Mentaya Hilir
Selatan river,
West Kalimantan
on 18 May 2008
25 Nm off Parepare, Makassar
Strait, 11 January
2009
Java Sea, on 30
May 2009

Nature of
Accident

Fire

Consequences
Ship/Structure
Passenger

Partial Damage

Capsize/Sunk Total Loss

Other Cargo

Probable
Cause)*

Loss of life

-

Technical

Loss of life

Loss of
Vehicle

Human Factor

Fire

extensive damage

Loss of life

Loss of
Vehicle

Technical

Sunda Strait, on
28 January 2011

Fire

extensive damage

-

-

Technical

Seribu Island, on
08 February 2011
Java Sea, on 04
July 2011

Engine room
fire
Fire

-

-

Technical

-

Loss of
Vehicle

Technical

-

Loss of
Vehicle

Technical

Loss of life

Loss of
Vehicle

Human Factor

Bone Bay, South
east Celebes on
27 August 2011
Barito River, on
26 September
2011

Medium damage in
the engine room
Extensive damage to
ship structure,
subsequently total
loss
Capsize/Sunk Total Loss

Collision
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Minor damage to the
Barge, Extensive
damage to the ferry

No

16

Involved ship/s

Location and
time

Nature of
Accident

registered tugged barge Bg.
Pulau Tiga 330-22
Indonesian registered Ro-ro
Sunda Strait, on
Collision
Passenger ferry MV. Bahuga
26 September
Jaya with Singapore registered
2012
chemical tanker MV. Norgas
Cathinka
*: NTSC summary reports. Data obtained courtesy of NTSC, 2014
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Consequences
Ship/Structure
Passenger
due to fire resulted
from collision
Minor damage to the
Loss of life
Tanker ship, Total
the ferry

Other Cargo

Loss of
Vehicle

Probable
Cause)*

Human Factor

Appendix – 5: SEMOMAP model results compilation data
Table 0-74: the compilation of SEMOMAP result for each phase and each stage to the selected cases
Nature of
Accident
Fire

Phase-1

Phase-2

Phase-3

Threat Indication
Threat Detection
Threat Analysis
Threat Prevention
Action
System Health
Indication
System Health
Detection

7
4
5

52
78
78

5

78

31

21

26

17

4

5

56

38

0

18

0

0

3

84

70

4

10

4

0

System Health Analysis

3

84

68

8

8

8

0

Emergency Response
Action

7

84

43

34

7

26

8

Emergency Response
& Evacuation Action

8

66

42

23

1

17

6

4

44

30

0

14

0

0

4

66

51

0

15

0

0

4

66

51

2

13

2

0

6
5
4

836
60
90
90

544
34
66
51

120
1
7
23

172
25
17
16

100
1
6
23

20
0
1
0

4

90

47

23

20

20

3

2

8

4

0

4

0

0

2

12

10

0

2

0

0

System Health Analysis

1

12

4

6

2

6

0

Emergency Response
Action

1

12

4

8

0

7

1

Emergency Response
& Evacuation Action

4

33

20

13

0

12

1

5

22

15

0

7

0

0

1

33

22

3

8

3

0

System Health Analysis
Phase-1

Phase-2

Phase-3

Total
Threat Indication
Threat Detection
Threat Analysis
Threat Prevention
Action
System Health
Indication
System Health
Detection

System Health
Indication
System Health
Detection
System Health Analysis
Collision

Phase-1

Phase-2

Phase-3

Source of Failure
Human
Equipment
Failure
Failure
6
2
12
0
8
0

Number of
event

Stages

System Health
Indication
System Health
Detection

Capsize

Observable process of fail/safe status
Applicable &
Applicable Not
Not
Successful
Succesfull
Applicable
27
8
17
47
12
19
46
8
24

Number of
Subject

Phase

1

33

14

6

13

6

0

Threat Indication
Threat Detection
Threat Analysis
Threat Prevention
Action
System Health
Indication
System Health
Detection

5
4
4

495
34
51
51

291
25
31
12

90
0
5
23

114
9
15
16

84
0
5
23

6
0
0
0

6

51

35

14

2

10

4

5

18

13

0

5

0

0

4

27

21

1

5

1

0

System Health Analysis

3

27

20

4

3

4

0

Emergency Response
Action

6

27

23

4

0

4

0

Emergency Response
& Evacuation Action

6

18

10

8

0

8

0

4

12

10

0

2

0

0

4

18

14

0

4

0

0

System Health
Indication
System Health
Detection
System Health Analysis
Total

2

18

12

2

4

2

0

352

226

61

65

57

4

188

